The last high-profile mis-issued cert was last week, and didn't even escape the control of people who were entrusted with the CA private key. So MS might not even be manually revoking it. Before that, the last blog post on googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com about a mis-issued certificate was ... March 23.
I would guess that it's re-signed daily, but only changes when there's an actual change to be made.
There's a reference to the date 150923203626Z (2015-09-23 20:36:26 UTC) somewhere in there, but I'm having trouble figuring out what it applies to.
apt, yum, PGP, etc. work the same way. There remains a decent argument for a secure transport anyway for privacy / avoiding side channels, or a general desire for HTTP delenda est, but it's nowhere near as strong an argument, HTTPS only provides marginal benefit to the side channels (Tor to a hidden service is much more effective), and other engineering concerns can legitimately override these concerns.
True, but it might be slightly less visible because you'd get an "update" instead of a failure. Also, I wonder if anyone has actually tested that scenario?
I'd like to believe that's true and that should be true, but I'd also have to actually test it before trusting it to be true.