That's how Samsung maintained the global top seller status after the Korean companies was forced out of China.
1,297 karma · joined April 1, 2017
1. China Helped Indonesia Build One of the World’s Biggest, Youngest Coal Fleets. It’s Still Growing, Indonesia is one of the few countries still building new coal power plants, the most polluting sources of power. Chinese companies are playing a large role despite a pledge by Beijing to halt such support. Nicholas Kusnetz, data analysis by Peter Aldhous, Inside Climate News, Oct 19, 2025
SK Hynix also has significant memory manufacturing presence in China; or about 40% of the company's entire DRAM capacity.
I find your last cherrypicked "Central and Eastern" EU smartphone data another stroke of desperation/genius, though it is not totally unexpected. Quite revealing!
(no "reply" button in your last comment)
Sure, doesn't really matter. I just have to demonstrate that your "local competition" theory in pre-Xi era doesn't hold water and the real world data don't bear that out, which I already have.
Whether Samsung China's sudden sales collapse came 1 day, or 1 year after Xi? not very relevant. That being said, in Apple's case, the Chinese media's coordinated attack started on Consumer Day in March 2013, just a day after Xi became president, but because of Apple's quick response and bold risky bet, suffered no damage. Samsung China's first sales decline since 2009 on the other hand became evident in Q1 2014 and after, or some 3 quarters after Xi. Or roughly equal to a 50% drop in market share and unit sales for the entire year 2014 and more significant drops in subsequent years. So we are talking 4+ years to go from 20% to less than 1%, so there goes your timeline arg out the window, too -- it's plenty time to implement informal anti-market policies and destroy a foreign competitor completely.
Again, this dramatic drop was not seen elsewhere, but in only China, indicating that the problem wasn't inherent to Samsung's product offering, competitiveness, or market. In open markets, such as EU, Samsung maintained a steady ~32+% market share post-Xi and wasn't affected at all by the rise or fall of Huawei, before or after the ban. Samsung EU's market share dipped below 30% in 2021 for the first time in 8+ years, after Huawei's ban which further undermines the narrative that Samsung somehow benefited from it.
Sure, you could use either metrics, but it shows the same thing: Samsung China's market share in 2012 was 17.7% (30M). Xi came to power in mid 2013 and Samsung's sales in each quarter 2013 were 18% (12.5M) in Q1, 19% (15M) Q2, 18% (17M) Q3, and 19% Q4 -- ie, it's a steady YoY growth, in relative % or absolute terms.
In other words, Samsung's sales were not affected by local competition "right before" or "around" Xi. Only after Xi's "In China, For China," both market share and absolute sales plunged from 17.7% (2012), to 19% (2013) to 7.9% (2014) or 31M (2012), to 70M (2013) to 35M (2014).
Again, this was isolated to China and as a result of Xi's anti-foreign policy in China only -- Samsung's sales continue to grow outside China to maintain their global lead.
Further, I cited McGee's recent excellent work which clearly demonstrates how Xi's anti-foreign policies suddenly changed business climate in China against foreign competitors -- which starts at Part 5: Political Awakening, Chapter 26 -- why it has everything to do with "The DESPOT." Not market competition, or THAAD/Note 7 fire.
Sure, except that narrative has too many flaws. Samsung China's smartphone sales increased from 11M in 2011, to 30M in 2012, to about 60+M in 2013 -- no such "drop" before Xi's rise. Then it cratered as Xi's anti-foreign "In China, For China" policy went in full swing. By 2016, Samsung's China sales figure was already down to just over 10M -- the Note 7 and THAAD were likewise inconsequential and Samsung smartphone sales continued to slide in China and China only. During this time between 2016-2017, Samsung's global sales continued to maintain its lead at around 310M even as its Chinese competitors, such as Huawei struggle against Samsung outside China without protection from Xi. Again, this conspicuous drop was in China only and there was no sudden change in consumer preference or product offering, as evident from Samsung's global sales -- ie, while Samsung China sales was down, it was up elsewhere. Xi's mercantile policies and the rising nationalism in China were the only changing variables.
