364 karma · joined December 29, 2025
What do you mean, as in it doesn't imply profitability (and profitability of what?) today?
> Businesses also bought dot com infrastructure, telecom fiber, crypto platforms, metaverse tools, and overbuilt SaaS.
Yes, and like I said, there is absolutely a stable state where token economics are profitable.
> The question is whether the AI application layer can charge more than its full cost and the costs are inference, infrastructure, depreciation, R&D, customer acquisition, support, compliance, security, and error remediation.
Of course they can. If they couldn't, they wouldn't, and then someone would come in and charge the correct price for it because there is a tremendous amount of demand that will spur supply. I'm not sure what the mystery is here.
> The numbers so far do not inspire confidence. OpenAI reportedly did $4.3B in revenue in the first half of 2025 while burning $2.5B, and Microsoft said OpenAI related losses reduced its own quarterly net income by $3.1B. An MIT 2025 enterprise AI study found $30 to 40B spent on GenAI with 95% of organizations seeing zero return.
I do not find this particular argument inspires any confidence either -- everyone is trying to capture market share. How on earth, on a blog with ycombinator literally in the URL, do people not understand that lack of profitability now says absolutely nothing about profitability in the end state, after this growth phase?
You seem to imply by your MIT study citation that there is "evidence" that AI is not even profitable. Reading between the lines here, your theory is: the entire market is wrong, AI is a net negative ROI (and in your mind, for how long? forever?), and is inherently unprofitable. That is a crazy thing to think in light of all of the datapoints we have.
> One of the core technical reason is that hallucination destroy enterprise economics. If SAP hallucinated 2% of invoices, or Oracle returned fake rows 2% of the time, nobody would call that early stage friction. They would call it unusable for core operations.
Yet we see absolutely incredible adoption? In your view we'd see a spike and then all of those dumb CEOs will say "oh oops we were dumb" and adoption will go down. Hallucination does not destroy enterprise economics. Hallucination rates, by the way, have continued to decline after every model generation. Believe it or not there are incredibly valuable, smart, sustainable ways to incorporate AI. Even if it's just coding agent licenses, that alone is a powerful enough revenue driver.
> In legal AI, even specialized tools have been measured hallucinating 30% of the time. The problem is that as AI gets better it is confidently, plausibly wrong. That forces humans to verify it.
You seem to be conflating two things: one is that there is an inevitable eventuality where everyone will finally shut up about AI being unprofitable because we exit this growth phase and reach a more steady state market economics. The other thing is that we are not yet there. I'm not arguing about us not yet being there, though I do think the evidence even there is a bit cherry picked.
> So the cost does not disappear. It moves from doing the work to checking the work. AI coding has the same issue. If an autopilot got you there faster but one flight in ten became unstable unless the pilot constantly supervised it, that is not productivity.
That's just not going to be true for long. The reason you see coding agent adoption and other step changes in adoption + capability is that error ("hallucination" and other error modes) get to a low enough point where they are acceptable for a given application. This will eventually eat most applications. Yes we have to check things today, but this will be less and less important once we reach a point where humans are even less reliable than AI at _checking_ output from either themselves or other AI systems.
> For the bull case to work, the usage must explode, the quality must improve, prices must fall, reliability must rise, legal risk must shrink, and margins must expand and all this at once.
What??! this is all happening _right now_ right in front of you. Usage _is_ exploding in ways we didn't even dream about 8 months ago. Quality _is_ improving in very predictable ways (scaling laws anyone? benchmark trends?). Reliability _is_ rising _and thats why you see the adoption level you see for coding agents_.
The European regulations are the thing that will kneecap anything meaningful coming out of Europe. Mind blowing to me that this is worth the tradeoff since Europe will be beholden to other frontier labs be it China or the US, so regulations accomplishing very little if anything on impacting actual AI development and losing vast amounts of leverage in the process.
I think the most important problem is that you have to marshall enough compute to be meaningful, and that is going to be more and more difficult as frontier compute requirements grow.
Any actual numbers to back this up? I don't see how nationalizing a very cutting edge technology outside of wartime is going to go super well. The leverage that these companies have is the same leverage that TSMC has: you can't just take over and expect things to rocket at the pace its going
What’s the world in which frontier model performance is open source? What does that look like? What’s a sensible business model that makes this sustainable? What’s a sensible regulatory framework that doesn’t hamstring AI progress?
Everyone is so enamored with these Chinese lab models like deepseek and qwen and GLM but they exist in a world where the top performance is still claimed by closed source models. These are not developed out of any benevolent commitment to the principles laid out in this article. A world in which OSS is the frontier and its development is controlled and funded by government subsidies of an autocratic government is not reassuring. You can inspect weights but good luck getting the cat back in the bag in terms of capabilities, safeguards, value system, bias, nerfing if it smells American business use cases.
Deepseek was such a darling but guess what, it’s now raising money — 300M at 10 billion valuation. OSS development isn’t sustainable as a business model and in a world where it costs a few hundred million to develop a frontier model, you need a strong business model, or you need strong state subsidies and incentives which introduce a billion new problems.
the most sensible economic picture of OSS models already exist. Commoditize your complement, passion projects for a hedge fund. These are unsustainable and exist at the pleasure of the business or the founder.
