> The whole thing is guilt by association. Everyone agrees that no evidence of mal-issued certificates exists. But some other company that uses your CA product had a rougue dev and because they are financially related because of history all of a sudden the industry is in panic?
No. The problem is that the entity in question is a root CA, and there is an expectation that root CAs demonstrate behavior befitting the trust given to them.
> But all I saw was a person rightfully defending rather unsubstantiated attacks on the integrity of her business.
If all you do is skim the thread and avoid actually reading the walls of text, sure.
But if you look more closely at the TrustCor replies... wow.
This response to TrustCor sums it up pretty well: https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-polic...
> It has never been the case that compliance with a narrow set of rules creates trust in a human endeavor. The decision to trust a CA is an ongoing one, and the behavior of its representatives is evaluated in that light, as representative of the attitude taken by the organization to its responsibilities. Your aggressive bloviation and evasion contrasts quite negatively to the openness with which other CAs have addressed issues before, and is most certainly affecting the trust that I would consider reasonable to place in TrustCor.
Here are some choice highlights from TrustCor's responses:
1- starting their email response with an (unjustified) ad hominem attack on the researchers
> Interesting that this is the first time you or anyone else in your research group has reached out to us, except if you count the Washington Post journalist who claims in his article that we did not respond, which is one of the many false claims made in the article since we responded very quickly to his contact. And before I begin, you should probably clarify if your views are representing The University of Calgary’s views, The University of California at Berkeley’s views, or your commercial endeavor AppCensus’s views, or your views representing any customer, agency, etc…? If in fact these views are completely independent and personal, that is also helpful to note.
2- suggesting that TrustCor is a more reliable CA than Google is, based on Gmail being a "high volume spam sending system"
> In Response to Ryan’s (Google) Additional Observations [...] Unfortunately, [MsgSafe.io] and frankly all free or low-cost email service providers, are often used by ransomware developers because of how they lend to privacy and anonymity, and how easily they can be obtained. (examples of gmail being the most popular across ransomware attacks [1], [2]). [...] we took an extra step to check constantly for receive-rate abuses when spammers send mail through another high volume spam sending system such as Gmail,
3- going on a long rant about being singled out, when everyone is primarily repeating "please clarify your corporate structure and stakeholders to us, because you keep dodging the question"
> In reading related reporting and blogging off-list, I need to address an elephant in the room. Apparently it may also come as a surprise to some readers and the researchers themselves that other root program members are in fact international governments, and some are also defense companies, or companies who are wholly-owned by defense companies and/or state-owned enterprises, meaning "businesses" that are completely owned or controlled by governments. Further, some of those governments are not free/democratic and in fact some have tragic modern histories of basic human rights violations. We are none of those things and our company does not identify with those values. Given this point above, why of all potential targets are these researchers interested in TrustCor? They could go after countries with human rights violations that have placed a CA in the program. They could go after countries that suppress free speech that have placed a CA in the program. They could go after companies that are smaller CA/issuers than us, or much larger ones. They could go after CAs that are actually state-owned enterprises (owned by governments). But they aren’t. So why? Why choose to spend their time on this and on us in particular? We’ve been asking ourselves this since it began. We’ve only come up with 2 possible answers. (1) They saw that single domain name in an old registrar account and simply fell into recursive confirmation bias to assume everything stemmed from that... or (2) They make money in their for-profit enterprise if they can find any American nexus, so they can involve the American government and the FTC and create pressure with American journalists. Well, this mystery solves itself. They do get paid by FTC in their own web of companies. They do tip American journalists using their university affiliation and then plugging their company in the articles. And their American customers apparently don’t reward them to go after foreign companies. So this represented a great opportunity for them if they could prove the American companies they saw had anything to do with us — unfortunately for them, they don’t. We are not an American company or a company owned by Americans. If they’d known beforehand, they’d have probably paid no attention just like they’re not paying attention to other program members who literally are governments or state-owned/defense companies. I think this is all about self-aggrandizing: getting themselves and their company known, and about making money. These guys are in business, and they’re bullies. They wear the hat and shirt of university researchers from different multinational universities and yet they’re involved in the same startup company/business and other related businesses that benefit financially from the exposure and follow-on work, and they’re misusing this platform and betraying the purpose of this mailing list. It’s also worth noting: the researchers followed no semblance of responsible disclosure processes which are well established in the industry. They never attempted to work with our product team or management to express their concern, or suggest improvements, or discuss potential vulnerabilities. Instead they opted for maximum public impact and attempted to pressure this industry body with journalism following their sensational false narrative. They were even able to get an American journalist to publish a story without proper fact checking, and without speaking to any representative of our company even though two of us responded to the journalist immediately. Our CTO provided proof of this in writing in his letter with screenshots.