Some notes from an InfoSec person.
- Have a stand alone SSH server that is something like a R-Pi[type B] running an OS that gets patches regularly via unattended-upgrades and reboots itself at least once a week.[could also be a minimal VM like AlpineOS if you need Gbps+ line speed]
- Have this R-Pi and your network gear plugged into a UPS that can withstand at least a couple of hours of power outage.
- Use non-standard ports on your perimeter FW for forwarding to the R-Pi.
- Run fail2ban or something similar. Set a bantime of at least an hour[3600 sec] after no more than 5 attempts in 600 sec. This is mostly to discourage anyone who stumbles across your perimeter listening port.[which enough will] Password login will be disabled anyway, but a bot might not check for allowed auth types.[nmap -Pn -p 22 --script ssh-auth-methods <target>]
- No passwords allowed in /etc/ssh/sshd_config[PasswordAuthentication no]. Use public key based authentication.[PubkeyAuthentication yes] Put the public SSH key[id_rsa.pub] of any machine that you wish to authorize into ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on your R-Pi. This way you can authorize and de-authorize remote machines[with particular users] at will.
- add 'AllowUsers xxxx yyyy' to your /etc/ssh/sshd_config
- No root logins allowed![PermitRootLogin no]
- Maybe limit via perimeter or on the R-Pi which source IP ranges are allowed to access to SSH.[whitelisting]
- Periodically review your logs of perimeter FW, R-Pi FW and /var/log/auth.log to see what's going on. It should be pretty quiet, but look at them anyway once a week.
- Sleep well knowing that you have a simple, layered and robust defense strategy that also has power-event survivability.
Others have mentioned port-knocking which is a cool trick but not something that I typically use in an actual daily defense strategy because I'm not sure how much value it really adds.
Don't use your perimeter device to host SSH services. It will not get patches fast enough when vulns come up.