Think what a terrorist could do with this though. Legislating it will only really stop people who don't intend to fly small aircraft into a no-fly-zone anyway.
Sure. But a sensible policy would also minimize the amount of weapons that are deployed in heavily trafficked airspace. That is why the sensible approach is to heavily regulate or even by-default prohibit UAV traffic anywhere near airports or common commercial aircraft routes.
In other words, parent post is a false dichotomy. It's possible to design and enforce regulations that 1) minimize danger and 2) enable aircraft controllers and the military to address rogue UAVs before they enter heavily trafficked civilian airspaces. Those regulations should go far beyond "shoot-to-kill near airports", but also don't have to be as encompassing as current bans.
Simply deploying weapons in commercial airspace as a complete alternative to legislation and regulation is insane.
> Legislating it will only really stop people who don't intend to fly small aircraft into a no-fly-zone anyway.
I think you under-estimate the size of the group of people who do dangerous shit without malicious intent. Look at the list of incidents at the end of the article, for instance, and guess at how many of those were intentional.
Furthermore, even in the case of malicious intent, crafting regulation that clearly and unambiguously sets expectations can allow regulators and the military to deploy counter-measures long before doing so creates an unacceptable risk to surrounding civilians and infrastructure.
Hence, my tradeoff is between making it difficult to own or operate a UAV ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES OR ADJACENT TERRITORIES; and making it incredibly improbable and difficult to simply ride one into an airport and cause a disaster, either by accident or on purpose.
My tradeoff also bears on the doubtful effectiveness of the legislative approach to prevent intentional violation of controlled airspace. In this case you require the sentries anyhow.
There's A LOT of middle ground between today's limitations on drone operators and a world where we expect to shoot down aircraft near crowded airports. If you try to sell that either/or to the public, you're going to lose. And rightly so.
FORTUNATELY, there's a lot the FAA could do to make the USA more drone-friendly while also ensuring the safety of conventional aircraft and critical infrastructure. Good drone policy, if ever enacted, will follow from this observation. It will not follow from a false choice between militarized anarchy and industry-crippling regulation.
(It'd also be neat if we could introduce technical solutions to the stupid/clueless person problem. For example, it'd be nice if the FAA funded the development of open-source, optional, and easy to disable software that warns the pilot (and only the pilot) before the drone enters a restricted area. It'd also be really nice if drone manufacturers voluntarily installed that software on capable drones. We're all better off if Johnny doesn't commit a felony and ground the next 30 minutes of take-offs while trying out his cool birthday present...)
Same goes for jamming them.
As others have pointed out, the last thing you want is some object flying over the airport that is not under your control.
Challenge accepted.
All that achieves is to secure the airport, poorly, against a very unlikely threat, and one that is unlikely to down a plane even if an intrusion occurs.
Nobody needs to be flying drones near airports. Seriously.
I'm certainly not interested in pulling this off.. but how hard would it be to just simultaneously launch a swarm into a busy airport while planes are landing?
Having a drone under control is almost always preferable to having a drone out of control, particularly in the pattern of a major airport. If you're going to take it down, it needs to happen in a way that gives you control of the drone, not just messes up their control.
The time window in which that's a valid option is closing fast. Autonomous flyers that don't need an external signal are already pretty good and after a few more years of iterations, they'll be even better and available to everyone. Not to mention air traffic requires lots of radio communication of its own, along with radar and GPS, and jamming equipment would need to be guaranteed not to interfere with any of that. It's a non-solution.
But who defines 'near'? At present, this is defined by the industry with a vested interest in passing the costs onto regulators and law enforcement. Not in investing in drone detection or mitigation technology.
CTRs around airports already deprive residents of their airspace rights, often to a radius of 5nm from an airport. In many cities that means no drones in a large chunk of residential area.