121 karma · joined September 5, 2010
This in combination with the marketing efforts of the IRCv3 group places large amounts of pressure to just accept and maintain the patch in order to ensure that you wind up on their list of recommended software to use, instead of their advocacy of using a different software which has added the patches.
Historically the IRCv3 project originated at Atheme as a project to bring some extensions to IRC in order to make it more modernized, such as the SASL binding (IRC Authentication Layer). ZNC guys and Atheme guys did not get along because political reasons, so they threatened to fork the project. Atheme decided to spin off the IRCv3 project at that time as it was no longer really interesting to Atheme anyway (IAL was adopted in basically every IRCd and most mainstream clients).
While I cannot really comment on the current managerial processes of the project (as I do not know what internal discussions the technical board has anymore, if any), the technical board allows people to submit things that they know will never ever be ratified, without saying what the outcome will be when it is already known to them, in order to give the appearance that they are an open project. In fact, advising people to not work on specifications that mainstream vendors will not adopt is actively discouraged by the working group, as the image of being open and the appearance of being non-offensive is more important than discouraging people from wasting their time.
As for charybdis (a widely deployed IRC server): we keep an eye on the IRCv3 group and implement things that we find interesting. There is no commitment from us to implement future IRCv3 work just because it is an IRCv3 specification.
As for IRC itself: IRC is a wonderful thing, but honestly in 2016 we can do much better. The backwards compatibility requirement of IRCv3 (which exists because they do not feel they have enough influence yet) is a serious crutch that prevents a lot of potential work for fixing design problems with IRC. The lack of unique identifiers at the client level (other than nickname) makes a lot of things like nickname ownership painful. The overall concept of IRC is a powerful one, but the technical foundation is crap. This is why Slack, gitter.im, etc are kicking IRC's ass right now, and IRCv3 is honestly too little too late for that fight. These services offer easy integration with any type of website and the IRCv3 group is too busy talking about bringing HSTS to IRC. This is a total and complete inversion of priorities verses where they should be.
The eventual end game is to have a flag day and deprecate the legacy format, but this will probably take a few years to do.
And he financed it with his bitcoin winnings, I guess.
Comcast is really in a class of it's own regarding one-sided peering policies, but the other providers like Cox for example are fairly easy to peer with.
The post clearly discusses layer7 floods which do not have layer3 properties (such as slowloris.pl, rudy.pl, etc.) which are uncommon.
It would be a safe bet to say that the Github attack had layer-3 properties.
I deal with this crap all the time.
Writing a fully-fledged RFC1459 parser that handles all potential corner-cases in a secure and efficient manner is actually very difficult. By moving the essence of the protocol to an encapsulation that is based on JSON, it can be parsed with already proven JSON libraries.
As an example, the bug which crashed EFnet at the end of 2012 was caused by an unanticipated side-effect in the way RFC1459 messages are formed. Ratbox is a server which has benefited from the work of many experts on parsing RFC1459, and yet the bug was still there.
A simple JSON representation maintains the serviceability of using telnet as a client, but the proposals made on the bug were ridiculous. Either way, you guys trashed it so it gets buried for now.
http://lowendtalk.com/discussion/20847/buyvm-lies-cheats-ste...
Whether they are doing so dishonestly is a subjective question though. I changed the README a little.
In that case, we do not have files in /proc to look at, we have to do it the hard way instead.
Hosting providers do this with their Virtuozzo products so they can take advantage of memory deduplication. Such information can be helpful in diagnosing performance bottlenecks (think paravirtual steal-time).
We need more things like OpenStack out there -- competently designed and implemented toolstacks that actually work correctly and have a remotely acceptable security model.
[5126545.172128] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffff1de68048