1,430 karma · joined April 6, 2013
ulysse.carion@tesseral.com
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> Another issue with network-attached storage in the cloud comes in the form of limiting IOPS. Many cloud providers that use this model, including AWS and Google Cloud, limit the amount of IO operations you can send over the wire. [...]
> If instead you have your storage attached directly to your compute instance, there are no artificial limits placed on IO operations. You can read and write as fast as the hardware will allow for.
I feel like this might be a dumb series of questions, but:
1. The ratelimit on "IOPS" is precisely a ratelimit on a particular kind of network traffic, right? Namely traffic to/from an EBS volume? "IOPS" really means "EBS volume network traffic"?
2. Does this save me money? And if yes, is from some weird AWS arbitrage? Or is it more because of an efficiency win from doing less EBS networking?
I see pretty clearly putting storage and compute on the same machine strictly a latency win, because you structurally have one less hop every time. But is it also a throughput-per-dollar win too?
In case anyone else was looking for it, this article from the same author covers the more algorithm-y question of how a camera body decides to actually use these motors when you press the "focus" button: https://exclusivearchitecture.com/03-technical-articles-DSLR...
I can't find any articles on how a camera body decides what is and isn't a desired subject. I'm guessing there's some amount of machine learning-type stuff involved in that, seeing as how they can detect human (and bird?) faces?
And then https://github.com/martinthomson/i-d-template, though a bit elaborate, does automate a lot of IETF stuff, including use of kramdown-rfc.
> Indeed, when someone has a property interest, he or she typically has the “rights of possession and control.” And “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property” is “the right to exclude others.”
> The immutable smart contracts at issue in this appeal are not property because they are not capable of being owned. More than one thousand volunteers participated in a “trusted setup ceremony” to “irrevocably remov[e] the option for anyone to update, remove, or otherwise control those lines of code.” And as a result, no one can “exclude” anyone from using the Tornado Cash pool smart contracts.
Immutability is what makes this whole thing work for Tornado. The ruling is basically a whole explanation of why an immutable smart contract isn't property, isn't a service, isn't a patent, it isn't anything Treasury can touch. In fact, it's not even a "contract" (no counterparty).
But the mutable aspect of Tornado -- the optional gas fee anonymization middlemen, who are registered via a mutable smart contract -- they're still in the rough. Which makes the rally in the TORN coin those middlemen get paid in all the weirder.
It seems pretty clear to me that Treasury can sanction all of those Tornado relayers, because relayers have control over their actions; their participation happens through a mutable smart contract, and they can stop at any time.
The west inherits from the Romans, and Julius Caesar standardized away the Roman intercalary month by glomming it into Feburary. Before that a "priest" (the pontifex maximus) (in scare-quotes because it was a political office) would add that month on an ad-hoc basis. Not so different!
The only really important assumption not obviously present in TZif's data format is that when you go from a local time to a UTC time, there can only be up to two possibilities. A lot of software works on that assumption, for instance java.time.LocalDateTime has a withLaterOffsetAtOverlap():
https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/?java/time/LocalDa...
That implicitly assumes that whenever it's ambiguous what 2:30AM means, you can only have two possible solutions (pre- and post-DST). If a timezone were ever to manipulate its offsets so that there were three or more solutions (such as if they did a "fall back" at 2:00AM and then 2:15AM or something), a lot of stuff would be unable to represent that.
FWIW, the English-speaking world used to switch years on March 25: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calendar_(New_Style)_Act_1750#...
Neither of these are technically things that tzdb can even talk about. They're concerned with civil time, not calendars or other "reckoning" problems.
Separately, I'm a little skeptical of the tzdb's endeavor of even thinking about pre-Unix-epoch stuff. The bug-to-utility ratio of that stuff doesn't seem to be there. `zic` is where most of the ugly gnarliness of tzdb lies, and I sometimes feel that it would have been better if `zic` weren't an artifact others could depend on.
I find it interesting that they made up both "NexFundAI" and "NextFundAI" (with a t) with some sort of made-up relationship between the two.
I'm not going to misleadingly edit my initial comment, and your comment is fair. I said "just" when I should have said "precisely". As in, I was already talking about how SAML interacts with "Bob from Sales got fired, probably should kick him out of the CRM". SAML gives you "Bob can't log into the CRM ever again", SCIM gives you "... and his CRM user and sessions are immediately revoked".
To be clear, SSOReady also has a "SCIM made easy" API, we definitely know about and care about helping people implement SCIM: https://ssoready.com/docs/scim/scim-quickstart
For example, the ID of a SAML `AuthnRequest` always gets echoed back to you in the SAML `Response`. So you can use that as an opaque identifier. You store ID/state pairs in the database when you start SAML logins, and look them back up when the assertion comes back to you. Basically, that's what we do on behalf of our customers.
It's a bit more work for us to implement, but it gives SSOReady customers the "deeplinking" functionality without the weird caveats that RelayState carries.
And yeah, you're right -- Okta, for example, doesn't let you add SCIM to an OIDC application. It's unfortunate -- there's no deep technical reason you can't mix OIDC and SCIM -- but it is the world we live in.
FWIW, the for library I work on -- github.com/ssoready/ssoready -- we sidestepped this issue by simply not using SAML RelayState at all under the hood. Between the fact that it's vulnerable to attacker manipulation, and the size limits, it's not worth the pain. We just implement SAML RelayState / OAuth `state` via good old database persistence.
In recent years IETF has given us SCIM (which is sort of like "offline SAML") which is 3 RFCs (goals, schemas, http stuff), and of course JWT is actually part of a series of like 9 RFCs (including JWT, of course, but also JWK, JWS, JWE, JWA, ...).
I think there's this phenomenon where people who are like "dude, nobody cares, just do the dumbest possible thing we can get away with" aren't the people who decide to get involved in writing security specs.
This isn't to reduce the notability of the article, but isn't BIPM's interest in any color-perception stuff basically limited to making lightbulbs roughly equally bright? (i.e. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luminous_efficiency_function) I guess I don't see how even nonlinearity in perceptual space matters for that purpose.