It's troubling to think of the conflicts of interest that go into the pricing of an IPO. The company would like it to be as high as possble, holding the number of shares sold constant. Investment bankers would like to preserve their good relationship with the hoardes of potential IPO investors, and therefore would like the IPO price to be below the "true value" of the stock, to provide their clients with a nice short term return. Another interesting bit, is that most of the employees of the company going public actually care about the price of the stock six months from now when their lockup ends, so their incentives are not exactly aligned either.
In short, the whole "big price pop on day 1 == good" idea needs to go away.
Do you have a source for this? It was my understanding that the investment bankers want the IPO to be priced as high as possible because that's how they make their commission. See the potential windfall for JP Morgan on the Saudi Aramco IPO
Investment banks often have to make guarantees about selling all of the shares, and the worst thing that can happen for them is to have a broken IPO (shares close below the open price). The investment bank that led Facebook's IPO had to buy back shares immediately to prevent that from happening.
Also, many of the initial shares are bought from the investment bank's book of contacts that they reached out to on their roadshow. If you lose money for your fund manager buddies, they won't invest in your next IPO.
Share price is a function of quantity supplied. You reduce quantity supplied, and for any market with a downward-sloping demand curve, the price will go up.
Perhaps a better way to look at this is that (1) market participants have differing views of the fair value of the securities, and (2) given the current market price, only market participants who think the shares are worth >= $24 (last trade) will buy. There is no "true price", just a lot of opinions resulting in individual buy/sell decisions.
I think you're wrong. My reasoning is simple. If the IPO investors thought that the company was worth less than $24 (e.g. $16), they would have sold already, and the price would have dropped. If they thought the company is worth $24 (or more), they would have bought the IPO at any price between $16 and $24 (minus spread) as well.
Really, the only argument for under-pricing the IPO is as a favor to the banks/hedge funds. But the question is, did the banks ever return the favor?
I'm not a lawyer but I think this is part of what's behind the trend toward convertible notes in company financing in SV, compared to the traditional priced equity round -- too hard to give a different deal to different investors, for what amounts to the same shares?
Would love to hear more from someone who knows more about this.
Yes, market cap should be independent of number of shares, and the market cap = # of shares * $ per share formula still holds, which is why many prefer to think about market caps rather than accounting units.
But it's also the case that a firm issuing a share for the price of $15, increases book value of the firm by $15, and this directly offsets the resulting shareholder dilution. Arguing it was impossible to find buyers at 24 dollars a share is a bit silly, given that the market immediately did just that.
Goldman Sachs would like to buy 50 shares for $14 each. Morgan Stanley would like to buy 50 shares for $15 each. Barclays would like to buy 50 shares for $16 each.
Citizen Bob would like to buy 5 shares for $24 each.
So what happens? HarryCo IPOs at $15 (the maximum I can get to cover all 100 shares) and then immediately pops to $24 when Bob buys 5 shares from Morgan Stanley.
I did not leave $900 "on the table" in my IPO because there wasn't enough demand to sell 100 shares at $24.
If we assume that GS and MS have a reserve price of 24, as evidenced by the market open, then their strategic 15 and 16 bids do represent money left on the table.
> And then immediately crashes back to $16 because there are no other buyers willing to buy at $24.
Which obviously didn't happen.
But I think that's not always a great assumption, because sometimes things happen that don't affect firm fundamentals (profit, revenues, margins) but do affect valuation, like changes in interest rates, shifting investor sentiment on the sector, a lighthouse investor publicly stating their intention to buy/sell, etc -- all of these things change market cap without altering the business per se.
All this to say, I think the simple CAP=SHARES*PRICE formula is too simplistic. I think it's more accurate to think in terms of ranges of what the firm's equity might be worth, and realize that it's a highly subjective assessment based more on aggregate opinion, than some hard objective law of physics.