> Given that the answer to CAN they is a solid no, and that random searches of homes is in no way related to searching devices used in a conspiracy to commit murder, what is the point of this? In one instance, someone has clearly committed a conspiratorial crime, in another instance, people are living in houses with low property value.
You said that the state should be able to search the phone because it was likely to have evidence of crimes. I am arguing that higher than normal likelihood, as you might expect in a high-crime neighborhood, is not sufficient to justify a search. Instead, I am arguing that evidence (indicative of finding things that will help solve or prevent crimes), not likelihood of finding such things, should be the standard for a warrant.
> A conspiracy took place.
I should have said "a conspiracy beyond the two dead perpetrators".
> one of the participants declared that they were part of a larger group
Did she? I thought she said she "pledged allegiance" to a larger group, like one might do to a Pope you have never met or spoken with.
> what information is missing that would motivate you to think that a search of the attackers' phones should be conducted?
I discussed this elsewhere in the thread, but you may not have seen that post yet. Here is a link: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11115698
> Are you really asserting that there is no evidence of conspiracy that extends beyond the deceased
No, I am /asking/ if there is any such evidence.
> I don't imagine that you're arguing that the post-mortem privacy interests of the terrorists prohibit investigation.
No, I don't think it prohibits investigation, but I do think that state searches of their personal effects ought to require evidence that searching their personal effects would solve old crimes or prevent new ones.
> Are you suggesting that the risk from not knowing the contents of the phone are so low as to not rise to outweigh the privacy interests of anyone incidentally mentioned on the device?
I am suggesting that those privacy interests can be balanced against evidence that searching the phone would solve old crimes or prevent new ones. I do not believe that risk is the only question. That is what I was trying to get at with my distinction between "high likelihood of" and "evidence of", above.
> What is the moral base from which you are arguing that this nearly universally accepted standard is somehow deficient?
The reason I think that evidence of solving (or helping to solve) old crimes or preventing new ones should be required before searching the possessions of any person, living or dead, murderer or pacifist, is a traditional one about privacy, but it seems like the balance I use is different than your balance.
That "societies generally allow" the state to do something, or that societies "nearly universally" do so, is not a big factor in my feelings on whether or not it is fair and just.