I'm not, but I do crypto (as in PKI, smartcards) stuff, so let me try to explain some of the thinking behind hardware keys.
The idea of a second factor is that "something you have" is hard for an attacker to also have, however, proof of having something usually means "proof that you know some secret" and that secret itself can often be copied.
The lazy "proof you have" something is SMS auth, i.e. proof you control a phone number. However this isn't great, since in some jurisdictions ringing your mobile provider is enough to get control over that number.
TOTP then says: let's assume you have some secret seed and I also know it. If I take a hash of it (HOTP) and include some time information I have a code valid for a small window that is hard to steal. The benefit is that everywhere this secret exists you can have an authenticator. The downside is that this is rarely a separate device to your computer. You also are going to enter your code into a website... and that might not be the right website, allowing capture of the code via phishing.
The standard for legal, qualified digital signatures in the EU is to have non-extractable keys generated on hardware devices and never backed up. Why? Well, if you lose the hardware token (or it is damaged) you don't lose access to encrypted data, just the ability to sign documents. At this point you have an annoying dance to do to be issued a new token, but allowing backup of the signing key means signatures may be repudiated (because someone else could have stolen the backup).
The same goal applies to U2F / FIDO certified security keys. U2F generates a unique key-pair per authentication target and that private key never leaves the authenticator. This gives you two things: 1) a binding between your target service and your device. Phishing becomes a lot more difficult unless you can present the right challenge-response to the authenticator, and 2) an authenticator you physically need to have present, but don't need a pin or awkward copy-paste of a code to use. You aren't using this key for encryption, but for authentication, so, the backup strategy is: have multiple keys. If you lose one, you can delete that entry from respective accounts.
Password managers exist because some websites are password-only and even if not, you can't always trust they employed argon2id as a password hash. It also saves you having to remember multiple passwords. Your password database is something you will need to keep backed up.
Personally I keep printed recovery codes of really important accounts, spare registered security keys, and a disk with my password database on in a safe place.