Windows is definitely part of the problem, but I agree it's not the problem. Linux or MacOS are not better enough either.
323 karma · joined September 21, 2019
We talk craptons about "innovation" and torrents of words on "cybersecurity" yet underpin daily life on recursive kludges on 1980s operating system and software technology. It's quite Kafkaesque!
This isn't just a matter of "spending more on IT" - they likely already spend too much. It's just spending on the wrong things.
No amount of layering crap on top will overcome the rotten, slapdash foundations of systems like windows, nor the diverging motivations between MS and and their customers. Especially customers like the U.S. Government. The amount of vendor lock-in to the shitty MS ecosystem, begetting atrocities like critical data living on godforsaken Sharepoint, is profoundly saddening. It's remarkable how everyone just uses hardware that's orders of magnitude faster than 1990s computers, yet interactions are far slower.
I once tried (reluctantly) connecting my USG-issued laptop onto my fairly locked-down home network. The amount of spew it continually issued onto the network was disgusting and I just disconnected it and drove in to complete whatever mandatory update they demanded.
Instead of creating yet another goddamn "cybersecurity czar", how about we try to take what we've learned in the past 40-50 years in computer science and try to properly engineer the software foundations for the next 30 years? This is absolutely something the USG could instigate and accomplish, if the initiative was run by the right people. I know some of them!
The idea that you can't maintain the runtime performance of C while innately supporting automated reasoning about invariants/safety just doesn't hold up. The idea is to move the whole Pareto front outward - that's what advancements in theory and technology do.
Is Ada really good support for your argument? Ada's heyday was well prior to the ubiquity of the Internet, had no focus on ergonomics, etc. Its initial adoption target was far more niche than Rust aims to be. I agree with you that there is a certain window in which to achieve relevancy, and that probably has much to do with why newer Ada versions haven't really achieved critical mass. On the other hand, Rust is being used in places from desktop software utilities (e.g., ripgrep) to large internal SaaS codebases. The field of potential Rust developers is far richer than I think Ada ever had.
> More code Forth than Rust
Not trying to be a dick, but do you have any evidence you can point to for these claims? I find them to be surprising and unlikely.
In Aerospace, within both U.S. government and industry, midwest engineering schools are widely seen as producing more undegrad-level engineers who actually want to be engineers than places like Stanford.
Stanford, in particular, seems to attract proportionally way more engineering majors that want to use engineering credentials as a gateway out of engineering (high finance, startup executives, management, etc.). A colleague of mine in Big Aerospace says there's a pretty consistent pattern of not being able to hang on to many Stanford or MIT grads for very long. Granted Big Aerospace can be a miserable place to work in a number of ways, but if you want to hone your craft in a number of aerospace disciplines, you'll need some level of exposure to that kind of knowledge/experience-base. You're not going to get that at the next delivery drone or flying taxi startup.
I don't have the whole story as to when and how this stopped being a requirement (1990s?), or if it was ever a true requirement, but in U.S. DoD aerospace today, Ada is uncommon. I'm not sure of any new systems developed over the past 20 years that are based on Ada. Perhaps some of the avionics suppliers like Honeywell or Rockwell Collins that historically used Ada still do, but I don't think most aerospace prime contractors do today.
The prevalent U.S. Government view is that the industrial entities that implement systems should have the latitude to decide what they want to use. For DoD systems, they would just be expected to have the DoD conduct reviews of their software/system design. [Sadly, such reviews vary wildly in their quality and how much companies' feet are held to any fire.]
Keep in mind the FAA requirements for civil aircraft certification are different from DoD's airworthiness assessments. And then launch vehicles and spacecraft are assessed/certified on a different basis than aircraft.
Also: https://sel4.systems/news/2021
Do you know more that would substantiate defunct-ness?
- Your comment also reinforces my point: if aerospace seeks to be more rigorous, then more in aerospace should be figuring out how to shore up development of SeL4. Instead, they continue with no vision as to what should one day replace things like VxWorks.
My personal view is that more of the industry, including SpaceX, should be moving toward engineering things to be more correct-by-construction, including formal modeling & verification as you mention.
As one example, I don't hear most aerospace firms talking about SeL4 for their flight computer RTOSes. For another, you might be surprised (frightened?) by how many vehicles implement their flight software as big single address space executables written in C (sometimes C++) despite running on modern superscalar processors with MMUs. Even static analysis in some of these codebases is relatively recent - they are heavily dependent on functional testing for safety.
No, that would not address the reasons why accountability in law does not yield accountability in practice. ncmncm is right.
The Executive branch is not going to police itself seriously unless there is huge public outcry. Americans' outrage tends to rise and fall at the tempo of (so-called) news cycles.
