Source?
285 karma · joined December 17, 2019
Source?
I'm curious, though, about why you'd make such an implausible claim without backing it up with any evidence.
[1] https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/06/feeding-gods-hundred...
[2] https://www.history.com/news/aztec-human-sacrifice-religion
The EPI thinktank report you linked to simply states the costs outweigh the benefits without any numbers to support that conclusion. This paper, on the other hand, does look at the numbers. I appreciate the reference, however.
You also haven’t provided any evidence to back up your claim. I’d be curious to read it, if it exists.
Do you have any evidence to back up that claim? Because hard data shows exactly the opposite: https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2018/beyond-bls/how-airbnb-has-...
...criticize them on HackerNews.
The differences boil down to the fact that the Lorentz group is O(1,3) whereas the (homogeneous) Galilean group is R^3 x O(3), both 6-dimensional.
Oh please. The internet hasn’t been “gutted”. Far from it. It’s getting faster. It’s getting cheaper. It’s becoming more widely available. Do you have any evidence, anything at all, that the internet has been “gutted”?
And you’re going to tell me with a straight face that the internet has been “gutted” for the vast majority of its existence? Don’t be ridiculous.
I don’t think so. ZFC is either consistent or it isn’t. That is, a Turing machine enumerating all theorems of ZFC either produces 0=1 or it doesn’t. This is, however, independent of ZFC (if the latter is consistent) by the second incompleteness theorem. See https://mathoverflow.net/a/332266, in particular Nik Weaver’s comment:
> I think the strongest argument in favor of the definiteness of ℕ, and against the idea that PA, or any other axiomatization, is the be-all end-all, is the evident fact that we have an open-ended ability to go beyond any computable set of axioms, for instance by affirming their consistency. If you accept PA you should accept Con(PA), and the process doesn't stop there: you can then accept Con(PA + Con(PA)), and so on. This goes on to transfinite levels. If our understanding of ℕ really were fully captured by some particular set of axioms then we would not feel we had a right to strengthen those axioms in any special way; the fact that we do feel we have this right shows that our understanding is not captured by any particular set of axioms.