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erwald

1,336 karma · joined December 11, 2020

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erwald··on GLM-5: Targeting complex systems engineering and long-horizon agentic tasks
Kudos for changing your mind
erwald··on GLM-5: Targeting complex systems engineering and long-horizon agentic tasks
Thanks. I'm like 95% sure that you're wrong (as is the parent), and that GLM-5 was trained on NVIDIA GPUs, or at least not on Huawei Ascends.

I think so for a few reasons:

1. The Reuters article does explicitly say the model is compatible with domestic chips for inference, without mentioning training. I agree that the Reuters passage is a bit confusing, but I think they mean it was developed to be compatible with Ascends (and other chips) for inference, after it had been trained.

2. The z.ai blog post says it's compatible with Ascends for inference, without mentioning training, consistent with the Reuters report https://z.ai/blog/glm-5

3. When z.ai trained a small image model on Ascends, they made a big fuss about it. If they had trained GLM-5 with Ascends, they likely would've shouted it from the rooftops.

4. Ascends just aren't that good

Also, you can definitely train a model on one chip and then support inference on other chips; the official z.ai blog post says GLM-5 supports "deploying GLM-5 on non-NVIDIA chips, including Huawei Ascend, Moore Threads, Cambricon, Kunlun Chip, MetaX, Enflame, and Hygon" -- many different domestic chips. Note "deploying".

erwald··on GLM-5: Targeting complex systems engineering and long-horizon agentic tasks
Where did you read that it was trained on Ascends?

I've only seen information suggesting that you can run inference with Ascends, which is obviously a very different thing. The source you link also just says: "The latest model was developed using domestically manufactured chips for inference, including Huawei's flagship Ascend chip and products from leading industry players such as Moore Threads, Cambricon and Kunlunxin, according to the statement."

erwald··on GLM-5: Targeting complex systems engineering and long-horizon agentic tasks
Where did you read that it was trained on Ascends? I've only seen information suggesting that you can run inference with Ascends, which is obviously a very different thing.
erwald··on LLMs, Theory of Mind, and Cheryl's Birthday
o1 mini seems to get it on the first try (I didn't vet the code, but I tested it and it works on both examples provided in the notebook, `dates` and `gabe_dates`):

    from collections import defaultdict
    
    def find_cheryls_birthday(possible_dates):
        # Parse the dates into month and day
        dates = [date.split() for date in possible_dates]
        months = [month for month, day in dates]
        days = [day for month, day in dates]
    
        # Step 1: Albert knows the month and says he doesn't know the birthday
        # and that Bernard doesn't know either. This implies the month has no unique days.
        month_counts = defaultdict(int)
        day_counts = defaultdict(int)
        for month, day in dates:
            month_counts[month] += 1
            day_counts[day] += 1
    
        # Months with all days appearing more than once
        possible_months = [month for month in month_counts if all(day_counts[day] > 1 for m, day in dates if m == month)]
        filtered_dates = [date for date in dates if date[0] in possible_months]
    
        # Step 2: Bernard knows the day and now knows the birthday
        # This means the day is unique in the filtered dates
        filtered_days = defaultdict(int)
        for month, day in filtered_dates:
            filtered_days[day] += 1
        possible_days = [day for day in filtered_days if filtered_days[day] == 1]
        filtered_dates = [date for date in filtered_dates if date[1] in possible_days]
    
        # Step 3: Albert now knows the birthday, so the month must be unique in remaining dates
        possible_months = defaultdict(int)
        for month, day in filtered_dates:
            possible_months[month] += 1
        final_dates = [date for date in filtered_dates if possible_months[date[0]] == 1]
    
        # Convert back to original format
        return ' '.join(final_dates[0]) if final_dates else "No unique solution found."
    
