Comment by rogersm | Hacker News Reader

Comment by rogersm | Hacker News Reader

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First of all I must say I don't believe in these kind of unpredictable systems: rarely doing this 'select randomly the process from a set of processes' works better than using the best process in the set.

But I don't think this applies:

  But terrorist organizations -- especially those employing 
  suicide bombers -- have very different goals and incentives 
  from those of smugglers, fare beaters and tax cheats. 
  Groups like Al Qaeda aim to cause widespread disruption and 
  terror by whatever means they can, even at great cost to 
  individual members. In particular, they are willing and 
  able to sacrifice -- martyr -- the very lives of their 
  solders in the service of that goal. The fate of any 
  individual terrorist is irrelevant as long as the loss 
  contributes to terror and disruption.

Training a terrorist has a cost, and he should succeed the "fate of any individual terrorist is not irrelevant". The terrorist group does not have an infinite number of terrorists (as he correctly concedes in the next paragraph).

So random screening works, not because that influences the behavior even of those who aren't checked, but because makes executing the attack more expensive to overcome the possibility of being detained in the random test.

Of course random screening is not as good as full screening, but from a realistic point of view is the only thing you can apply without shutting down world economy.

But if you read the article, I believe the point was that if the terrorist gets caught under a random system, the terrorist still achieves a positive result for the terrorists (the govt becomes forced to shut down aviation and then apply the maximum screening to everyone, causing expensive chaos and terror of its own).

This is not the kind of chaos of terror the terrorist has on his mind. Otherwise they will be shutting down traffic light control systems.

Getting caught is a failure. A bomb exploding is a victory.

Getting caught this time was a huge win. By all accounts, the guy who got caught was a nobody. Had he even been to the camps for training? For the cost of a pair of explosive underpants and the life of one shmuck, AQ is once again top-of-mind in the west --- not to mention the tens of millions of dollars of disruption the stunt caused.

There is a practically limitless supply of shmucks out there for AQ to weaponize. All they have to do is get better at converting them. What evidence do we have that this will be a long-term operational problem for AQ? Everything I see indicates that they will get better at it, not worse.

This is also why they aren't shutting down traffic lights. A failed attempt to shut down traffic lights wins nothing. Nobody is viscerally afraid of darkened traffic lights. In fact, until it happens, nobody is going to be viscerally afraid of someone taking out the grid. But everyone is afraid in their gut of exploding planes. Just the threat --- just 5% of the threat --- is enough to wreak havoc.

Ramping up a new KSM has a high cost. Ramping up a mujahedeen to skirmish with NATO in Khost has a high cost. Ramping up the guys who know how to rig PETN bombs has high cost. Ramping up guys who can operate safe houses and route money through a paranoid cell system has a high cost.

Building the system has a high cost. Using the system to exploit the dumbfucks who get captured by the system in order to get them to put the explosive underpants on is cheap.

If the system was jeopardized by any terrorist attempt, you'd be right. But it isn't. It's like spam. It may have a 0.001% conversion rate, but as long as it pays off 10000000:1, it's sustainable and resilient.

I disagree with your premise that a comparison can be made between SPAM and Sending-terrorists into the American Aviation system. SPAM is cheap because it is simply software than can be used to send out billions of copies. The number of possible jihad-motivated individuals that can be sent into the American Aviation system, between the screening, visa, and no-fly/selective screen lists (that you just _know_ are about to get a lot more aggressive in the next 90-120 days) is pretty limited.

There just aren't that many jihadists that will be allowed to fly without a lot of careful screening anymore.

Particularly after international airlines now have some experience with patting down and inconveniencing _all_ of their customers as a result of missing the christmas underwear bomber - there is now a pretty good incentive for them to start being cautious about those who were in gray area previously. No more gray area - if there are doubts (I.E. you are on the TIDE list) - you get checked carefully.

You keep using this word "jihadist" as if the people on the flights have spent a year running obstacle courses and stripping down kalashnikovs in the camps in Waziristan. That's not who they'll put on the planes. For every AQ op that can shoot straight, somewhere in the world there are 100 shmucks that can put a pair of underpants on and board a plane.

All AQ has to do is get better at taking mentally unstable people from unstable parts of the world and pointing them in the right direction. 90% of them will fail. Hell, 99%. But the 1% that succeed will make us react horribly to the other 99%.

Theoretically, yes. But why hasn't AQ gotten better at this "flood 'em with attempts" strategy so far?

Perhaps even most fanatics and angry unstable people prefer to shoot at soldiers than take a 99-in-100 chance of winding up in infidel custody, famous only in failure.

Per - Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam. Oxford University Press

'The term "Jihad" used without any qualifiers is generally understood in the West to be referring to holy war on behalf of Islam.'

What I'm trying to state is that the number of individuals who have radicalized to the point at which they will blow themselves up AND are authorized to fly on the American Aviation system, are few and far between. Even the christmas underwear bomber had been reported to both the CIA and State Department. If they had simply taken the father at his word "My Son is radicalized islamist and has a Visa which permits him to fly into the USA" they would have put him onto a list of selective screening and a bit of an extra pat-down, if not revoked his Visa in the same manner as the UK.

You can be certain that the TIDE list is going to be aggressively reviewed, and the list of 14,000 or so people currently targeted for selective screening is going to grow dramatically in the next few months.

> You can be certain that the TIDE list is going to be aggressively reviewed, and the list of 14,000 or so people currently targeted for selective screening is going to grow dramatically in the next few months.

They really need to make this a list of names/photos instead of just a list of names. The idea that we can target terrorists with a 'no-fly list' based entirely off of someone's name and not the mugshot is absurd.

Ironically religious beliefs mean that Islamic extremists won't let people with a known mental illness become suicide bombers. So they have to filter for sane people then get them to act insane.

Uh, what?

Also, consider that the greatest threat is not from people who hope to live and accept a strategic risk of death. Rather, the greatest threat is from people who believe that death is the ultimate success, for both their worldly and otherworldly aims.

While a one-in-a-twenty chance of success sounds good from a terror chief's perspective, no suicide bomber wants a 95% chance of winding up in captivity, famous only as a failure. Out of the twenty, they want to be the one!

So plans that allocate many participants to expected capture will have far fewer volunteers. And every report of a capture will decrease potential-volunteers' willingness to sign up, because they will adjust upward their expectation of embarrassing capture rather than martyrdom.

What AQHQ knows about the odds of success for a operation are and what some shmuck is told about the odds of success are two different and unrelated things.

Even granting that the bombers are gullible and unstable, and that "AQHQ" will oversell them on the chances of success, they can see the actual track record, and the mere act of training them sensitizes them to all the ways things can go wrong.

There's also a tradeoff between their naivete and effectiveness: a bumpkin who's never traveled internationally might believe whatever his handlers tell him, but is also more likely to draw suspicion or otherwise foul the mission.

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