I really want to know how much of this "bias" is actually just an informative and useful prior.
As an example, suppose you have two candidates from Princeton. One is black, the other is asian. With high probability, the asian candidate is smarter - he had to pass through a much more rigorous college admissions filter than the black person.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11904256
Now given equal evaluations, it probably makes sense to hire the Asian person over the black person. (Similar reasoning suggests you should prefer an Asian to a white person.) The reason is simply that base rates matter. Bayes rule says that P(good candidate|evidence) = P(evidence|good candidate) P(good candidate)/P(evidence).
The term P(good candidate) is known as the base rate - as simple arithmetic demonstrates it's important information.
So assuming the base rate for various groups differs, these "biases" might actually not be biases at all - they might be informative. If we eliminate these biases from our process, we might actually make worse decisions [1]. Unfortunately this article doesn't address that question at all.
See also this body of research, which suggests that many racial/sexual stereotypes are actually useful priors and improve human decisionmaking: http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~jussim/unbearable%20accuracy%20o...
I'm also curious to hear arguments about the ethics of using such information in decision making, assuming they are in fact informative.
[1] For those unfamiliar with statistics, I've got a simple article here illustrating the arithmetic of base rates. Clickbait title: A gay person donates blood which tests negative for HIV. A straight person donates untested blood. Which is safer? The answer will SHOCK you. https://www.chrisstucchio.com/blog/2016/why_gays_cant_donate...