Also it wasn't just Samsung alone either -- Apple was the next major foreign smartphone seller in China. Apple avoided Samsung's fate after Xi's rise in 2013 and Patrick McGee, a FT reporter, has recently released Apple in China: the Capture of the World's Greatest Company, meticulously detailing how Apple countered Xi's "For China, In China," but, by doubling down on China, Apple is in effect "captured" by Xi. see Chapter 26 "Despot" and on.
Not sure if Huawei was ever a threat to Samsung or Apple outside China as most of Huawei's growth was in China only and there was no other single major market in which Huawei came close to Apple's or Samsung's. China is also the only major market where Samsung's market share is less than 1% and I'm very disinclined to believe this is coincidence. I think the common misconception is that Samsung was "outcompeted" by Huawei when it was in fact forced out of China. This practice became quite common in other industries too after Xi -- eg, all foreign competitors in EV batteries business such as LG, Panasonic, Samsung, etc were also effectively banned in China under Xi's Made-In-China 2025, launched in 2015 to protect local "champions," such as CATL/BYD.
Apple is the most profitable company in the smartphone business and, while their "unit sales" or market share accounts for only about 20%, Apple's share of the smartphone industry's profit is about 80+%.
I'm otherwise of opinion that the West's decisive counter measures are necessary against China's mercantile practices.
pareto?
Not really. THAAD really plays no part in Samsung's fall in China. Samsung's smartphone sales in China was already down by -70% by the time THAAD broke out in 2016 from its peak in 2013 and still went down further to less than 1%. Samsung packed up and closed the last Chinese factory in 2019 -- went to Vietnam instead.
Patrick McGee recently released Apple in China: The Capture of the World's Greatest Company: it better describes the anti-foreign political situation in China at the time and what it meant to the smartphone industry. And how Apple avoided Samsung's fate, but is now captured by it. See Chapter 26 "Despot" and on.
But for EVs, the vast majority in EU/US is NCM/NCA. China is about 6 to 4 LFP to NCM, but China's EV market is about 2/3+ of the global EV share.
Republic of Armenia,
Republic of Azerbaijan
Republic of Belarus
Georgia
Kyrgyz Republic
Republic of Moldova
Russian Federation
Republic of Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Republic of Uzbekistan
Socialist Republic of Vietnam
No need to pretend that Chinese EV/battery companies can compete on their own without the gov't protection or "illegal" subsidies.
We are talking since early 2010 and on. And it's pretty much what everyone says they are: China has been breaking every trade/IP laws/agreements -- forced IP transfer/IP theft, ban foreign competition, illegal state subsidies to overcapacity, etc to get to where they are in the EV battery market.
As explained, the price level or the cost of manufacture in China, the exporting country, is completely irrelevant as their local price/cost of manufacturer is artificially propped up by illegal state subsidies or other anti-market tactics to cripple foreign competition past 15 years. Again, China is a non-market-economy.
In those cases, trade regulators can use "undistorted" prices without gov't interference or use a market price in a similarly situated 3rd country as benchmark.
But then China is a non-market-economy, so none of these rules apply in a hypothetical anti-dumping case -- ie, China's local price, or "normal value" doesn't matter.
LFP's thermal runaway threshold is higher than other lithium ion battery types, but once TR starts, LFP generates more hydrogen gas that can explode if not air-vented out fast enough.
China is also increasing their coal footprint outside China despite their pledge not to[1].
1. China Helped Indonesia Build One of the World’s Biggest, Youngest Coal Fleets. It’s Still Growing, Nicholas Kusnetz, data analysis by Peter Aldhous, Inside Climate News, Oct 19, 2025
They don't want to go home because they fear the Chinese criminal gangs would follow them home in South Korea where they were recruited in the first place by Korean-speaking Chinese for debts they accrued while they were held captive. Others also fear they could also be held liable for participating in their fraud -- even if they were forced -- not because they love getting beaten.
