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Comment by ErrantX | Hacker News Reader

Well on the face of it it is a reasonable concern. But if the system has a keylogger there is very little you can do to protect your user. It is a very poor attempt at security through obscurity.

If the users system is compromised there is nothing you can do. Sacrificing general security for that case is silly.

The best defence to a keylogger attack is to have a secondary number vaidation alongside the password that requires you to enter a random subset of that number each time (eg 1st, 2nd, 8th).

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To log in to my bank online I need a browser certificate, my login, my 4-digit pin-code, and a 6-digit one-time random number from a little card my bank sent me. To get the browser certificate you need my login, my 4-digit pin-code, and another code the bank sends by SMS to my cell-phone.

I love my bank, their authentication is cheap, platform-independent and reasonably secure. It's definitely safe from keyloggers, because it requires access to items that are in my possession. And best of all, it's not annoying for me as a user.

Care to share the name of the bank?

http://skandiabanken.se

Well, to be pedantic, the best defence to a keylogger attack is a two-factor system. (RSA Fob, Smart Cards, and the like)

Well yes you would generate the number those ways. The keylogger defence is actually in the random subset of numbers asked for. It completely destroys any attack it could make by never giving it a single complete picture :-)

It's quite laughable really, if I'm logging into my bank I type HSBC.co.uk first, anything following that is my International Banking number, following that is my password (which is the best defence you state) and date of birth. If I was required to enter all 8 numbers my password would be the easiest thing to catch.

The only better defence I can think is to have a user enter 3 genuine numbers from their password and 3 randomly generated numbers given to you, but it the 6 numbers are requested randomly. Requesting only random genuine numbers gives you encryption by hiding the sequence of the numbers, if you are also hiding the genuine numbers it's two levels of deceit.

I wish hsbc gave you the numbers it wanted you to enter as images too. Makes it a little more difficult to parse.

Some banks in South Africa used to bring up a little image keyboard and you click the letters (ie no keyboard) in my mind this is still one of the best ways to protect against keylogging.

Storing the password in a truecrypted file and copy pasting also works. Though, for someone going to those lengths, a keylogger is a very unlikely to be a problem for someone paying that much attention.

A software key-logger can also typically snoop the contents of the clipboard.

which is what my bank does. (Lloyds).

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