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Comment by adevine | Hacker News Reader

I don't buy the arguments in this article. For example, the whole part about why Google failed with Google+ is just wrong IMO. It wasn't that Google wasn't capable of building a good social network. If anything, I (and most people I know) preferred the design and interface of Google+. The problem was that Facebook already had a huge head start, and all your friends were already there. Facebook was "good enough", and there wasn't a big enough incentive to want to switch to Google+.

If anything, large companies often miss out on new trends and changes in business and technology, but it's not solely because building that one new layer "up the stack" is so technically hard or different.

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Everyone you know thought Google+ was a better interface than Facebook? That seems quite a strong anecdotal statement, but I have a hard time accepting it at face value. Yes G+ had some nice aesthetics, mechanics, use of white space, etc, but conceptually and organizationally it was a mess.

To chalk it all up to network effects is to let them off the hook too easily, after all there is no reason you can't build other successful social networks concurrently with Facebook, you have your Twitters, Instagrams, Snapchats, etc.

The way I see G+ failing is because there was no soul or vision to the product, it was driven by a simple fear of Facebook, and it's implementation was a simple conglomeration of features that constituted a cool tech demo but was not shaped by real users or a real use case (Google does this often, see Wave, but at least in that case they were trying something novel). In short, G+ was not true to Google's DNA.

I think my view still supports your main point though—stacks simply are not the same for each company. Lower level stacks tend to be more similar, but at the top they are serving unique market segments, so they are simply not fungible.

> but conceptually and organizationally it was a mess.

Conceptually they had the core of a very good story, which was the idea I could have "Facebook where I segregated the people in my lives". It was even quite good timing, as it was mooted around the time people were starting to bubble up stories about "my boss started reading my Facebook and I got fired", "my family are upset by the politics my friends discuss" and so on.

The biggest problems with G+ from my perspective, around launch time, was other than Facebook's network effect, that the dribbling out of invites completely cut against the core success model for a social network, and the whole circles functionality ended up being one of those UI nightmares you get from Googlers who don't understand how normal humans actually work.

It may have been a nice story as viewed by some of us privacy-conscious people (I remember rooting really hard for it, and a couple of my most shy family members still use it), but it wasn't a viable strategy when trying to steal significant (>10%) market share from an incumbent, especially when the target audience was the general public.

G+ positioned itself against Facebook sort of like DuckDuckGo went against Google: we made the same product, but fixed X!!!, where X is some gripe about the incumbent's product that only a small percentage of the product's potential userbase cares about (privacy, in both of these cases).

That was (and is!) a fantastic strategy for DDG, for whom a fraction of a percent of all search traffic counts as massive, life-changing success. Google is not DDG, though. G+ would have needed a much larger share of the social networking market to be considered a win for Google, and the initial differentiation was not anywhere near clear enough to get there against a rival as strong as Facebook.

I also agree about the UI mess, and all that, of course, it was not a great product to use out of the gate.

> but conceptually and organizationally it was a mess.

Facebook annoyed many users each time a new update came. The privacy settings were constantly being reset. I do not believe facebook has a great UI to this day. Google+ is not great but it does not offend me the same way.

A product doesn't win in the market by not being offensive in some way, but by providing something people want. Google+ didn't commit many of the sins of Facebook, but it also didn't have a compelling use case other than "I hate facebook"

And I say that as someone that doesn't have Facebook account.

A tangent.

> The privacy settings were constantly being reset.

True. What privacy-minded Facebook critics often miss is that privacy settings seem to have been constantly reset towards "more private" mode. Hell, at this point Facebook is starting to get really annoying with those recurring reminders about visibility of my post. I post all-public because I like it that way, I hate the constant nagging about switching to more private mode.

Before a few years ago they were being reset to less private.

Yeah, head starts can be overcome. Especially with each generation. I thought MySpace was horrible but also unbeatable because of its reach.

