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I think you could do a lot worse than lastpass. You could also do better, by sacrificing some usability. On the extreme side, you could use a separate, offline device, just for password storage.

But I don't think it's worth getting excited about a single lastpass bug. Everything is vulnerable. There will be more of them. Chrome itself had 105 security issues, just this year (https://www.cvedetails.com/product/15031/Google-Chrome.html?...) - a few of them potentially leading to your passwords being exposed without any extensions.

Upgrade often, don't do stupid stuff, keep backups, and you'll be more secure than 99% of people. Evaluate your choices from there.

>Everything is vulnerable.

Well, that put it in perspective for me. I just googled the vulnerabilities in offline password managers like Keepass/X and 1Password. And oh man, I was pretty shocked to see even the offline ones could be broken into.

I think I just had a crisis of faith.

>you'll be more secure than 99% of people

Thanks. I guess since I don't store very sensitive info (financial, etc.), and the important services - Google, Github, Atlassian, AWS use 2FA. I guess I don't have to be paranoid.

You need to consider the exploit paths though. Remote or local. With or without user interaction.

I do not use LastPass exactly because of what you describe. I use a KeePass Password safe without autofill. I use other software to sync the file. It used to be Dropbox, later I was using BitTorrent Sync, but what tool sync shouldn't really matter. As I see it: the tool only gets to see and sync an encrypted file. You could even use a USB stick and not sync at all. Or only sync on LANs.

I love it how I get to decide who or what gets to see the encrypted file.

Now hopefully the Keepass audit will not reveal any issues in the encryption.

Similar here, also using KeePass. Fairly happy to sacrifice some of the usability for more control and less "cloud".

Lastpass also only syncs data after it's encrypted locally, so the threat model is the same.

Not entirely, since you download the encryption code way more often (for example, when you open the "Lastpass Vault", which is just a website like any other). Parts of Lastpass are simply a website, not part of the browser extension, and as an avid Lastpass user in all honesty I don't know which parts.

This matters because even if it's client-side encryption, the encryption code just got downloaded when you opened the site so if the server or the network was compromised, you got compromised. [0]

With Keepass, the only time you run that risk is when you download Keepass.

[0] As far as I can tell, this is the core argument of tptacek's "javascript crypto considered harmful" rant (https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/b...). I'm not sure, because it's written worse than his most drunken HN comment, but I believe it is.

I'm pretty sure when using the Chrome extension, all the HTML/JS is downloaded locally once when installing the extension, as logging in via the extension brings you to a chrome-extension:// URL. When logging in via lastpass.com, of course, you will be redownloading the crypto code every time.

Ah, yes, I was assuming the website would be avoided. I didn't realize it was hard to distinguish (I don't personally use LastPass, I prefer Firefox Sync).

You're right about that. The threat model is equal when using Dropbox. It's still different when you use a local LAN share or a USB stick though.

I was hoping for someone to audit, keepass. Lets see what happens.

I'd say some of the points could be easily covered by something like KeePass which, unlike cloud, doesn't have to depend on questionable security of third-party services.

For example. I use KeePass to store all my password. I keep my KeePass database in Google Drive, so any change to the file will be updated. because of that I can use KeePass on any machine that has access to Google Drive (I also keep executables for various systems in drive). Furthermore, there are number of free mobile applications for KeePass which can hook into GDrive and you can use KeePass on the phone too. And lastly - browser extensions which let you use your KeePass to automatically fill & save passwords (I don't use it, though).

Sure, KeePass requires a bit more of an effort compared to all-in-one solutions such as LastPass. That is the price you pay for not thinking about possible security breaches in the cloud.

It's not really very much more effort. I use KeeFox (Firefox) and Keepass2Android (you can guess). I love both tools, they've made password management trivial, and I used to be a die-hard "one password for everything is just so much more convenient" fan.

> I use KeeFox (Firefox)

Integrating with the browser is probably a bad idea, it shortens the exploit path from a webpage to your password store.

Using a standalone application and using the clipboard would require a malicious website to break out of the browser and then break into the password store process, which could in principle run under a different user and interact with the clipboard through some broker process.

Given how broken clipboards are, using a clipboard isn't much more secure. Though, an extension can probably request credentials so it is a trade-off.

How do you sync the two?

I keep the file in Dropbox, Keepass2Android automatically syncs it every time I open the database and merges any conflicts. It's pretty nifty, I've never had a problem.

What you do does seem pretty good.

> 1. I can go to any computer with chrome and get access to all my passwords, so don't have to carry my passwords with me everywhere.

Maybe a computer you can trust but I wouldn't say any computer. I consider the shared PC you'd find in a hotel business center to be the digital equivalent of a diseased hooker. I'd be impressed if it didn't have a key logger installed.

> 2. Don't have to worry about storing passwords properly since lastpass is a good company and they know their stuff about protecting the customers' data.

Not being OSS I don't think that can be proven. It boils down to "Trust us, we're smart".

> I'd like to hear the thoughts of anyone else who uses lastpass and what they think.

Trust noone and put your faith in OSS (KeepassX, pass, etc).