This is somewhat dated (2012), but I suspect that it hasn't changed much: <5%[1].
1. Rare Earths Shortage Would Spur Pentagon to Action, Gopal Ratnam, Bloomberg April 9, 2012 https://archive.ph/1aEF8
Sure, China's tech transfer in BEV/hybrid/battery tech had been going on since 2011 and continued until fairly recently, not just in 2011 (read NYT article cited in example #1).
> No, technology transfer is not blanket banned by the WTO. It's actually encouraged for developing countries.
Wrong. That only applies to LDC, or Least Developed Countries under the TRIPS Agreement, GATT 1994. And we aren't exactly talking about high-tech EV/battery or semi-manufacturing tech, but better farming, irrigating, fertilizer techniques in countries like Bukina Faso, Angola, or Haiti. The rules aren't for China to exploit.
China's "developing" status allows "additional transition time," in implementing necessary local IP regulatory regime. China's WTO Accession was in 2001 and this transition arrangement/allowance expired about 15 years ago and China is still inconsistent with the global standard (see for instance EU's recent anti-injunction suit). Nothing under the WTO allows China's illegal forced tech transfer/IP theft otherwise.
> I don't think the WTO has ruled on that complaint.
Sure, there was hardly anything for China to deny or defend. China instead agreed to reform their foreign investment laws (FIL): no further market restriction or force tech transfer, but took another 3 years to implement in 2020/2021 and many are still afraid to pull out some 4-5 years later; again Tesla being the only foreign automaker operating fully independently without a JV in China.
> The US faced virtually no competition for EV vehicles from China before 2022. The protectionist measures came up as soon as the competition appeared.
BYD's electric bus business in California has been around since the early 2010s. The Japanese + Korean battery producers, such as LG, Panasonic, Samsung, etc banned in China since 2015 under Xi's protectionism (aka, Made-In-China 2025), have been in the US without any restriction for well over a decade. The last American battery producer, A123, collapsed in 2012 and the foreign battery producers have dominated the US market without any restriction. Unlike China, America has no problem collaborating with foreign trading partners.
> You're really going to claim that China does not lead in current-day research?
Not really. Many are awe'ed as China's illegally subsidized overcapacity floods their local market, but often conflate the two: market domination vs. tech innovation. China's competitive edge is a function of China's illegal subsidies and protectionism. No evidence to believe Chinese EV/battery producers can compete without daddy Xi's big wallet or baton to keep away foreign competition.
> You're reaching back to decades ago, ..
Sure, most lithium ion battery tech used in today's EVs were developed over 20+ years ago and most relevant EV battery patents developed past 10-15 years are by Japanese/Koreans and they will dominate for quite some time. Again, this is why China has focused on LFP (effectively royalty free after 2022/2023 for export) or post-lithium batteries instead. In other word, China is likely to benefit from their R&D in post-lithium once they are commercialized and mass-produced at scale years down the road, if ever.
> Government subsidies are fairly small, and are paid to the consumer (not the producer), ...
Already cited an article showing that China's consumer direct subsidy was significant (see example #1, $19+K per EV which more or less continued until 2019) and another showing that the consumer subsidy was anything, but pro-consumer (see example #3) -- consumer's choice was limited to EVs with Chinese batteries to funnel subsidies back to their local battery "champions" only -- ie, anti-consumer. China's neo-mercantile economy prioritizes national "champions," not consumers.
> so they don't affect the cost of exported goods.
Of course they do. That's what EU's recent probe (2024/1866 and 2024/27) revealed and also why China hand them out like Halloween candies.
> Chinese companies are selling EVs in Europe at far, far higher prices than in China.
