> "Possibly [...] inaudible infra- and ultrasound could be synergistic with an ototoxin just as industrial factory noise can be."
[0] https://www.wired.com/story/us-diplomats-sonic-attack-ototox...
1,355 karma · joined September 30, 2013
> "Possibly [...] inaudible infra- and ultrasound could be synergistic with an ototoxin just as industrial factory noise can be."
[0] https://www.wired.com/story/us-diplomats-sonic-attack-ototox...
1. Isn't the default virtual host practice still a problem even without TLS/SNI? Apache chooses a default virtual host on port 80 in the same way. Is that "acceptable" simply because it's more common for the default port 80 virtual host to be controlled by the hosting provider? That's not as robust as one would hope.
2. Wouldn't http-01 over TLS be made safe if the certificate was required to be valid for the domain being challenged? Granted, there's a TLS chicken and egg problem there, but that's beside the point.
[0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-09#section-...
I'm curious what this was. Can you elaborate or point me somewhere I can read about that?
This prevents cookies from being set at the root domain by a subdomain. Which in turn prevents non-TLS MITM cookie injection [1] as long as the application uses HSTS (even without includeSubdomains from the root).
[0] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Se...
[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technical...
Sometimes I call this a URL black hole.
In all fairness, black holes are everywhere when you consider that most web servers ignore unrecognized query params for routing. Examine this URL:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?t=choosing-between-names-a...
Of course the difference is that Hacker News doesn't disseminate URLs of that form, but that doesn't mean someone couldn't pollute the internet with them.
The text encodings themselves (e.g. UTF-8, UTF-32) ought to be proper data types. Strings are a leaky abstraction that cause otherwise competent programmers to have funny ideas about what text is and isn't, as this entire thread demonstrates.
I failed and the glasses I ordered were unusable. In the end I brought them in to my optician's office where they precisely measured not only my PD but a couple of other metrics that I think described the frame/lens position on my face.
I sent all those measurements to the vendor (https://www.warbyparker.com) and the second glasses were perfect.
These other self-measure methods look better than the ruler-mirror method that I did, but if I ever buy glasses online again, I'm going to take the trial frames straight to the optician's for proper measurements.
https://www.yubico.com/2016/05/secure-hardware-vs-open-sourc...
It's fun to think up thought exercises to try and help break out of our conceptual framework. On a smaller scale, an approach I've played around with is taking attributes of existing technologies that have certain things in common, then diagramming them in different ways and looking for holes.
As a concrete example, let's go back to 2005. You might reason that e-mails and blog posts are both kinds of written messages, however blogs have an open audience, while e-mails are sent to specific recipients, so a closed audience. Separately, you might compare e-mails to text messages, and realize that they are very similar, but one is long form while the other is short form. You can draw this as a table:
| short form | long form |
-+------------+-----------+
open | ??? | blogs |
-+------------+-----------|
closed | SMS texts | e-mail |
-+------------+-----------+
Now try to figure out what fits in the missing box (short form, open). It's Twitter! (Or even better, decentralized micro blogging.)Store an "epoch" date in the database for each account. Tokens issued for that subject are considered invalid if they were issued before the epoch. This allows you to do mass token revocation (e.g. sign out all active sessions) without knowing the IDs of the tokens that have been issued.
Yes. Code coverage should not be the primary measure of quality of your tests. That thinking leads to tests designed to cover lines, not use cases.
Phishing is a hard problem, and any technical solution will only go so far. The main criticism I have with many OAuth authorization dialogs, not just Google's, is that they often don't show enough information for technical users to vet the authenticity of the app. It's like if a web browser didn't show the address bar.
> "We're deploying some abuse detection and reactive measures to deal with impostors that might try to abuse this sort of attack. Given this, we do not intend to perform validation that the URL matches the branding information."
That last part was in reference to one of my proposed mitigations, which they chose not to implement.
Here's the discussion on the IETF OAuth WG mailing list from that same time period: https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg07625...
Also, not all doomsday scenarios are terribly far fetched. AWS might one day have to discontinue a service after losing an intellectual property lawsuit, for example.
> Italics: All orbiter names should be capitalized [0] (e.g. Atlantis, Columbia, Discovery ). We also italicize lunar module and command module names (e.g. Eagle, Columbia, Odyssey, Aquarius). We do not italicize mission names (STS-44, Apollo 11). All ships should be italicized (e.g. the Hornet, the Enterprise). We do not italicize the names of probes and robotic spacecraft (e.g. Voyager, Cassini).
