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Where is the constitution does it say the state can't do that?

What does your explanation have to do with the fact that C++ can express by-value returns of complex objects?

My question stands.

Has anyone actually been charged and convicted for disclosing knowledge of a vulnerability in exchange for money with no further collusion to commit a crime?

No, it wouldn't.

Has anyone actually been convicted of abetting a crime by selling a vulnerability, by itself, not conspiring with the buyer to commit a crime using said vulnerability? Not as far as I can see. It would be absurd to jail someone for accurately describing a bug.

> Blackhat markets will always be able to pay better.

... than Google?

> Selling to Google though you aren't chancing jail time.

Why would you go to jail for selling a vulnerability? It's free speech.

You let the market decide. Google could purchase the bugs on the same market blackhats do.

The whole AI-O-Sphere is allergic to using sandboxes that are actually robust

What makes you think this task won't fall quickly too?

5) Otherwise-sober people on X will say "oh my god i was a doubter before but now it's real omg" before the new model smell wears off and they realize the new thing is stupid in ways models have been generally stupid

6) accusations of quantized serving after new model smell wears off and people see the new thing making mistakes

> no easy way to tell a reserved 2LD (open for 3LD registrations only) apart from a normal 2LD on .name

And that's one reason why the public-ness of a hierarchy level belongs on a DNS record on that level and not some separately-distributed side list.

It's a good metaphor and I refuse to let AI ruin it for me.

What makes you think Rust is automatically better?

(Also, "Rust or native" is a strange dichotomy. What's not native about Rust?)

There's no security benefit to doing this versus demand-downloading hashed-locked components on need.

This equivocation on the word "exist" doesn't work anymore. It's not 2018 anymore. Normal people with common sense understand that keeping politics separate from technology isn't the same thing as existential violence. Nobody, to "exist", needs to make software political.

No, it is definitely possible to make great software without inserting messaging on irrelevant issues into it. Whatever the quality of Omarchy, DHH is right about parts of the free software world becoming entangled worth various irrelevant causes.

Oh. Correction noted. That's all water under the bridge now though. You can't hold grudges forever.

Why would he resign over that? He's threatened to resign over removing DOS support, but has no problem with pdumper.

WASM is totally unnecessary. Vanilla seccomp is sufficient and runs at full performance. What is it with people trying to stick WASM in places it's not needed?

Browsers have been sandboxing their tabs since 2008. Don't sit there and tell me that bwrap, sandboxing, whatever is some kind of recent innovation with uneven distro support.

And yes, bwrap needs root or namespaces. So what? So does sudo. Setuid binaries are as old as time.

You know what's also been around and doesn't require root? Landlock. Have you heard of it? Has anyone? There's a huge PR and visibility gap in this space. We don't have to invent some new thing. We have to get people to learn about what we already have and use it.

"Oh, the technology works, but it need setup! Oh, my distro doesn't enable it! Oh, it doesn't work out of the box with my code!"

This is a social problem. It's not a technology problem. It's people not wanting to do the work, not understanding what already exists, dismissing solutions based on non-problems (like bwrap needing privileges on some systems), and in general adopting an attitude of "no", not a can-do problem solving stance.

And we're supposed to solve this problem with let another precious little effects language or another fucking MicroVM environment? FFS.

We need unprivileged sandboxing!"

"Use bwrap"

"Nooo, that needs setuid root or file caps!!!1!1"

"So the problem is that bwrap is part of the TCB?"

"Yes. We need sandboxing that relies only on unprivileged code like the Linux kernel"

... the fuck?

You can't solve a social problem with technology.

The technology works fine if you use it in a disciplined way. The problem is that people don't! You're necessarily going to break programs if you put them in restricted environments. That's not the same as the restriction technology not working properly.

> Sandboxing almost always involves having a dedicated, privileged service, due to how operating systems have designed things.

Or just invoking bwrap. Or sandbox-execute. There's no performance overhead. Complexity is minimal. Just read current Codex source code. It's not so bad. People have been making these sandbox tools for AI agents for years. Just need to apply sandboxing to all domains.

You want some kind of silver bullet that makes code "safe" without anyone having to change anything? To prompt for nothing? To use no IPC portal? That's not happening.

The people saying we need a new language or something are half right. We don't need a new language. A pure library solution is fine! But people do need to do work to make an ecosystem based on capabilities and least privilege to work. And we need to tell people who refuse to do this work to go to hell.

A new language is neither necessary nor sufficient. What we need is new set of balls.

There's no good reason a proc macro can't run in a no-IO sandbox by default. None. Doesn't require a language change. Doesn't require some microvmcapabilityeffect BS. It requires looking people straight in the eye and saying "no" when they complain about needing to prompt for privileges.

No, the reason people haven't been doing this -- and we've had technologies for ages -- is that it's a huge pain in the ass, a "tax", that it's hard to get developers inside a company to pay, much less participants in open source ecosystems.

Look at how snap, flatpak, etc. provoke people to just turn off security rather than deal with breakages.

A new language won't help because the problem is social, not technical.

FFS, you can't even get people to use filesystems via intermediate objects in today's languages. People think your language is broken if you don't have an ambient open(). You don't need a new language to enforce capability discipline. You need to whack people repeatedly with a cluebat until their laziness and brain damage abate.

MicroVM this, effects that --- can we discuss security without needing to invoke bay area buzzwords?

The idea is "least privilege", and we desperately need it in computing. The precise technical mechanism we use to achieve it is less important than committing to the idea that a dependency doesn't run with full privilege of its host program and an install script doesn't run with full privilege of the programmer.

The original Linux seccomp is old enough to drink. It's always been possible to do things like expand macros in a no-IO environment. Nobody's bothered to do it over the past two decades. Why would anyone bother in the next two decades?

I'm honestly baffled as to how EU regulators can see Apple's behavior as compliance. They're doing everything they did before, perhaps changing only to temporarily turn down the intensity a bit.

Different RISC-V dialects might as well be as different from each other as English is from German. Sure, the cognates, family the resemblance, and common(-ish) alphabet make some things easier, but if you're shipping a manual, you still need to do it both in English and auf Deutsch unless you rely on machine translation.

So it is with the family of mutually incomprehensible ISAs called RISC-V.

If some drainage good, maybe more drainage better?

Even if it is temporary, so what? Can't you just repeat it? And wouldn't clearing these drainage channels be harmless (modulo risks of any surgery) even if the theory didn't pan out? If I had early-stage Alzheimer's I'd go to the ends of the Earth and do everything I could to slow it down.

Why?