    # Example usage:
    possible_dates = [
        "May 15", "May 16", "May 19",
        "June 17", "June 18",
        "July 14", "July 16",
        "August 14", "August 15", "August 17"
    ]
    
    birthday = find_cheryls_birthday(possible_dates)
    print(f"Cheryl's Birthday is on {birthday}.")
erwald··on I Am Tired of AI
For the same reason we don't want art to be 10,000x times more expensive? Cf. status quo bias etc.
erwald··on The war on remote work has nothing to do with productivity
Thanks, though I'll note that that article is about Blackrock encouraging/forcing its own workers to do hybrid work, not arguing that other companies should do so.
erwald··on The war on remote work has nothing to do with productivity
You were responding to a comment saying the world is not so coordinated by giving some examples of how coordination might happen. I gave some evidence that coordination of the type you mentioned does not seem to happen, at least for the topic being discussed, suggesting that the world is indeed not so coordinated (at least in this instance).
erwald··on The war on remote work has nothing to do with productivity
None of those are think tanks.
erwald··on The war on remote work has nothing to do with productivity
I meant evidence of them campaigning, or financing/instigating campaigns, against remote work, thereby influencing decisions of companies to implement "back to work" policies.

ETA: I agree that you did not say this was happening in your original comment, but it seems to me your comment implied that these companies were actually influencing major decisions (since that's the topic of the OP).

erwald··on The war on remote work has nothing to do with productivity
Do you have any evidence to back these claims up? (genuinely curious)
erwald··on The war on remote work has nothing to do with productivity
Can you link some think tank pieces arguing against remote work? I tried looking but couldn't find any. I found a few things but clearly none of these are part of an anti remote work effort:

an AEI interview https://www.aei.org/workforce-development/the-future-of-remo... which seems pretty balanced overall (and doesn't take a prescriptive position)

an AEI piece https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/the-trade-offs-... which seems pretty balanced too

a Heritage piece (from early in Covid) https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/labor-policy-... that seems mostly bullish on remote work (but mostly focuses on other issues, like labor rights)

a McKinsey report (also from fairly early in Covid) https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/wh... which is mostly descriptive and also seems pretty balanced

a Cato piece https://www.cato.org/commentary/remote-work-here-stay-mostly... which argues in favor of remote work

erwald··on Qwen2 LLM Released
Could you share the source on that?
erwald··on India Eliminates Extreme Poverty
The numbers in the article are PPP-adjusted.
erwald··on Midihum: An ML-Based MIDI Humanizing Tool
Yes, that is indeed the main use case.
erwald··on This can't go on (2021)
"Sure, you could prepare for imagined eventualities, or you could do the actual work of improving efficiency, reducing waste and unnecessary middle-men, and removing centuries old bureaucracies that are now absurdly pointless in the face of the internet. There is an underlying _desire_ for apocalypse encoded in this type of thinking."

OP was written by the person who co-founded GiveWell[1] to make charitable giving more effective, and who while running Open Philanthropy oversaw lots of grants to things like innovation policy[2], scientific research[3], and land use reform[4].

Anyway, more broadly I think you present a false dilemma. You can both prepare for tail risks and also make important marginal and efficiency improvements.

[1] https://www.givewell.org/ [2] https://www.openphilanthropy.org/focus/innovation-policy/ [3] https://www.openphilanthropy.org/focus/scientific-research/ [4] https://www.openphilanthropy.org/focus/land-use-reform/

erwald··on Do Machine Learning Models Memorize or Generalize?
"Grok" in AI doesn't quite describe generalization, it's more specific that that. It's more like "delayed and fairly sudden generalization" or something like that. There was some discussion of this in the comments of this post[1], which proposes calling the phenomenon "eventual recovery from overfitting" instead.

[1] https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/GpSzShaaf8po4rcmA/qapr-5-gro...

erwald··on StableCode
Sure it's easy -- you can use benchmarks like HumanEval, which Stability did. They just didn't compare to Codex or GPT-4. Of course such benchmarks don't capture all aspects of an LLM's capabilities, but they're a lot better than nothing!
erwald··on The Darwinian argument for worrying about AI
The author of this article is Dan Hendrycks, who has a PhD in ML from UC Berkeley and was one of the contributors to the GELU activation function (among other things).
erwald··on Maps distort how we see the world
That's weird, are you looking only at the top 10 countries?

I've reproduced dwaltrib's results using World Bank data on 251 countries, and I get a Pearson's r of 0.82 and a p value of 5.6e-61 (!). I.e. a strong correlation, with high confidence. It makes sense too -- larger countries generally have more people, and more people generally generate more economic activity.

