[0]: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curse_of_dimensionality
1,122 karma · joined October 23, 2013
[0]: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curse_of_dimensionality
Actually, not new. Earliest CVE I found was from 2017, which feels a decade later than it should be. I guess no one thought of pushing JSON over trusted interfaces, and probably for good reason.
Anyways:
1. Github benchmark: https://github.blog/engineering/infrastructure/improve-git-m...
2. The original email thread: https://public-inbox.org/git/CB04005C.2C669%25joshua.redston...
3. There's another email thread that gets linked everywhere - but in light of the prior thread, the numbers don't track: https://public-inbox.org/git/CB5074CF.3AD7A%25joshua.redston...
I recall there being a message from someone either at AirBnB or Uber who mentioned that they have a similar monorepo but without the slow git status, but can't seem to find it now - it's likely on one of the other mailing list archives but didn't make it to this one.
Point being that painting this as "the community was hostile" or "git is too slow for FB" is just disingenuous. The FB engineer barely communicated with the git team (at least publicly) and when there was communication, it was pushing a single benchmark that was deeply flawed, and then ignoring feedback on how to both improve the performance of slow blame, commit by repacking checkpoint packfiles (a one-off effort) and also ignoring feedback that the benchmark numbers didn't make sense in absolute terms.
Nail in the coffin on this was a benchmark GitHub ran two years ago that got the results that FB should have: git status within seconds.
Facebook didn't use mercurial because of big O, they used it because of hubris and a bad disk config.
If there's one thing you learn quick in fintech - it's you absolutely do not fuck with sanctions.
Sanctions violations are very much a "do not pass go" style crime, and this looks like it was an entire batch that was delivered directly to Hezbollah.
Our question was far simpler: it was a simple class (java + python variants, no fancy syntax) and ask them to describe what it does, then find the bug, and finally ask them what they would change.
It reflects a true test of what the day to day is, and whether or not the candidate would succeed in the role.
Google did extreme evil with .dev, with the blessing of ICANN.
Which gives some context to the calls for Google to bring the play store content library to Horizon.
* Remote desktop forwarding through tmux, ssh, mosh, etc
* Instrumentation of your UI - simply replay the input
* Screen recording with asciinema
Not to mention that you can target the exact same UI framework across Linux, Mac, Windows, and more.
On the other hand, it doesn't play well with your desktop environment. Taken to an extreme - if all your daily drivers are in the terminal:
* You can't easily tell them apart because they all have the same icon
* Some of those bells and whistles might not be supported in all emulators - tmux and mosh are probably a good baseline.
* Accessibility support is lacking (TFA). This is probably more of a demand side problem than anything else though.
On the whole, it's a decent enough UI target for an inner platform on the level with the web - all we need now is Muon - a wrapper that includes a terminal emulator so you can write "native" terminal programs with their own icons.
Even if that were somehow ok, they should have seen greater visual engagement for hunt and peck one finger typing (exclusively right index finger).
No mention in their methodology if they allowed students to practice the one word they gave them to write five times either, which further pollutes the data.
Bottom line - poorly designed study produces predictable results and researchers use that soapbox to suggest educational policy.
I sync two databases across Mac, linux, ipads, and android phones. One for work, one for personal.
Saying the civil war is not about slavery because the invasion was about responding to Confederate belligerence is like saying that someone who died with Covid-19 actually died from heart failure. You might be technically correct (most people's hearts fail when they die), but it's at best pedantic and at worst disingenuous.
https://www.battlefields.org/learn/primary-sources/declarati...
That was just the first result from searching for "letters of secession"
Point is that just taking the tiny step of forcing this from a wiki page into code can tip things towards automation. The real difficulty is keeping those scripts up to date. I'm still working on a solution for that (hopefully I'll have something to share in the next few weeks).
More likely than not, this got caught up in a regular job that scans DNS zones for new domains to "filter". It's just a matter of time before this catches anything related to Scunthorpe[0].
A lot can be done in 3014 bytes, but what's the difference in code size for the ascii trie vs. a flat list/gzip/brotli?
They were aware of the issue, buried it in the report and reneged on their promise to keep it internal-only. That was the mitigating argument for allowing it despite the known existing usage. Google acted in bad faith and I'd need to see concrete proof to convince me otherwise.
That having been said, this was a wonderful read, and beautifully presented.
Do you know if they simply encrypted the data in place or if they succeeded in exfiltrating a full copy?
Regarding the decorators, there's a reason it's popular: it saves boilerplate. The good news is that it's python, so you can do something like this:
from pyappcache import RedisCache
@RedisCache
def get_slow_thing_v3(thing_id):
thing = get_slow_thing_from_a_database_layer()
return thing
def update_something_slow(thing_id, new_thing):
get_slow_thing_v3.set_cache(thing_id, new_thing)
set_thing_in_a_database_layer(new_thing)It's a matter of having a smaller attack surface. There are plenty of container images that run with root access by default, which is almost full access to the kernel. This means that if the application running in the container is compromised, you need to rely on the kernel enforcing the sandbox between containers. This is a relatively new threat (root not being fully trusted), so beyond there simply being more attack surface, there's likely to be more bugs/vulns out there to be discovered. With effort and care you can safely run this but reducing attack surface is a good idea for defense in depth.
Story time: I had tmux sessions active on all our servers and would simply ssh into my work laptop from home, so the sessions were never really closed. One day, I decided to upgrade from 1404 to 1604 and closed out all my sessions (including on the servers because I was pushing out a new tmux config). After 5 minutes we started getting smss that the system was down and couldn't write to disk. One of our production servers had been set up with an encrypted home folder and when my session closed out, it closed the encrypted folder. Unfortunately, the ssh folder wasn't outside the encrypted portion, so we had to use IPMI to restore access. That's the story about how we started joking that closing my laptop is a great way to break the production system.
A basic assumption of TCP is that retransmission only happens due to congestion. It fundamentally assumes a perfect channel, which is why wireless connectivity doesn't play well with it. There have been many attempts to fix this but they require changes in both the AP and the client, so I don't think anyone has really bothered to implement in common hardware yet.
That aside, I dont see any first hand source for the repo owner being Iranian, only speculation in the comments. The situation is sad, but a reasonable response to a PR that has legal issues. I don't think there's much intelligent discussion that can be had about this.
[0]: https://techcrunch.com/2019/07/29/github-ban-sanctioned-coun...
EDIT: github doesn't show profile location on mobile. My bad.