Incorrect. You may be thinking of the "/dev/random vs. /dev/urandom" argument, which says it's stupid to _block_ on reseeding based on some arbitrary heuristic (and which I agree with). However, that doesn't mean reseeding is unnecessary. Even a CSPRNG cycles and you need to reseed before it does so or the wheels start to come off. Generators become less random looking even before cycling. The general rule is that you shouldn't use more than sqrt(cycle length) from a single generator.

If you use a secure n-bit block cipher in counter mode, for instance (generally considered a "good CSPRNG") then the generated numbers start to become distinguishable from random after 2^(n/2) generated blocks due to lack of collisions. This is a weak statement, but the point is any proofs that assume randomness (likely all proofs of hardness of crypto reversal) no longer hold. If you don't reseed before this point then you're doing it wrong. Other desirable characteristics of CSPRNGs, like forward secrecy, may require periodic (or frequent) reseeding depending on algorithm.

Best practice for a source of secure "randomness" is to use an entropy accumulator that finds as much "true entropy" as it can and constantly mixes that into a pool (while protecting against injection attacks), then to use a good CSPRNG algorithm to "stretch" the available entropy since true entropy is a scarce resource. That's what urandom and OpenSSL do, for instance (see Yarrow/Fortuna for a good design).

A lot of thought has been put into the design of urandom. Pulling one random seed from urandom and stretching it forever in user-space is _not_ equivalent. You could probably design something in user-space that _is_ as secure, but it's not trivial.