So no web traffic should traverse in the clear - the URL, domains, GET data, POST data, headers, etc are protected.
however that does leave a surprising amount of info. Your IP address, the IP address you're connecting to, the host domain you're connecting to if your browser just did a DNS lookup (99% likely it did), how long you communicate with that site, the traffic shape, etc etc.
As a crude example: your ISP sees a DNS lookup to pornhub.com, followed by a connection to the IP address associated with that name, followed by 3 hours of fairly large packet sizes in regular repetitive patterns. It's highly likely they can extrapolate what's in your browser.
There are several websites that offer this service: search an IP and get a list of all known websites that use that IP.
A link to an article from an authority in this field, that really explains this, would be really welcome!!!
Also, usually (almost) everything is exposed on the first request, before the server has got the chance to redirect to the encrypted version. At that point, the ISP/interceptor could just replace the redirect...
> The hostname is (usually) exposed through DNS, and is required for the server to know which certificate to send.
SNI solves this problem.
> Also, usually (almost) everything is exposed on the first request, before the server has got the chance to redirect to the encrypted version. At that point, the ISP/interceptor could just replace the redirect...
Admittedly, this is somewhat of a culture issue. I haven't read the DNSSEC spec, but it'd be cool to be able to specify redirects using DNS or smth. But at the end of the day, after that first connection (or preferably, it's already setup with HSTS preinitialized in your browser) you're never not going to be using HTTPS without scary warnings (assume the site admin has set up TLS properly).