cuspy

The belief in self-consistent logical systems of argument must also be accepted on faith, without logical proof. There is no falsifiable theory that proves falsification as the final criterion for distinguishing science from non-science, etc. It's your faith-based attachment to the the falsifiability demarcation theory and to a metaphysically "laden" notion of logical validity that causes the impasse. All of these "defeater"-style logical arguments ultimately rest on a kernel of faith. Foucault, or any other decent theoretician, would recognize in this the expression of power that comes out of a particular historical tradition of knowledge rules. The empowered popular discourse they are rooted in is exactly what Foucault would call an "episteme". (Which again, few thoughtful practicing scientists would claim they "believe" in. Rules are always provisional frameworks for the complicated objectives of science, which themselves exist inside a sort of network or market. Nothing is simple or linear.)

See my other response above about the materiality and contingency of linguistic utterances. Like all other physical phenomena, the scientific approach views language as an event, a behavior, a material process that is always context-dependent and, at the "lowest" levels, pervaded by uncertainty, even in our best attempts to model it.

My position as a materialist (and a practicing scientist) is that propositions are not magical transcendental objects. The idea of "refutation" rests on the presupposition of a given linguistic exchange being inside a self-consistent system of argument. In reality, language behaviors, including writing and argument, are always material, contingent and underspecified. Language is a "reef of dead metaphors". Utterances take place in a cultural and historical context, and their meaning, both at the level of reference and argument structure, is always dependent on that context, <i>including what I am writing right now</i>. You run into this kind of boring infinite recursion refrain when you remain attached to the idea that "proof" and "truth" operate at a metaphysical level above material. It's unfortunate that this is so widespread.

Power and knowledge are co-constitutive. Knowledge masks power relations between individuals and it always has a disciplinary function.

All discourses, including science, are rooted in their historical epoch. There are no transhistorical truths, but truth and justice are true relative to the field of power/knowledge they are embedded in.

Does that really sound like widely accepted common sense? Do you not agree that western societies are driven by a popular belief in either pure nationalist authority or in authority masked in terms of objectivity, scientific progress and justice?

Ironically, your conveyance of your opinion in this dismissive register with no substance, just the affect of smug certainty, is a perfect example of why the relationship between language and power deserves attention today. Your post is a pervasive and automatic mental pattern, common in a population that has been raised to uncritically worship abstract philosophical notions like "objective truths", notions which no decent self-critical scientist would accept. Your post's voice assumes the appearance of a disciplinary authority without actually engaging substantively with the ideas under discussion. So, in effect you've provided the best possible support for the article's argument.

Those who argue that Chomsky singularly "pioneered" or "revolutionized" the study of formal language should thoroughly read the book "Linguistics and the Formal Sciences" by Marcus Tomalin. It is a great historical account of the development of this particular strain of formal linguistic study. Knowing more about the intellectual environment and his predecessors and contemporaries helps to erode the mythology of Chomsky as the sole revolutionary catalyst in the development of formal language theory. In fact the major principles of his classic theory of syntax can be thought of as fairly incremental developments from previous work. Many of the specific claims he is well known for had been made by others before.

As for his contributions to cognitive science, I think one side of the field simply feels that he is clinging to some outmoded notions of what Bayesian modeling can achieve in terms of explanatory power.

As a counterpoint, EVERYONE should read Andy Clark's beautifully written BBS paper "Whatever Next? Predictive Brains, Situated Agents, and the Future of Cognitive Science."