7,585 karma · joined March 31, 2016
So now you’ve packaged the problem in a new layer that doesn’t solve anything but creates new problems.
The concept of an open connection waiting for the server to say anything is not novel or special, it just, as we already know, doesn’t really work reliably, you have to do more work to make it reliable.
* if you’re this paranoid, do not give your phone to a stranger
The point of the system is to protect against an attacker who steals the laptop so it is a complete failure.
https://www.theverge.com/2023/11/22/23972220/microsoft-windo...
Running servers and writing software is not free.
If the environment is safe, don’t expose it, functions that expose it are unsafe and should be documented as unsafe and unavailable in production.
If the functions are normal, the environment is unsafe, don’t store secrets there.
You have to make a choice, it can’t be half of both. That is the real issue.
Not choosing is not an option, it leads to this ‘max severity score’ ‘vulnerability’.
If your AppleTV is running an app that is playing media, that app is the player. And that app will add the new keys, that it finds in the media it is playing, to its revocation list so that app can no longer play any protected media to the blocked device. It will refuse to communicate with the inline box because the key used by the box is now on the revocation list.
And there probably is some mechanism that causes this to apply systemwide, either because the encryption and list management is in some dedicated chip or because the list is shared systemwide.
These systems are so thoroughly broken though that as far as I know this has never been used and the protection is more of a legal one.