There is no Swift or Objective-C in the xnu kernel, so the answer to the first question has to be "no". To the second question, Swift is generally safe against these bugs except (1) in the face of race conditions and (2) when the developer uses things that have "unsafe" in the name.
This is your periodic reminder that not all problems have a technical solution. There probably is no bot scanning for this. If it’s ever enforced, it must be through manual human action.
Probably important to mention that at the moment, TypeScript as a configuration format means anyone who writes a configuration blob for you has arbitrary code execution. This is rarely an issue in practice, though.
There’s more to measure with allocators than how fast it can pump out memory. You’d probably want to check for memory overhead and heap fragmentation and various security considerations.
For context, a worker on an H1-B can be in the US for a total 6 years. Within that time frame, their employer can sponsor them for a green card, which allows them to stay indefinitely and keep the job. However, through the lens of the government, what actually happens in this transition is that the H1-B worker’s job disappears and a new job appears. The H1-B employee must apply to this job and compete fairly with Americans for it. If they come out winning, they can get a green card. Otherwise, the American gets the job and the foreigner goes home, probably. These job offers have to be posted in a variety of ways endorsed by the government.
From my read looking at other articles on the matter (https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/facebook-face-claim...), Facebook is accused of not circulating enough these job postings to and making it too easy for the non-American they already hired to keep their job. They’re not creating jobs that entire populations except the US can see.
1- want to convince people still on Intel Macs to update
2- lengthen the news cycle when the first units are shipped to the tech press and _they_ run these benchmarks
Charitably, “don’t want to be distracted by politics” means “the status quo works for me”. This doesn’t mean anyone at Coinbase is ill-intentioned, but given the status quo, there’s a lot of people it won’t work for.
Outside of whether it would be feasible to move wealth to bitcoin before fleeing, discounting the existence of people who weren't miserable before they had to flee their decent existence due to war is insulting. You insinuated that all people who flee their country were resourceless before their displacement. Confronted with the fact that they aren't, you thought to save your point by declaring them "anecdotal". Not classy.
I loathe Bitcoin, but that’s vastly wrong. As one counter-example, the Syrian civil war didn’t only displace poor people who never had anything to begin with; it displaced a lot of middle class families, made of engineers and doctors and such, who did have assets to their name but that were almost certainly incapable of taking it out of the country with them.
It remains to be seen whether it would have been practical to move money from Syrian liras to Bitcoin. No one wants to buy hyper-inflating currency.
Support can be effective even if it doesn’t come from a first party. As long as someone is signed up to fix your problems, it’s not an unsupported hack.
People need to accept that the moment you’re face to face with a cop, software isn’t going to restore accountability on the spot or give you an edge against an adversary that has the monopoly of violence. If your threat model is that you should be prepared for a cop to seize either your physical driver’s license or your phone, you should make sure you carry the one you care the least about with you.
Meat produced in New Zealand might be more sustainable, or ethically farmed, or have a smaller environmental transportation footprint if you’re in New Zealand, than meat from somewhere else. People paying premium for meat may be interested in all of these things—in fact, they may be interested in these things even over the taste of the meat.
ARM already has several instructions that aren’t exactly RISC. ldp and stp can load/store two registers at a given address and also update the value of the address register.
It’s clear that W^X isn’t “solving security”, but it’s not a bad idea just because it’s a low-hanging fruit. On Apple platforms, I think that it came to be as a natural consequence of the ability to toggle RX mappings to be RW without a syscall.
Almost all DMA-capable peripherals on Apple Silicon (including iDevices) are gated behind an IOMMU.
The voucher that Apple can decrypt once enough positives have been received contains a scaled-down version of the original. How else would Apple be able to even run a second hash function on the same picture?
For better or worse, opaque server-side CSAM models are the norm in the cloud photo hosting world. I imagine that the consequences would be roughly the same as if Google's, Facebook's or Microsoft's "secret classifiers" were leaked.
Before they make it to human review, photos in decrypted vouchers have to pass the CSAM match against a second classifier that Apple keeps to itself. Presumably, if it doesn’t match the same asset, it won’t be passed along. This is explained towards the end of the threat model document that Apple posted to its website. https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Security_Threat_Model...
I would recommend @johnregehr, @shafikyaghmour and @trav_downs if you're new to the area. If you're particularly interested in rust, @myrrlyn, @ManishEarth and @steveklabnik are great follows. @jfbastien is a compiler dad-joker extraordinaire and @jckarter is a master shitposter (with a side of old Macs) if you're in need of compiler-oriented comic relief.
In particular, John tends to get involved in a lot of interesting conversations, so he's great to find more people to follow.
I believe that Graydon left Apple a while ago, but following compiler Twitter, it’s pretty clear that the rust folks and Swift folks are usually in good terms.
I like to think of LLVM as a piece of infrastructure, like neutral fiber wiring that any ISP is allowed to use. From that perspective, I’m a lot less concerned about having few options that I am about browsers.
Although the diversity of C/C++ compilers is descending, the number of compiler backends in general is still pretty high (Go, .NET compilers & runtimes, Java compilers & runtimes, JS engines, etc), and LLVM can’t fill all the niches. I don’t think that we’re at a point where research is stifled.
This is many steps removed from the current situation, which is that the feature rolls out in the US and photo hashes are provided by the NCMEC. Please describe how you think the system would work in China.
Matches aren’t automatically reported to authorities. They first go to Apple, and a match on an absurdly non-CSAM picture will be noticed. If it passes through, it will be reported as a tip to the NCMEC, which will also evaluate the pictures; and only then can it be forwarded to the government.
I hope that there will be a transparency report for how many reports happened and how many were found to be false positives.
Regarding China, the answer is probably “nothing”, but the system as it exists is not amenable to what I imagine their goals would be: only monitors the photo library (not messages) and requires a certain threshold of matches. The question is, I think, what today prevents China from requiring devices to attempt to match a database of pictures with a mandated match algorithm and a mandated reporting server. I believe (admittedly without any knowledge of the matter) that the same standard would apply to both.
A change in policy regarding the pictures that are scanned is a change of NCMEC policy, which would be the same kind of high-level court dispute.
I’m not knowledgeable enough to comment about other countries’ policies, but the fact remains that no one has a law enforcement iBoot, as far as we know; and if one exists, CSAM filtering was never the opportunity that repressive regimes were waiting for.