One: Google+ was a terrible interface, in that it tried to force a "programmers" thought pattern on the user. Circles? OOP in disguise. It looked enough like Facebook that the different, and far more complex, behaviours were confusing to people. Switching would be painful. You may have liked it but most people did not.

Two: G+ kept trying to hook into everything Google did. My Youtube account with all my embarrassing 80s playlists and WoW videos and cats and ... WTF? NO I DON'T WANT TO SHARE THAT. Pretty much every time I logged in I had to say "No I really don't want to do that" until they finally snuck it through at some point. Many people just weren't interested in establishing a network with somebody who didn't understand privacy at all and kept changing the rules for existing services. Coupled with previous missteps, I'm looking at you Buzz, this was a deal breaker for many. Facebook has a bad reputation but at least they are not trying to surface embarrassing info from other sources.

Three: Google+ was tech heavy from the start, which meant it tended to drift "professional" and be considered "for the geeks". Friends and family were already connected to me on FB, G+ tended to be old colleagues who weren't close enough to be connected on Facebook. I just don't have much to share with those people that I'm not already sharing on LinkedIn. For a social network, geeky early adopters is NOT a recipe for success.

Four: Google+ started making other services worse. Youtube comments were a disaster and seriously broke content creators ability to have a dialog with their audience. Google Reader was gutted and eventually shutdown. New services were artificially hooked into G+ for no real reason. Basically, G+ became the punching bag for problems in it's other products.

You're making some valid points, however I do not agree with some of them.

For me Facebook is only useful for my personal life. Should I want to post about some programming stuff? Doesn't belong on FB. The reason is because FB ends up being a disaster if you combine your friends and personal interests with your professional network. It just doesn't work as it doesn't give you the tools to separate the two. And yes, I ended up silencing or unfriending folks for that reason as well, as an alternative to deleting the account altogether. And I have no acquaintances that use FB for non-personal stuff, unless they sell social media bullshit of course.

You're talking about circles being complicated. Not sure what it has to do with OOP, though those circles do represent a taxonomy. And they are complicated, but at least Google attempted solving the problem. The problem being that at home I'm a totally different person. And when I follow people I don't know, I follow them only to get stories on certain topics of interest and I don't really care about their personal life.

You're saying that G+ was tech heavy. I disagree because that's currently Twitter and G+ would have won if that were true. I don't know the reason, but my guess is that it had to do with shitty things like the real name policy. Or in other words, having FB's creepy restrictions without the network effect.

> Should I want to post about some programming stuff? Doesn't belong on FB.

That was kind of my point #3. You already had Facebook for your friends so G+ became your network for your geek friends and geek co-workers. If you're not a geek, you were already using LinkedIn for that purpose. That's a small market.

OO Programmers (and biologists) are the only people who naturally think in terms of complex taxonomy.

Agreed, their real name policy made it completely unattractive for many purposes, including Mashable trying to set up an account and needing to rename it to Pete Cashmore (if I remember right). But Twitter is not tech heavy, it's tech/startup/entrepreneur/media heavy, including tech but not strictly limited to it.

> Three: Google+ was tech heavy from the start, which meant it tended to drift "professional" and be considered "for the geeks". Friends and family were already connected to me on FB, G+ tended to be old colleagues who weren't close enough to be connected on Facebook. I just don't have much to share with those people that I'm not already sharing on LinkedIn. For a social network, geeky early adopters is NOT a recipe for success.

That, and during the brief window where G+ had the most hype and the best shot and getting mainstream, which also happened to be right when Facebook had just recently made some pretty egregious privacy fuckups and pissed everyone off... they very strictly limited who could get an account. I forget the exact timings but it was basically impossible for a typical prospective user to get G+ until around 6 months after they had actually rolled it out. What the fuck, guys?

Then when they finally opened up registration no one gave a shit anymore.

I guess maybe they were trying to mimic the thing with Facebook where you initially had to have a .edu email in order to get a Facebook account - but it's very debatable whether Facebook succeeded because of that or in spite of it.

