Wat.
An approximately rational truth seeking community can reasonably be expected to come to a reasonably good approximation of the truth, compared to what they have access to. As such, such a community can be used as an (approximate) indicator of the truth.
Moral relativism can fall down a well. (emphasis on the ism. I don't mean ists. It is a rhetorical statement, not a literal one.)
- You're writing about a rational truth seeking community when the user @afarrell is writing about majority of people. Do you see the difference? People (members of homo sapiens sapiens species) have not evolved to seek truth, but to survive and reproduce.
"Moral relativism can fall down a well."
- How can moral relativism fall down? What does that even look like? Fall according to what standard? Is the standard relative or not?
I was expressing [distaste/dislike/disapproval] [for/of] moral relativism. Was this somehow not obvious to you? Are you merely feigning incomprehension? If you are, to what end? (Would you think that I would think that it benefits your reproductive fitness?)
> You're writing about a rational truth seeking community
I included the word "approximately". Do you think that if I was asked if I included it for no reason, that I would answer "yes"?
Which would occur more, with nothing else changed arbitrarily: A collection which is more capable of achieving ends, or one which is less capable of achieving ends, becoming more prevalent than the other over time, if both have being prevalent as an end?
Would a correct understanding of decision theory predict that having more or less true information, all else being equal, would result in an entity being more or less successful in achieving its ends?
What do you mean when you use the word "to"? Do you mean "such that ___ occurs"? Is that what the word is commonly used to mean? (What about in the question immediately preceding this one?)