I'm not sure how well cloudflare handles http vary headers, e.g. 3rd party resources that serve different content depending on cookies or user agent. An example could be google web fonts which serves different css and fonts to different browsers.
3,611 karma · joined April 24, 2011
I'm not sure how well cloudflare handles http vary headers, e.g. 3rd party resources that serve different content depending on cookies or user agent. An example could be google web fonts which serves different css and fonts to different browsers.
[1] https://developers.google.com/closure/library/ [2] https://groups.google.com/group/closure-library-discuss/brow...
cpu:
hetzner: Intel Xeon E3-1275 (4 physical cores)
ec2: 4 virtual cores (13 "ecus" where each ecu is ~ 2007 xeon core)
ram:
hetzner: 32 GB ECC
ec2: 34 GB (previous commenters have speculated that it's non-ecc because Amazon only mentions otherwise for compute units)
disk:
hetnzer: customizable, cheapest is 3TB disk or 120 GB SSD for 15 euros/month
ec2: 850 GB (ephermeral)
network:
hetzner: 100 Mbit (incoming free, 10TB outgoing free, 7 euros/TB after)
ec2: unknown speed (incoming free, $0.12/GB outgoing, $120/TB)
price:
hetzner: ~$265 for first month, $115 thereafter (includes setup fee, excludes VAT, after euro to usd conversion,
includes cheapest hd option)
ec2: $648/month
There are a lot of other factors like the additional services amazon provides, failover, scaling, bandwidth quality, US ping times, reserved instance pricing, etc. It's not a straightforward comparison, but I would argue that for many users hetzner is the much faster and cheaper option.edit: formatting, spelling
The cpu specs are disingenuous as well. A heroku dyno may run on an intel xeon cpu, but I would never say a dyno "has" a 4 core cpu.
The different sources of the SMS may not cause alarm. The victim may not go back to original message to verify the numbers. Many companies have multiple legitimate phone numbers. The phisher may try to find phone numbers that are variations of Google's so the user is less likely to notice.
The phishing page could be secure in the sense of having SSL and looking professional. I haven't use Google's SMS verification, but I'm hoping that the text they send raises red flags about only entering the code in Google's web site. If not, e.g. if it's just the code, I could very easily see a victim entering the code into a legimate site. If Google's SMS does have warnings, the attacker could get a domain like https://gmailgiftcardverification.com that may still get some victims to enter the verification code.
I think this is more dangerous than page directly phishing for a google password. Users are conditioned to look for google.com and a green address bar before revealing their password. On the other hand, SMS verification is relatively new, and users may be less familiar with what to expect regarding the format and origins of the text messages.
That being said, I have no problems with Apache, especially if it's already in place and working.
As an interesting side note, tunneling HTTP over a random port (in the slides port 61985) had a higher success rate than port 80 (86% vs 67%). If I remember correctly, the speakers attribute this to intermediate proxies hardcoded to handle port 80, leaving other ports free of processing.
Instead of an implicit promise of compatibility, a Nix continuous build and testing system[2] could explicitly mark openssl-dependent packages as compatible by bumping their versions. The end user would need to update a lot more packages, but these cost could be reduced by binary diffing old and new packages, which should be almost identical with the exception of dependency metadata.
[1] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3aoDjW1bjxo [2] http://nixos.org/hydra/
I think packakge managers should only handle the storage of static files like executables and shared libraries. Forcing the user or another process to handle configuration files and startup/shutdown hooks has additional benefits such as making these files easier to store in version control.
[1] http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2008/12/msg01027.html
What's unusual to me is that the username field is on the initial page. On most sites I've used that upgrade from http to https, only a generic login button is on the unencrypted page, e.g. creditkarma.com. Maybe facebook a/b tested this setup and found users log in more often.
Bug fixes and security patches are applied to both stable and dev branches. Some of the recent buffer overflow patches only affect features added in 1.1.
Hopefully future changelogs can be more comprehensive and usable now that nginx has venture funding.
- the $connection_requests variable.
- $tcpinfo_rtt, $tcpinfo_rttvar, $tcpinfo_snd_cwnd and $tcpinfo_rcv_space variables.
- the "worker_cpu_affinity" directive now works on FreeBSD.
- the "xslt_param" and "xslt_string_param" directives. Thanks to Samuel Behan.
- the "from" parameter of the "disable_symlinks" directive.
- the "return" and "error_page" directives can now be used to return 307 redirections.
- the "disable_symlinks" directive.
- the "proxy_cookie_domain" and "proxy_cookie_path" directives.
- multiple "limit_req" limits may be used simultaneously.
- the "TLSv1.1" and "TLSv1.2" parameters of the "ssl_protocols" directive.
- the "proxy/fastcgi/scgi/uwsgi_cache_lock", "proxy/fastcgi/scgi/uwsgi_cache_lock_timeout" directives.
- the "pcre_jit" directive.
- the "if" SSI command supports captures in regular expressions.
- the "so_keepalive" parameter of the "listen" directive. Thanks to Vsevolod Stakhov.
- the "if_not_empty" parameter of the "fastcgi/scgi/uwsgi_param" directives.
- the $https variable.
- the "proxy_redirect" directive supports variables in the first parameter.
- the "proxy_redirect" directive supports regular expressions.
- the "valid" parameter of the "resolver" directive. By default TTL returned by a DNS server is used.
- support for multiple "limit_conn" limits on the same level.
- the "image_filter_sharpen" directive.
- support of several DNS servers in the "resolver" directive. Thanks to Kirill A. Korinskiy.
- "proxy/fastcgi/scgi/uwsgi_ignore_headers" directives support the following additional values: X-Accel-Limit-Rate,
- decrease of memory consumption if SSL is used.
- the "uwsgi_buffering" and "scgi_buffering" directives. Thanks to Peter Smit.
- the ngx_http_upstream_keepalive module.
- the "proxy_http_version" directive.
- the "fastcgi_keep_conn" directive.
- the "worker_aio_requests" directive.
- the module ngx_http_mp4_module.
- the "max_ranges" directive.
- now shared zones and caches use POSIX semaphores on Solaris. Thanks to Den Ivanov.
- accept filters are now supported on NetBSD.
- cache loader run time decrease.
- "loader_files", "loader_sleep", and "loader_threshold" options of the "proxy/fastcgi/scgi/uwsgi_cache_path" directives.
- loading time decrease of configuration with large number of HTTPS sites.
- now nginx supports ECDHE key exchange ciphers. Thanks to Adrian Kotelba.
- the "lingering_close" directive. Thanks to Maxim Dounin.