clwg

Here are the criteria for rating the risk of wildfires in Alberta http://wildfire.alberta.ca/fire-smart-landscapes/wildfire-th...

The fire presented a risk right at the beginning and seemed to spread into populated area's faster than could be responded to, once that risk was no longer present outside assistance was not required.

Those weird trusted root CA's are preloaded by Microsoft https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/293781

I was flying with a friend one time and he jokingly said "never hack the plane your flying on", while it was just joke, it's something I'd never actually considered although it's blatantly obvious. Sometimes people get caught up in their own curiosity, don't think through their plan and loose perspective on the consequences of their actions.

While what they did was reckless and irresponsible, I think their overall intentions were to inform of the risk associated with vulnerabilities/hacking of this nature and raise awareness. I would assume that they have learned from this, and won't be shutting down cars on a highway to show off anymore.

The thing about risk is that it's best dealt with when there is a clear understanding of it, the conversation on what is appropriate testing, and raising the general awareness of the public regarding these vulnerabilities are both factors that will hopefully mitigate risks moving forward.

There's this https://github.com/hrbrmstr/pewpew it's as much a criticism of these sorts of security visualizations as it is a means to create them.

This seems closer to Levenshtein distance than NLP classification. You could also get similar results from a soundex comparison against domain names (substituting numbers for letters when appropriate and breaking up/combining subdomains).

Even with categorization based on ASN's, there is still a high risk of false positives that would make this more a analytical process as opposed to automated inline blocking approach.

I used to work in security for one of the big OEM hardware vendors, Microsoft has been working with all vendors for years trying to secure the Window's ecosystem by extending out their SDLC and providing free security services and training to OEM partners.

We use to ship them our consumer laptops for testing, and the result was always the same "get rid of the crapware". MS is probably more upset about this than anyone, because ultimately this isn't about Windows at all, but people don't differentiate between Windows and the garbage that OEM's throw on their boxes, so they get blamed as well.

He's the main author of cryptocat, which in the past has gotten allot of flak for it's javascript/client side implementation of encryption.