[0] I think "capitalized" is a typo here that should be "italicized".
This reminds me of firewalls that weaken security by filtering unrecognized HTTP headers: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12655180
Another reason I prefer sign in is because there's less discord about its usage. I have never seen anyone try to write signin. Maybe they'll hyphenate it, but even then people seem less inclined to use sign-in as a verb compared to login.
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEgDCCA2igAwIBAgIILLVnxACV9P8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwSTELMAkGA1UE BhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAoTCkdvb2dsZSBJbmMxJTAjBgNVBAMTHEdvb2dsZSBJbnRl cm5ldCBBdXRob3JpdHkgRzIwHhcNMTYxMTAzMDEzMzM1WhcNMTcwMTI2MDExMzAw WjBoMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwN TW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzETMBEGA1UECgwKR29vZ2xlIEluYzEXMBUGA1UEAwwOd3d3 Lmdvb2dsZS5jb20wggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDHzMz8 G+xLkFuyF2yBjvm1uwY3LewkD/U5oBRrJAzZ8nVAGc5hwOHLAg2kDe2nW2AYpdpC FtgRTi4M+vNHlrJcPfbT0j+IpS0FSeqBlbi28LUQuv+S8MuaoGHsZQ+oHUIMm5/+ fXWfqpnJSCaFBBTg4ywHeO1qcj9865b1efD8E2Nhjmm58Z9EyNqJ3SpeWagAhk7k j66vV+63MILYMfMWNQUPEM9qytPkYuVxE2SCDAPAIl1rN7put8BO2gUAhRDUh7JP CzVH8k6WQp55f0VUuxlbpH0tjPHZS/vDDPb0nggDyqdqzIUQRCeS19m8q/mFh7Rq 0znNnlRktE4UD7OpAgMBAAGjggFLMIIBRzAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAQYI KwYBBQUHAwIwGQYDVR0RBBIwEIIOd3d3Lmdvb2dsZS5jb20waAYIKwYBBQUHAQEE XDBaMCsGCCsGAQUFBzAChh9odHRwOi8vcGtpLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vR0lBRzIuY3J0 MCsGCCsGAQUFBzABhh9odHRwOi8vY2xpZW50czEuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS9vY3NwMB0G A1UdDgQWBBTOIMTSAYg4AHgT3U/MUkCw2dAjtzAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMB8GA1Ud IwQYMBaAFErdBhYbvPZotXb1gba7Yhq6WoEvMCEGA1UdIAQaMBgwDAYKKwYBBAHW eQIFATAIBgZngQwBAgIwMAYDVR0fBCkwJzAloCOgIYYfaHR0cDovL3BraS5nb29n bGUuY29tL0dJQUcyLmNybDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEASTQEiHIasdUPoCQx y+6LUjW1uW5tXFO3T5wtMYcECARrjo7jxQlfZ4pID3s1b+iNc+cL6OgTzPxfcC1r 450qeRwGW3gLtX5Hxi/bFvz/iIS+0EKAWy7cYLI+XIg9fBWNW3Q7I0xH4h3yRiFm yICwiJJULfAFXO6ySJX9Y64WvWWF6hTx2hB+oqu3UbZy2uKKhA4P0xjoK/xZCcGH BrlY0qXGWexiI0PGYhvcaQMLDLHvhmpk8tFDgjGUnrW8GrhR97oPaigA4LbdwY2O oysN7cwTsSvZP6Sfia2jqOeYn7d6q8PI1/KL9MIriwUNBANGyyWbUR7dQbeaQCTN qUJdPg== -----END CERTIFICATE-----
It's a SHA-256 certificate which expires in January, and it was signed by a SHA-1 intermediate that expires 12/31/16.
Also, I, for one, still favor e-mail, but I'm definitely in the minority there.
> "the OAuth2.0 standard does not cover or define the critical security requirements and protocol details to govern the interactions between the 3rd-party (client-side) mobile app and its corresponding backend server during the SSO process. As a result, various IdPs have developed different home-brewed extensions..."
But the prevalence of implementation flaws indicates a bigger problem. We need better tools and libraries for app developers. Too many people are rolling their own ad hoc implementations, and they shouldn't have to do that.
Some think the spec is partially to blame. The core spec is deceptively approachable, and implementers don't know how to respect it properly. And it's only a primitive building block. On its own it's often not enough to be useful. Even if you implement the core successfully, the glue around it might be bad. That's why I believe we need a bigger ecosystem of vetted utilities for every niche.