I forgot about that! We were thinking of using it for a few things at work but then a few people in our office couldn't get in and ...

Google+ was a copy of Facebook, in that it didn't introduce really different new concepts or differentiators. I know, "What about circles?" Well, one big thing that people demand was privacy. That's why people built Diaspora & co and Snapchat. Google got Circles right, but one can't trust a social media which also owns your emails and Youtube comments, and they indeed screwed us with the Real Name Policy and the intrusion of G+ in all things Google.

There were plenty of people for me on Google+; nearly as many as on FB. But my FB friends' interests (for want of a better word) didn't pollute my YouTube recommendations, Google search results, etc. I mean Lord love 'em and all, but some of those people listen to and watch stuff that would make me long for deafness and blindness, have weird-ass hobbies I don't even want to think about, are heavily into alt-med, conspiracy crap, and UFOs, or are living in places that aren't even on the political spectrum anymore. The problem with G+ was that it was an all-inclusive package deal that touched all Google properties (except Gmail). I have an account because it's necessary to have one, but it's just a page in the middle of nowhere with no access, friendless, and looking forward to staying that way.

I think Facebook's huge head start was a big part of Google+ bombing, but I think there were other issues, too.

First of all, I think it really bothered a lot of people how they retroactively converted a bunch of pre-existing accounts into social networking accounts. Especially for things like Gmail, I don't think people had any idea they were signing up for a social network.

I also think tying together a dozen disparate sites and services under a single account login bothered people. Nobody really wants their search results, chats, video watching, picture sharing, and email all smashed together into a big social network. Especially not when it's unclear how those things are related and how clicking "Like" or "Share" on one site will show up on the others.

On the other hand, just being logged into Facebook doesn't implicitly log you into a dozen other sites and it's pretty clear that if I click a "Like" button, I'm liking it on Facebook.

Yeah, but for your Google+ example, isn't that another example of not understanding the customers' needs? In that case, Google failed to understand that the customers already had Facebook and were happy with it and that all their dumb friends were already on it so they didn't want to switch.

So maybe it's not customers' needs, as much as their wants, but close enough. The customers wanted Facebook (because of chicken-and-egg/first-mover advantage and also the good-enough factor), so a me-too competitor just didn't have much hope.

It was similar with Apple under Jobs: they knew what customers really liked and wanted, so they made tons of money even when there were technically superior alternatives to their products.

Except for a few niche markets, technology is never a product.

Many products - even corporate products - are chosen for their social signalling implications, not for rational reasons of performance, cost, or efficiency.

Remember "No ever got fired for buying IBM"?

G+ had the technology, but it had no ability to manage the social signalling.

Apple is all about social signalling. That's possibly its primary product. The hardware is just a signifier.

Facebook doesn't have social signalling - it is social signalling. Same with Twitter, and all the other social sites.

Google has never understood how this works. Even when it has a pin-sharp social marketing message represented by extremely attractive shiny people, somehow it never quite makes it stick for specific products in the way that other companies do.

> Apple is all about social signalling. That's possibly its primary product. The hardware is just a signifier.

It's so often repeated, but this is silly. Sure, Apple is fashionable, but that is hardly the only reason anyone buys their products. Apple products are good - or at least good enough for their customers - and that is why people like them.

Many programmers here on HN use MacBooks, for example. That's not just because it has a shiny apple silhouette on it.

>That's not just because it has a shiny apple silhouette on it.

Actually, in my experience, it's because that's what the company offers them to use at work, and most people just go with the default. I have been told many times "And you get a shiny new MacBook!" And I thank them and mention that I prefer to work on a Linux machine. It is almost comical how many blinking stares I have gotten. It fucking is about the shiny apple silhouette on it. It is 100% about image and not utility ("Sorry! I have work to do and I'm not allergic to the GPLv3!"). Especially because when you buy an Apple, you are paying so much for mediocre hardware at best. I have had better luck with late-model Thinkpads than I have had with MacBooks! They're not magical. Well, not magical beyond that shiny Apple silhouette.