Code if you want to try yourself:

import pandas as pd

gdp = pd.read_csv("~/Downloads/API_NY.GDP.MKTP.CD_DS2_en_csv_v2_5551501.csv").set_index("Country Name")

land_area = pd.read_csv("~/Downloads/API_AG.LND.TOTL.K2_DS2_en_csv_v2_5552158.csv").set_index("Country Name")

gdp["GDP"] = gdp["2020"]

gdp["Land"] = land_area["2020"]

gdp = gdp.dropna(subset=["GDP", "Land"])

from scipy import stats

print(stats.pearsonr(gdp.Land, gdp.GDP))

#+RESULTS: : PearsonRResult(statistic=0.8151313879150333, pvalue=5.621180589722219e-61)

erwald··on Maps distort how we see the world
> But this is obviously not true. Just look at the list of top 10 by GDP and check out how many of them are relatively small.

There absolutely is a correlation between land mass and nominal GDP.

erwald··on The Prospect of an AI Winter
I'm curious, did you read beyond the summary? (I don't mean that in a snide way, it's totally fine just to read the summary -- that's why it's there.)

The 1e35 FLOP number is meant as a conservative upper bound and comes from here: https://www.lesswrong.com/s/5Eg2urmQjA4ZNcezy/p/rzqACeBGycZt...

The major fabs all have roadmaps for approaching 1 nm, and there are other advances that could allow you to keep going either if transistor size scaling stops (e.g., vertical scaling). (That said, I definitely don't think it's a given that HW price-performance keeps doubling at the same rate 10+ years.)

erwald··on Caricaturing Noam Chomsky
I think I mostly agree with you, but I think this framing is a bit misleading. On autocomplete, I'll just lazily quote the relevant part from my post:

It’s completely true that LLMs are trained on next-token prediction (although some, like ChatGPT, are then additionally trained using reinforcement learning with human feedback). It’s also completely true that this fact profoundly influences the texts they generate. So I don’t think it’s unreasonable to call LLMs autocomplete engines or to emphasise next-token prediction. But I think it’s subtly misleading:

- Though LLMs were trained to optimise success on next-token prediction, that is not necessarily what they do. We don’t know what it is they do. The training process reinforces behaviours/heuristics in the model that tend to cause it to make better next-token predictions on in-distribution data. This does not mean that those behaviours/heuristics are fundamentally “about” optimising next-token prediction, especially when the model encounters out-of-distribution data.

- The usual example here is human evolution. Humans were shaped by a process that optimised for reproductive fitness. This gave us a bundle of drives such as family kinship, prestige and sexual pleasure – drives that aren’t fundamentally about optimising for reproduction, which becomes evident as we enter a new environment – one with contraceptives, say.

- Optimising for a task for which intelligence is useful encourages the optimised thing to become more intelligent. Sam Altman gave expression to this last week when he wrote, “Language models just being programmed to try to predict the next word is true, but it’s not the dunk some people think it is. Animals, including us, are just programmed to try to survive and reproduce, and yet amazingly complex and beautiful stuff comes from it.”

- The forms of intelligence that are useful in doing next-token prediction are different from those that are useful in human reproduction, but I think there’s a considerable overlap, as (1) some fundamental abilities, for example using and applying concepts, just seem very broadly useful and (2) the data LLMs are trained on are written by humans, for humans and often about humans and things that matter to us.

I think the "they're just autocomplete" take also hides other properties of LLMs, like them seeming to (as mentioned in another comment, and in the post) contain and use world models, and being able to learn general algorithms.

erwald··on Caricaturing Noam Chomsky
They definitely hallucinate a lot too. But they also seem to do things genuinely like reasoning, e.g. they seem to contain and use "cognitive" world models, and seem to be capable of learning fully general algorithms.

Beyond that, many intellectual capabilities are also useful for successful bullshitting, so even if we can confidently say that that's all they do (in some sense), that doesn't mean they don't also do something-like-human-reasoning etc.

erwald··on The Swedish Pandemic Approach: Now we know the results
Excess mortality still looks substantially higher in Sweden than in Norway and Denmark (though not Finland) in this OWID data set, I wonder why the difference?

- https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/excess-deaths-cumulative-...

erwald··on Caricaturing Noam Chomsky
> Aaronson’s biggest error, now corrected, sort of, in bold, is in assuming that Chomsky has spent his life in some sort of failed effort to build AI, which kind of entirely misses the point of Chomsky’s piece (which says in so many words that we need to study the mind first before we try to make AI) and also utterly misrepresents Chomsky’s career. Frankly, I would be embarrassed to have to publish a correction (the part in bold) like this [...] It’s a wild swing and a miss. Chomsky has spent his career trying to understand how humans acquire language, not “building machines” to try to do the same.

