807 karma · joined January 10, 2015
Thanks for bitcoinj though.
The point is both incidents are incredibly rare. Your first two examples don't really work in this context; cows on the other hand - good example. http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5829a2.htm
I've only used it on mid-high end systems though. You should easily be able to launch a few small VMs (each AppVM is tunable) on a dual core machine with 4 GB of RAM though.
The Xen attack surface is then reduced to about 20 hypercalls (even less for ARM). http://xenbits.xen.org/docs/unstable/hypercall/index.html
The attack surface of Xen is much smaller than a traditional kernel like linux. I'm guessing the same can be said for OpenBSD after looking at the number of system calls.
Chrome and Firefox should add SourceForge to their malicious site list.
1. Ownership of the deposit box is not define by pin holders
2. Deposit boxes are tangible
3. Deposit boxes and contents have intrinsic value
3. Forgetting a pin doesn't effectively destroy the box and contents
4. The security of a deposit box is not defined by only math
I'm not trying to be pedantic, I'm just saying it is more complicated than that.
If I posted a number which happened to have a value of $14,001 USD in this post, I would be breaking the law. If I sold t-shirts with bitcoin private keys printed on them, I would be considered an unlicensed money transmitter by FinCEN.
Congrats on the new idea, Josh.
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https://github.com/runuo/runuo/tree/releases/2.5"I asked Microsoft if the company would be able to comply with unlocking a BitLocker disk, given a legitimate legal request to do so. The spokesperson told me they could not answer that question." - https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/06/04/microsoft-disk...
"Be suspicious of commercial encryption software, especially from large vendors. My guess is that most encryption products from large US companies have NSA-friendly back doors, and many foreign ones probably do as well. It's prudent to assume that foreign products also have foreign-installed backdoors. Closed-source software is easier for the NSA to backdoor than open-source software. Systems relying on master secrets are vulnerable to the NSA, through either legal or more clandestine means."
The article would have been far better if they only included Microsoft's answers and ended the piece with the same line:
"Whatever you choose, if trusting a proprietary operating system not to be malicious doesn’t fit your threat model, maybe it’s time to switch to Linux."
The original presentation was given in 2010.