Again, China's local price or cost of production don't mean jack -- China is a non-market-economy and their local price/cost products are artificially deflated by the Chinese gov't's illegal subsidies. Also cited EU's Anti-dumping Regulation (2016/1036) explaining how the "normal value" is determined in such a case (see Article 2, Determination of dumping; A. NORMAL VALUE). It's well to remember however that Chinese EVs are countervailed under EU's Anti-Subsidy Regulation (2016/1037) where the price level/normal value is NOT a major consideration.
Thanks for playing, but I don't like talking in circles. Good bye.
of course they are relevant and are built on tech transfer.
> It was not only allowed, but actually viewed as a legitimate way for underdeveloped economies to develop.
Again, this was illegal then and China was taken to the WTO in 2018 (WT/DS549 China — Certain Measures on the Transfer of Technology ) as I'd already explained (example #1).
> The US has all sorts of "Buy American" provisions and subsidies, going way back before 2022.
Sure, which EV or batteries before 2022?
> You're talking about the 1990s. I'm talking about now, 30 years later. The Chinese lead in battery technology and spend massive amounts of money on R&D.
Again, "ACTIVE" patents. Patents last just 20 years. Korea in particular have already dominated most automotive lithium ion battery patents 10-15 years. Again, this why is China forced tech transfer and "effectively" banned Japan + Korea battery makers when they realized their local "champions" still couldn't catch up or compete in 2015. China's obsession with LFP whose core patents expired last 3-4 years is likewise no coincidence and their "RECENT" investment in "post"-lithium ion batteries, such as sodium.
> Not true. First off, just as a footnote, there never was "forced technology transfer."
Again, see the WTO case WT/DS549 China — Certain Measures on the Transfer of Technology
> No, dumping involves selling your products below the cost of manufacture in foreign markets. When you instead sell them at a substantial markup, that's called "making bank."
Again this doesn't apply to China. China's "local price" or "cost of manufacture" is not considered a "normal value" as their entire supply-chain is distorted by gov't subsidies.
Europe's Basic Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 (anti-subsidy regulation) has specific provisions for non-market-economy countries -- ie China, Article 2(7a)
In the case of imports from non-market-economy countries (6), the normal value shall be determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in a market economy third country, or the price from such a third country to other countries, including the Union, or, where those are not possible, on any other reasonable basis, including the price actually paid or payable in the Union for the like product, duly adjusted if necessary to include a reasonable profit margin.Sure, I'm giving you a chronological high level view of China's illegal practices past 15 years when China's NEV subsidies programs started.
> Chinese joint venture / technology transfer requirements in the automobile sector were eliminated several years ago.
This was never allowed and China upon China's 2001 Accession were required to phase them out 15 years ago, which China never did.
> You also raise domestic component requirements to qualify for subsidies. The US does exactly the same thing.
Sure, Biden's IRA passed in 2022 is a counter measure against China's domestic sourcing requirement since 2015.
> 1. China leads in EV R&D. Chalking up its dominance to theft of foreign IP doesn't make any sense.
False. Most, or close to 80% of all ACTIVE lithium ion battery patents are held by Japan and South Korea. The lithium ion battery industry was single-handledly created by Sony in Japan back in the early 1990's; quickly followed by South Korea. China was very late to the game and so far behind, which is why China forced tech transfer from Japan and South Korea since 2011 (see example #1) and effectively banned them in 2015 (example #2) -- still refuses to enforce IPR of foreigners, which isn't anything new. Japan + Korea in fact started going after the Chinese infringers only this year and in Europe -- already scored significant legal victories and sales injunctions in Germany. Many more coming and CATL isn't far in their legal pipelines.
> 2. China specifically invited Tesla to enter the country, and showered it with subsidies.
Sure, again Tesla is the only foreign automaker operating fully independently without forced tech transfer and other jazz in China. Tesla is an exception, not the norm. After EU filed WT/DS549, China promised to reform FIL and supposedly implemented in 2020/2021, but Tesla still remains the only foreign automaker without forced JV/tech transfer today.
