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Comment by blazespin | Hacker News Reader

The problem that Alex is skimming over here is that if Wes got access to this data, you have to ask yourself - WHO ELSE GOT THE DATA?

If Alex knows anything about his job he should know that he has to refresh all those keys even if Wes didn't report it or say anything.

The diff between Wes and everyone else is Wes just explained to Facebook how completely screwed they are. Alex is just pissed because Wes made it bluntly clear how much he screwed up.

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Alex has been a vulnerability research since the 1990s, and co-ran iSEC Partners, one of the best-known software security firms in the world, through the 2000s. I'm pretty sure they're on top of the key situation.

A lot of things has changed since 1990...

Yes, that's true, and Alex is one of the reasons they've changed.

judging by this exploit and the fact that they didn't rotate keys and other folks probably got this data, I would say this wasn't one of their finest moments, wouldn't you agree?

Take the top 10 tech companies on the west coast.

Select the most senior security person at those companies.

Roll 1d10 and substitute that person for Alex in this exact situation.

Now bet your life that you won't have your life wrecked by a prosecutor based on the outcome of that die roll.

I don't love Stamos calling the guy's boss, but if it's between "call his boss" and "tell legal that a bounty participant has FUCKING GONE ROGUE WITH ALL OF INSTAGRAM'S CREDS", I think he made the right goddamn call.

Jesus.

That just sounds like ass covering to me. The fact of the matter is that Alex had no idea and no one at Facebook had any idea if this researcher indeed went rogue with their credentials, because of the lack of security that the hack exposed. No logs on S3 buckets? No separation of access between user data and operations buckets? Give me a break. Calling the guy's boss or the guy himself wouldn't give any authoritative answers as to what's on the researcher's laptop, so I really don't see how calling the researcher's boss was a way out of "telling legal that a bounty participant had THE KEY TO THE KINGDOM BECAUSE CAPS ARE REALLLLLY AWESOME!" If you think that simply calling the guy's boss was the right call and not acknowledging the massive security holes that this guy exposed, then I hope you work for a company that has a more clear bounty program and deal with equally ethical researchers who will tell you about a full systems exploit without violating any user privacy and hope he's happy with your $2500. That will happen..

> but if it's between "call his boss" and "tell legal that a bounty participant has FUCKING GONE ROGUE WITH ALL OF INSTAGRAM'S CREDS"

False dichotomy - those weren't his only options, had he bothered to think more on it. There was an even better option, which strangely he chose not to take (assume an actual rogue actor got there before Wes and react accordingly: rotate the AWS keys, password reset for affected users, update SSL signing keys).

It bears asking - what exactly was he trying to achieve by calling Wes' boss, and has he achieved it? This is not his brightest moment.

Now bet your life that you won't have your life wrecked by a prosecutor based on the outcome of that die roll

What I get from your comment is that it's never a smart move to take one's chances dealing with company security people. The only smart move is to sell anonymously to the highest bidder.

It says right in that response that the keys were already rotated.

Or... one could actually read the response article: "This bug has been fixed, the affected keys have been rotated, and we have no evidence that Wes or anybody else accessed any user data. "

Didn't they have to ask wes to figure out what data he accessed in the first place, and even then they couldn't figure out he had accessed the keys?

'We DO NOT have evidence that X happened' is evidence of incompetence.

The competent responses would be:

"We DO have evidence that X DID NOT happen", or

"We DO have evidence that X DID happen".

A bag of rocks also has "no evidence that Wes or anybody else accessed any user data". Would you trust a bag of rocks with your computer security?

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