5,303 karma · joined October 24, 2013
Web http://socsci.uci.edu/~rfutrell/ Twitter @rljfutrell
Whether she learned through language is irrelevant. Before seeing red, she might have learned about it by consulting extensive charts of the brain, or (black-and-white) videos of timecourses of brain activation. Maybe she even got to run computer simulations of her own brain response.
By construction Mary already knew everything physical about the color red, so the new knowledge she gained through consciously experiencing it is not knowledge about anything physical.
> A related argument known as the “knowledge argument” was famously put forward by Frank Jackson. Imagine Mary, a scientist of the future who, for whatever reason, has spent her entire life in a black and white room, never having experiences of colors. She has, nevertheless, through her studies come to learn all the physical facts there are to know about the physics and physiology of color perception. For example, she knows down to the last detail what is going on in the surface of a red apple, and in the eyes and nervous system, when someone sees the apple. Suppose she leaves the room and finally comes to learn for herself what it is like to see red. In other words, she comes for the first time to have the qualia associated with the conscious experience of seeing a red apple. Surely she has learned something new. But since, by hypothesis, she already knew all the physical facts there were to know about the situation, her new knowledge of the qualia in question must be knowledge of something over and above the physical facts.
In the thought experiment, when Mary sees red for the first time, it seems that she gains new knowledge that she did not have before even though she knew everything there is to know about the properties of matter involved. You have to either accept that she learned something nonphysical, or deny that she learned anything. The version of this that I learned first was "what is it like to be a bat?" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_It_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F
Another one that I can recall offhand, from Descartes: Physical things have extension in space. One way to test whether something has extension in space is whether you can cut it in half. But your consciousness can't be cut in half, you can't even conceive of what this would mean. So it's not physical.
Make of the arguments what you may. I wrote term papers against both of the above in undergrad. But it's definitely something people have thought carefully about, not just an ideological assertion that consciousness Must Be Different.
This kind of judgmental attitude is the thing that's not worthy of respect, imo.
- Finding marks by sending out text messages which have the appearance of being a normal message sent to the wrong number, and which invite a response.
- Building a long-term relationship with the mark over text messages.
- Eventually convincing the mark to invest in a fake crypto exchange.
- The fake crypto exchange delivers small wins for a while
- Eventually convincing the mark to make a very large investment.
- Then the money disappears.
- The scam is run by Chinese operators in an illegal call center in Myanmar using human-trafficked labor.
This obviously has characteristics that distinguish it from a generic scam.
Example of a scam that is not pig butchering:
- I got a text message offering me $XYZ/day to drive around town with a Colgate toothpaste ad on my car
- If I had accepted the offer, they would have asked me to send in a downpayment for the ad materials, then they would have vanished
> The GPT architecture, using transformers to do iterated predictive text, is a modern version of the Markov bot.
The Markov nature only matters if the text falls outside the context window.
> Perhaps surprisingly so, until you step back, look at the training data, and look at the information flow: the conditional probability of the next token isn't mostly coming from the source text.
I’m not sure what you’re getting at here. If it’s that you can predict the next token in many cases without looking at the source language, then that’s also true for traditional encoder-decoder architectures, so it’s not a problem unique to prompting. Or are you getting at problems arising from teacher-forcing?
Basically the question was how an LM could possibly help translation, and the answer is that it gives you a strong prior for the decoder. That’s also the basic idea in the theoretical UMT paper: you are trying to find a function from source to target language that produces a sensible distribution as defined by an LM.
For theory on how a strong target-language-side LM can improve translation, even in the extreme scenario where no parallel “texts” are available, https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2023/file/7...