Even if parts of the Executive branch wanted to pursue accountability, they would run into a hard wall due to claims of "National Security" by the intelligence community. You see how much it took for Daniel Jones and how much he still didn't get. It would require Executive branch orders at the highest levels that the intelligence community must cooperate, and sustained policing under those highest authorities to deal with the intelligence orgs when they try to find ways to argue and dissemble about complying with what they were ordered to do. Even then, staff might just outright commit illegal acts knowing that there will never really be consequences so long as you can claim "National Security". The Executive branch is not going to want to air any of this dirty laundry.
Colby at the CIA tried to be more forthcoming with Congress and that was part of what led to his being let go from his position as DCI.
The Judicial branch isn't going to take action autonomously.
The greatest likelihood of any accountability would have to come via the Legislative branch (Congress) and public outcry. There is an insufficient level of backbone among the people in power in Congress, because it's incredibly easy to be attacked on this politically when it comes to "National Security". There is this incompetent populist mindset that conflates intent with actions. So if the intelligence community or DoD was trying "defend America against those that would seek to harm her or her people", as many will say, you will find no shortage people who wrap themselves in the flag for political or media exposure benefit and assail any politician that would dare to criticize the intelligence community, DoD, etc. Because if they have our best interests at heart, who cares how they go about their business, right? A vocal segment of the populace will lap this up and say that we should be treating America's enemies even more harshly, not kowtowing to emasculated Liberal desires to give terrorists baskets full of daisies.
Also, it will be virtually impossible to air the incontrovertible proof of wrongdoing in the open. No matter what the level of wrongdoing, the highest priority will be placed on not damaging ongoing intelligence operations, methods, sources, and active personnel. As well, there will be considerations associated with airing information that would embarrass or otherwise cause blowback to cooperating partners, like other countries. So you will end up exposed to reports written by people who have seen the stuff that needs the right clearances, but the conclusions will all be more vague and high level and you will also have congresspeople who "disagree with the report", also in a vague way (either because of the political benefits or because they belong to the tribe that thinks the end justifies the means), thereby reducing its credibility and impact.
There has to be a critical mass in Congress that can survive the political fallout to try to do something about this problem, and there has to be a presidential administration that also badly wants to do something about this even if they get skewered publically. That's unfortunately a very tall order.
And yes, writing this all out depresses and saddens me.
Whether that's enough travel time reduction to make these aircraft worthwhile is definitely a valid question. The low-boom technology that NASA is pursuing is for sub-Mach 2 aircraft (I don't believe Boom is pursuing a low-boom design, but I haven't followed closely as I don't consider them a credible organization either).
True.
And also, the author is an operator, but not necessarily someone involved in the engineering or acquisition.
Nonetheless (and I say this as someone who was severely soured by my involvement with the program), people get tribal as to whether the JSF (provides an unmatched capability) XOR (is the zenith of acquisition malpractice). It's not either/or; both are simultaneously true.
No one in DoD R&D/acquisition fails to appreciate how expensive these things are and this realization is certainly driving long-term decision-making.
There are other forums in which they publish export-controlled information.
They patent things for at least two reasons. One is monetization - some in Government believe that monetization helps recoup some of the taxpayer's R&D contributions by claiming a "rightful" share of the benefits to commercial entities. I'm not saying I agree with this, just that is it a commonly held viewpoint.
Another, even in cases where the licensing is royalty-free, is for defensive purposes. It ensures a benevolent entity owns the patent and can license it for implementation in an equitable and non-discriminatory way.
Practically speaking, if you were to implement NASA-patented technology in a non-commercial context (homemade battlebot), it's extremely unlikely NASA would come after you for patent infringement.
There is generally a very sad reticence to acknowledge mistakes within organizations, but failure to earnestly acknowledge, show contrition, and learn from mistakes is dereliction of duty in the public sector in my view. In my own experience, I was a lone voice asking "What are we going do based on learning from this that lessens the likelihood of future such failures?" It was and is an unpopular question. I don't foresee any organizational changes taking place, even though they should. And I don't just mean staff changes, I also mean clear commitments to principle, intent, and wiser behavior.
This is true if you understand the context. Ballistic missiles are for nuclear strikes. Whoever is saying "anything currently being used" means conventional. These hypersonic weapons are conventional, i.e., non-nuclear.
> US Commander in Chief, West Point graduation speech.
That's not at all germane. No one in the DoD or in Congress is working on or funding these systems because Donald Trump thought they were the fastest possible weapons system. Heavy U.S. spending in hypersonics preceded Trump. You'll also note for example, Trump sticking his technically illiterate self into debates about the catapults used in the new generation of aircraft carriers. It changed nothing in terms of what DoD or Congress did with that program.