So you don't like the MacBook therefore nobody could have any valid reason to like it?

Consider why these companies given employees MacBooks in the first place. (The answer is usually that Linux doesn't work well enough for them.)

No, the answer is that they don't have a lot of people that use Linux. You can't honestly tell me that Macs work better than Linux for most of the tasks a programmer or devops needs to do on a daily basis. I know it's true that they don't work as well as Linux machines because I have had to support both platforms over my twenty years in this industry. Here's a neat trick (and just one example): Set up LDAP authentication on a server and then try to get your MacBook's to work. Good luck!

> It wasn't that Google wasn't capable of building a good social network.

The the author doesn't dispute this. Building the site was "trivial," but determining what to build was the real challenge. And they failed at it, because they didn't understand the users' needs.

Users didn't need a "me-too" social network that was just a facade of the old social network with a fresh coat of paint. If you want to win over users, you'll generally need to either (a) provide something that users need and that the competitor has overlooked, or (b) provide a 10X-better version of something your competitor provides. Google+ didn't come close to doing either.

> because they didn't understand the users' needs

That's generous - users told them repeatedly and in no uncertain terms that they were extremely unhappy with numerous aspects of the platform. Google simply did not care if users liked the product. How they expected it to be a success with that attitude boggles the mind.

Alternately, perhaps Google cared more about making some of its internal divisions happy than about making customers happy, and that's what drove their definitions/metrics of "success".

For example, the "Real-name only" policy was never customer-focused at all, but an incestuous favor to the advertising/profiling panopticon.

Similarly, the "forced collapse of all credentials" into G+ (like Youtube identities) probably made some things easier for Google (especially pushing its adoption as an identity-provider) but did a lot of things existing users weren't happy with.

How does real names relate to advertising? G+ doesn't even have ads. Google already has your browsing history to know your shopping interests. G+ had real names because Facebook had real names.

A real name and DOB go a long way to cross-correlating with other information. I work at a market-research company, and we're doing some partnering to correlate with voter records...

Fairly simple - a belief that the users who were complaining did not represent the majority of the market.

I think the Apple Maps example is even more questionable. Apple didn't fail because moving "up the stack" meant they had no idea what consumers wanted from a mapping service; that's absurd. They didn't fail because they didn't have the expertise to write usable software either.

They failed because they didn't throw enough resources at something that wasn't that strategically important to them.

(cf. their entry into the music distribution business, a brand new "up the stack" market which was of huge strategic importance to them, where they ended up assessing customers' needs better than the existing players in that space)

I suppose it depends what you mean by "usable".

Apple Maps certainly had serious quality issues at launch. Whether they considered building a mapping app to be easier than building an OS, I have no idea. I am sure that many at Apple were under no such illusions. But it was a product made for purely corporate strategy reasons.

Google puts as much effort into their phones as Apple puts into their maps, and vice versa, with predictable results.

I (author) didn't say it's hard to move up from (only) engineering side. It's hard to move up from customer empathy perspective. Hence the emphasis on what to build. It's a product strategy question.

Also there is this thing called 'network effect' which plays a huge role for social networks.

EDIT: Why the downvote?

I didn't down vote you, but my guess it is the tone of your comment. You are of course 100% right that for a general social network there can only be one. Until Facebook messes up it won't be possible to build a new general social network - maybe News Corp will buy Facebook and an opening will arise.

I think this example adds truth to the author's argument in that there have been a few social media apps like Instagram and Snapchat that took off in ways the Google Plus never did. I do agree that there was little impetus to move to Google Plus from Facebook, but there could have been features that would have made it enough of a differentiator that people could have moved over to Google Plus. It's not like Google lacked the ability to scale out or provide such a service.