These companies have to care about good measurement frameworks because the quality of their models depends on it. Any PR department can polish a turd, but an army of smart researchers far outside the control of these companies are going to figure it out if they are gaming metrics.
You are making a technical point, which I am pointing out that while for _some_ benchmarks this is _technically_ possible, it's not true for plenty of benchmarks that all agree with the others.
> which of course would mean that the benchmark was created entirely "by hand" or using some other provider that is unconnected to the provider you are benchmarking
yes this is incredibly common. I'm not talking about hypothetical scenarios.
> To put it another way: a closed-weight model is, by definition, impossible to independently benchmark.
Even if you believe this, you're doing some mental gymnastics if you think this is really the most likely explanation for what we're seeing. It's absolutely possible to benchmark proprietary models when you don't have access to the weights or control over the API, even if they are adversarially trying to combat this, which they aren't. Doing what you're describing would be easy to detect: you'd see extremely high benchmark scores for established benchmarks and then poor scores for new benchmarks as they come out. It would be relatively easy to figure this out and not subtle.
First of all, if you take the articles critiques and work out the implications on the METR graph, all you're doing is shifting the curve up or down, it doesn't change the fact that progress is scaling exponentially. While it is technically possible the universe could be throwing a massive pathological curveball to change the conclusion from METR data (which is we've been seeing exponential growth over the last 6 years), I think that seems very far from likely. The fact that we see the same behavior from a variety of sources over a wide variety of tasks and domains is a pretty clear indication that METR while certainly far from perfect is actually painting a consistent picture at least in terms of the rate of progress.
You can look at ECI for a summary benchmark statistic, which does NOT use METR's benchmark, and you see a similar trend. Same with SWE-bench where the task distribution is far more in domain for real world problems. It is a bummer that this METR data can't be better funded. It would probably take $1M or so to really beef it up properly which any of these labs probably have in their couch cushions.
Saying we have linear capability for super-linear cost compares an unbounded variable (dollars) to bounded instruments (because benchmarks saturate). On unbounded measures, growth is exponential; you can see METR time horizons double every ~4-7 months (https://metr.org/blog/2026-1-29-time-horizon-1-1/). And capability being proportional to log(compute) is what the scaling law predicts.
Epoch puts training cost growth at ~2.4x/year as your link shows. Meanwhile cost for fixed capability falls ~10-40x/year (https://epoch.ai/data-insights/llm-inference-price-trends), and lab revenue is growing ~10x/year! Anthropic went from $1B to $9B to $30B+ run rate in ~15 months, OpenAI ~$25B.
On [3]: the "destroying value" conclusion flips sign on an assumed 15% baseline rework rate. The report's most direct metric is +16% merged PRs per dev. The RCT evidence is genuinely mixed (METR: -19%, with n = 20 and Claude 3.x; Cui et al: +26%) but its just super hard to do this well, I think Faros stuff was pretty cool, I haven't seen this before so thank you for the reference.
Uh, I don't really think that's anywhere close to an accurate characterization of most people here. Everyone, including Dario and any researcher at any frontier lab, knows the situation is quite scary and unprecedented. There are problems that will be solved and diseases that will be cured, but will we be living in an Orwellian universe? Will a rogue drone swarm find you cowing in your basement and murder you? I mean the technology for this is already mostly here, it's a matter of the willpower and budget to roll out something really evil.
The comment's question is about capabilities and why the discussion about capabilities often times is far removed from todays capabilities.
- All of your observations are absolutely dead on
- Yet, we have very very very robust scaling laws that as Dario points out we've had and validated for over a decade. This extends to downstream measures like METR time horizon and compsosite benchmarks like the epoch capability index.
- If you look at where you're at now, which is again dead on, you're looking at a point on a curve that is quite easy to extrapolate, but less easy to tell when exactly on the curve a certain capability or use case undergoes a step change from error rates dropping below a threshold that is hard to anticipate in advance.
So while Dario / other frontier CEOs are understandably unpalatable, they are absolutely spot on with a call out that all of this is bound to happen and happen quickly, and that's without solving several core problems that haven't been solved yet (e.g. continual learning). In 2023, coding agents were just laughable. Yet they followed the same predictable training curves. Anyone looking at the data can see the obvious, and anyone reading newspaper headlines or hacker news comments would get a very different impression.
I'm sure you have evidence for this
Not to mention: thinking that the api behind the scenes is literally swapping to overfit models to maintain some sort of illusion that they perform well on these benchmarks is just beyond ridiculous.
This is...just incredibly conspiratorial and a bit silly. You can make a benchmark right now and run it on the models. They'll have a benchmaxxed model on your...previously non-existent benchmark? I mean: if models really were overfit to benchmarks, which zero lab is doing because its idiotic, against their incentive structure, and easy to detect, then why would we see a slow ascension of performance on say humanity's last exam for one benchmark example? You could trivially get those numbers to close to 100% if you wanted to.