This is pretty unfair IMO. Aaronson wrote (emphasis mine):

> In this piece Chomsky, THE INTELLECTUAL GODFATHER GOD OF an effort that failed for 60 years to build machines that can converse in ordinary language, condemns the effort that succeeded.

He never wrote that Chomsky himself was involved in this efforts, only that he was influential to it (which may or may not be true, but Marcus never argues that point).

erwald··on Caricaturing Noam Chomsky
IMO Chomsky (and Marcus) are mostly wrong on LLMs. Quoting the summary of a post[1] I wrote recently:

- LLMs are sometimes said to be “just” shallow pattern matchers, “just” massive look-up tables or “just” autocomplete engines. These comparisons amount to a form of (methodological) reductionism. While there’s some truth to them, I think they smuggle in corollaries that are either false or at least not obviously true.

- For example, they seem to imply that what LLMs are doing amounts merely to rote memorisation and/or clever parlour tricks, and that they cannot generalise to out-of-distribution data. In fact, there’s empirical evidence that suggests that LLMs can learn general algorithms and can contain and use representations of the world similar to those we use.

- They also seem to suggest that LLMs merely optimise for success on next-token prediction. It’s true that LLMs are (mostly) trained on next-token prediction, and it’s true that this profoundly shapes their output, but we don’t know whether this is how they actually function. We also don’t know what sorts of advanced capabilities can or cannot arise when you train on next-token prediction.

- So there’s reason to be cautious when thinking about LLMs. In particular, I think, caution should be exercised (1) when making predictions about what LLMs will or will not in future be capable of and (2) when assuming that such-and-such a thing must or cannot possibly happen inside an LLM.

https://www.erichgrunewald.com/posts/against-llm-reductionis...

erwald··on A critique of longtermism: why you shouldn't worry about the far future
longtermists, having noticed the skulls[1], have addressed these issues. they are most definitely concerned about extinction risks that happen on much shorter timeframes, quite possibly before humans break even 10 billion. second, op is criticising total utilitarianism. total utilitarianism does lead to longtermism, but it's not the only ethics that does, and there are longtermists who are not utilitarians. third, discounting money is not the same as discounting lives -- $1 was worth way more 100 years ago, but 1 life was not worth more then than 1 life is today.

about "the future is distant and we can't know anything about it", see e.g. this[2] post on the effective altruism forum.

> Possible misconception: “Trying to influence the far future is pointless because it is impossible to forecast that far.”

> My response: “Considering far future effects doesn’t necessarily require predicting what will happen in the far future.”

> [...]

> Nuclear war could feasibly happen tomorrow. Climate change is an ongoing phenomenon and catastrophic climate change could happen within decades. In The Precipice, Toby Ord places the probability of an existential catastrophe occuring within the next 100 years at 1 in 6, which is concerningly high.

> Ord is not in the business of forecasting events beyond a 100-year time horizon, nor does he have to be. These existential threats affect the far future on account of the persistence of their effects if they occur, but not on account of the fact that they might happen in the far future. Therefore whilst it is true that a claim has to be made about the far future, namely that we are unlikely to ever properly recover from existential catastrophes, this claim seems less strong than a claim that some particular event will happen in the far future.

i recommend op engage with some longer longtermist writings and try to understand the view from the inside. another poster mentioned toby ord's the precipice, but there is also plenty of material online. for example, i recommend this interview with carl shulman about extinction risk.[3]

[1] https://slatestarcodex.com/2017/04/07/yes-we-have-noticed-th...

[2] https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/ocmEFL2uDSMzvwL8P/...

[3] https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/carl-shulman-common-...

erwald··on Around one-in-three children globally suffer from lead poisoning
i second this. i recommend, for anyone who is interested, reading their write-ups on the ea forum to get a good intro on the problem (and how they work):

- https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fd96FtLFACeAshqJP/...

- https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/ErKzbKWnQMwvzRX4m/...

or my interview with lucia coulter, one of the co-founders:

- https://www.erichgrunewald.com/posts/interview-with-lucia-co...

erwald··on How bad is QWERTY, really? A review of the literature, such as it is
no need to apologise :)
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