I would argue that Snapchat and Instagram occupy VERY different niches than Facebook. Most importantly, virtually everyone who uses Snapchat or Instagram also uses FB. Google thought they had enough clout to win the "general all purpose category" social network - they were trying to compete directly against FB.

> It wasn't that Google wasn't capable of building a good social network.

Like automatically creating a Google+ account for every google account without asking first? I can see millions of doormant accounts where you think you are following somebody when indeed there will never be an update from that account.

That's not true, Google+ accounts were not created automatically for Google accounts.

It seems you missed many past news like:

- http://techland.time.com/2012/01/20/want-a-google-account-no...

- https://marco.org/2013/01/03/no-avoiding-googleplus (the WSJ later changed that page)

- http://www.cnet.com/news/getting-gmail-now-you-get-google-to...

Perhaps initially. Now Google forces you to create one if you want to do various kinds of things. It's not quite automatic, true, but it's almost.

Correct, but many people were "coerced" into making an account that they never had any intention of using.

I think the problem with Google+ was that they couldn't decide what they wanted it to be. It was a social network, but it was also supposed to extend across the Google empire. It was difficult to get your head around it. Reminded me of an old Saturday Night Live fake ad - "it's a floor wax, it's a desert topping."

Now that they've split up the product and made Photos a standalone app, they've got something. It's not a social network, but rather a simple concept that people can easily understand. Now if they could make the relationship between Drive and Photos a little clearer, they'd really have something. :)

A lot of people here are focusing on network effects or feature comparisons between G+ and FB.

However, I think the biggest reason for G+'s failure was that the spirit that permeated it was corporatism and inauthenticity. It's frustrating, because it could have been a great opportunity to thoughtfully integrate Google's services.

G+'s phoneyness often manifested in overriding user preferences. E.g., unthinkably, Eric Schmidt thought it was a great vehicle to get people to start using their real names. Coupled with forced signups, butchered product integrations, destruction of Google Reader, awkward promotion by Black Eyed Peas, and Vic Gundotra constantly posting Youtube videos that were clearly meant to appeal to "regular people", it has been painful to watch.

The public is not oblivious to motive, especially when it comes to choosing a social network. FB's key to its early success was an air of Ivy League exclusivity. G+ had Google's relatively sterling technical reputation, respect for privacy, and credence in the "don't be evil" motto, but squandered it to desperately imitate Apple and FB.

Google Plus came out years after Facebook with a fraction of the features. No events, company profiles/fan pages or apps. No levity.

Well, MySpace had a headstart on Facebook but it didn't prevent Facebook from beating them.

It doesn't matter how "good" the product is if you're not talking to the users and uncovering their need for it. What you've said here doesn't contradict the point of the article - determining an unarticulated need and meeting it is the true measure of how a successful product is built. The fact that you can easily trivialize something successful's true purpose, without doing the legwork to find out what need it's meeting is the logical fallacy enforced by failing copycat products.

The article specifically says it's about knowing the customers needs and that technical skill can just be bought/acquired. How you got "we think companies struggle to move up the stack because of technical difficulty" from that, I have no idea.

It's about knowing how to build a rough copy. It's the ability to figure out what is going to work in terms of getting users and usage.

I don't even like Facebook much, but I still strongly preferred the design of it over Google+.

Not to mention Google+ was truly asinine about forcing users to merge their YT and G+ accounts (and even gmail, iirc), it was all just very confusing and obtuse. I don't want a SSO. I don't want a G+ account for every Gmail account.

I didn't want to have to fuck around with merging my accounts, tethering each YT channel to my social network, etc. I want -- and have business needs for -- a division between the sites I use. I frequently need several different usernames and identities on different sites, even if the sites are owned by the same company, as sometimes I am creating social accounts for clients.

Google was, IMHO, trying to be shady and act like every youtube comment was actually Google+ activity, simply so they could claim, "We have XXX million active G+ users each month!!" They weren't and you don't. I'm glad their shady network and backhanded business practices failed.

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