> Maybe a computer you can trust but I wouldn't say any computer. I consider the shared PC you'd find in a hotel business center to be the digital equivalent of a diseased hooker. I'd be impressed if it didn't have a key logger installed.

I think you'll be impressed in a lot of cases than. I would be surprised if more than 15% of shared PCs have keyloggers active on them.

Still doesn't mean i'm going to login to anything on them though.

LastPass does at least provide a convenient on-screen keyboard to foil key loggers.

... to foil cheap keyloggers.

I use Lastpass for work and can't stand it. I use 1Password for personal stuff (and some private work stuff now that I think of it) and highly recommend it. It's got a Chrome browser extension, mobile app, and like someone else mentioned below you can sync the encrypted db to a cloud service (iCloud, Dropbox, etc) so you can access it from all of your devices.

>I use Lastpass for work and can't stand it

I don't mean to be the advice bird, but maybe you can point all the points you made to your superiors and make them re-evaluate their choice. If they're a huge enterprise, then I understand

I work for a company with 3 owners and approximately 40 people. It would be okay but we need the shared 'team' aspects of a password manager -- I could be mistaken but I don't think 1password can handle a team sharing logins. I'm sure there are other options out there.

It even runs on Linux with Wine with browser integration.

That's awesome! Did not know that.

> I've been using LastPass for about 3 years, and now I'm seriously thinking about all the times people told me about how storing passwords in someone else's cloud is bad.

This bug doesn't seem to have anything to do with the cloud.

FTA:

> The bug that allowed me to extract passwords was found in the autofill functionality.

I meant the software as a whole and the fact that there can be vulnerabilities in the browser extension right now.

I have never understood the password manager market honestly. To me it's very obvious that the CONCEPT of a "single point of failure" is a terrible idea. Putting faith in one or the other is just like humans backing politicians, they think they are backing something when really they just got manipulated into an opinion which they slowly defend more and more.

Don't use a password manager, remember your passwords, or reset them all the time. It's a conceptual vulnerability, and if you read hacker news you are better than this.

Are you saying that you remember a unique and sufficiently random password for every website/app/etc you use? If so, you've got a far better memory that me.

Not the GP, but yes, and it doesn't require a good memory. The main things I do:

1. "Salt" my email usernames with the name of the service (johndoe+reddit@example.com)

2. Use multiple (long) password bases depending on the type of service (eg website vs app)

3. Combine the password bases with a cipher/salt based on the service name and my username

I'm guilty of not rotating passwords on a regular basis, however.

So do you use encryption on that combined version? If yes, how do you deal with different requirements (one website says symbols required and more than 8 characters, another says symbols forbidden and less than 8 characters). If no, what stops someone who finds one password from changing the service name part and trying it somewhere else?

No encryption or hashing, since that would require (easy-access to) an external tool and lacks control over length and characters. It's not possible to simply change the "name part" of one of my passwords since the general format looks something like: {password_base}{service_cipher}{username_cipher}{special_chars}.

Depending on the type of service, `password_base` changes. For example, HN uses a separate one from Gmail for Business. Likewise, `service_cipher` and `username_cipher` are simply that: truncated ciphers of the service name and username. Lastly, `special_chars` is used for pesky sites that want special characters outside the range provided by my password base.

I'd like to think my system is very difficult for someone to crack without gaining access to a large number of passwords. The only limitation is that a few sites have limits on password length(!) which requires using a shorter base or even truncating the password entirely.

What about this technique? https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/create-secure-passwords...

The post does point out that this would not work if multifactor authentication is on. I would never dream of using my LastPass account without that anyway.

Like with all decisions this is balancing risk/reward. The reward are all the points you have already expressed that I also love about LastPass. Currently I believe the risk is fairly minimal assuming you use 2 factor-authentication. Though I might turn off autofill now as an extra precaution.

MFA for the end site, not for lastpass. This bug would still have been exploitable with lastpass MFA.

> I'm seriously thinking about all the times people told me about how storing passwords in someone else's cloud is bad.

This was a client-side bug and so surely doesn't depend on the fact that your passwords are 'stored in someone else's cloud'?

i.e. If there was only local storage of passwords this vulnerability would still be there.

(Also worth noting that lastpass encrypts your remote and local store with a key which is presumably only stored hashed and salted on their side)

repeating my other comment: 'I meant the software as a whole and the fact that there can be vulnerabilities in the browser extension right now.'

Consider https://salty.pw/

The idea is good, just not sure about SHA-256...

How do you deal with sites that don't accept the passwords generated by salty?

Good point. Perhaps a modification can be made that is restricted to generally safe characters, then you can add your own stuff as the website demands. Which then leaves you to remember which stuff you need to add, on every site - so not that great.

Or there could be several modes and a database of websites that automatically picks a mode based on the website. Which leaves you remembering modes in the worst case scenario, or trying a few of them out.

I think an acceptable solution can be made by analysing the password requirements of the top N websites, then coming up with a good scheme that works on most, and an alternate scheme that works on the rest. One mistake is usually allowed everywhere.