> 3. That's the opposite of how dumping works.
Wrong again. That's exactly how dumping works and why there are over 6-7 dozens of anti-dumping measures against China in EU. Dumping doesn't depend on a markup or profit/loss, but on the undistorted "normal-value" born by market without gov't interference -- eg, price fixing or illegal subsidies.
> This was a purely political decision.
Again there are over 100+ ACTIVE anti-subsidies/dumping measures in force against China. It's just one of many and has been on EU's radar for 15 years.
In the US, it's implemented thru 19 U.S.C § 3571. The EU's foreign subsidies are regulated by Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 based on the same WTO SCM Agreement.
While the WTO's regulations don't preclude local subsidy regulation, they must be consistent with the WTO's Agreement. In other word, any gov't subsidy favoring a "specific" company(ies) over domestic, foreign competitors, or distort market competition is an "actionable" offense and can be litigated before the WTO -- agriculture (quota based) and national security are however exempted. Others, such as export subsidies or local content requirement are prohibited under Article 3, "Prohibition" of the SCM.
That's your local political problem.
Not really, not much similarities between China and EU subsidies past 15 years. China's NEV subsidies are illegal because they are either conditioned on illegal tech transfer, local content requirement, or restrict market access. To give a high level view of the problems:
1) forced technology transfer/IP theft -- all foreign automakers/EV battery producers forced to give up IP to access China's market (and subsidies). This was litigated before the WTO by the EU in 2018 (see WT/DS549):
Hybrid in a Trade Squeeze, Keith Bradsher, Sept 5, 2011, NYT
... The Chinese government is refusing to let the Volt qualify for subsidies totaling up to $19,300 a car unless G.M. agrees to transfer the engineering secrets for one of the Volt’s three main technologies to a joint venture in China with a Chinese automaker, G.M. officials said.
Power Play, Trefor Moss, May 17, 2018, WSJ
... China requires auto makers to use batteries from one of its approved suppliers if they want to be cleared to mass-produce electric cars and plug-in hybrids and to qualify for subsidies. These suppliers are all Chinese, so such global leaders as South Korea’s LG Chem Ltd and Japan’s Panasonic Corp. are excluded.
... Foreign batteries aren’t officially banned in China, but auto executives say that since 2016 they have been warned by government officials that they must use Chinese batteries in their China-built cars, or face repercussions. That has forced them to spend millions of dollars to redesign cars to work with inferior Chinese batteries, they say.
... “We want to comply, and we have to comply,” said one executive with a foreign car maker. “There’s no other option.”
Why a Chinese Company Dominates Electric Car Batteries. Keith Bradsher and Michael Forsythe, Dec 22, 2021, NYT
The government soon said electric car buyers could get subsidies only if the battery was made by a Chinese company. G.M., which had not been notified of the rule, started shipping Buick Velite electric cars in 2016 with batteries made in China by LG, a South Korean company.
Angry consumers and dealers complained that local officials were denying them subsidies, people familiar with the episode said. G.M. switched heavily to CATL for the huge Chinese market.
Why a Chinese Company Dominates Electric Car Batteries.
... A rival had released a video suggesting that a technology used by the company, CATL, and other manufacturers could cause car fires. Imitating a Chinese government safety test, the rival had driven a nail through a battery cell, one of many in a typical electric car battery. The cell exploded in a fireball.
Chinese officials took swift action — by dropping the nail test, according to documents reviewed by The New York Times. The new regulation, released two months later, listed who had drafted it: First on the list, ahead of the government’s own vehicle testing agency, was CATL.
As of this week, EU has over 100+ countervailing measures (anti-dumping/anti-subsidy) in force against Chinese imports, ranging from ceramic tiles (AD560), to decor paper (AD712), to polyester yarn (AD690); in addition to few more dozens of on-going investigations from candles (AD726) to hardwood plywood (AD717).