Ultimately, how cats deal with being harnessed even after being acclimated is extremely individual personality-dependent. I've seen some happily walk like dogs. Mine don't particularly want to walk alongside people and very quickly want to go off under plants or other places where they can hide and stalk, and where people can't easily go. We take them out for as long as both they and we can stand, and don't jerk them around.
The Kitty Holster type harness is significantly less escape-prone than say the PetSafe style of nylon straps, and probably less uncomfortable as well.
> the claim that hypersonic weapons can reach their targets faster than existing ballistic missiles
The majority who are seriously working in these fields do not advocate for such systems based on this class of claims.
> This extreme heating limits performance in two ways. First, it constrains glider geometry, as features like sharp noses and wings may be unable to withstand aerothermal heating.
Everybody working in this field understands this and has various approaches to the problem.
> Second, this heating renders hypersonic missiles vulnerable to detection by the satellite-mounted sensors that the United States and Russia currently possess, and that China is reportedly developing.
Also well-known. While you are going to be thermo-structurally constrained, Boyd's Energy-Maneuverability theory is decades old and relevant to these systems.
> Yet the performance of hypersonic weapons against missile defenses is strategically meaningful only if it offers a new capability (i.e., if these weapons do something existing missiles cannot). This is not the case.
The speed and what it confers is a new capability.
> the technical basis fails to justify the price.
In the U.S., this is more a reflection of the U.S.' failure to maintain its leadership in hypersonics since the 1960s and 1970s. NASP was a disaster of a program and a bad idea (though it did provide huge benefits in terms of learning and technology programs). As is typical in U.S. behavior, upon the cancellation of NASP, there was a slamming shut of funding to hypersonics that undermined healthy sustainment of expertise and facilities. Present-day expenditures are helping the country get out of the pit it entered.
There are a number of valid technical & programmatic criticisms of hypersonic systems and the U.S. hypersonic efforts. This article touched only on cost without any compelling support.
While I'm not a credentialist, neither of the authors appear to be aerospace engineers, and it shows in this article. They would have been well-served by vetting this through people actually involved in the programs referenced.
Most people would interpret "making a statement" to be a matter of signaling to others. I tried to make clear that people who buy these cars appreciate the benefits to themselves as the ones that drive and experience it, and that it has little-to-nothing to do with signaling to others. Early on in Tesla history, particularly with the Model S, I think you could argue there was a signaling element. Particularly well into in the Model 3 era, I don't think that holds to any major degree.
This is pretty dismissive. I'm not sure how many Tesla owners are trying to make a statement, nor are all Tesla owners over the moon with the product. You can see a prior comment I made: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21173756
There is probably much wider variation in Tesla quality than other car manufacturers, as the Model Y stories (detaching roof, hardware store wood trim hack jobs to hold assemblies) suggest. Their lack of respect for "legacy" practices throws the baby out with the bathwater. There's lots of valid criticism for Tesla.
All that being said, if you get a unit without the worst of those issues, you quickly learn to see the bigger picture and realize no competitors have yet built a comparably-capable EV. That is what drives the sales. They are here today.
EVs are not for everybody. But if they fit your automotive use case, when you need a car for transportation duties rather than the kind of pleasure that comes from driving a high-performance combustion-driven vehicle, they are so clearly the future. It's like using an LCD flat-panel monitor with a VGA connection in the early 2000s. Even before they got to the high standards they have now, those early units presaged that LCD monitors were obviously going to make CRTs obsolete. Tesla cars are the automotive equivalent of those LCDs. And it will be great for the consumer when Tesla no longer has the enormous lead that it still enjoys (years away).
So much modern aerospace technology historically comes from SoCal, and yet CA as a state doesn't seem to care about hanging on to world-changing industries like it.
Your example about Aerojet Rocketdyne is telling. They are contracting - I believe the Aerojet facilities in Sacramento are being divested if that's not already done. Boeing is divesting most of its Huntington Beach campus, and Rockwell in Downey is long-gone. A lot of Space Shuttle Main Engine/RS-25 work is done at their Stennis facilities or in Huntsville.
Aerospace in CA is not healthy.
The real issue with that engine isn't its reusability, it's that the industry has learned a lot about rocket engine design, operation, and manufacturing since the RS-25 was developed. That's reflected in the engines available from the likes of Blue Origin and SpaceX. No knock on the RS-25 - it stands as a watershed achievement for humanity in the engineering of thermodynamic systems.
Though calling the SpaceX engines "available" needs the caveat that SpaceX will not make them available outside of SpaceX.
I don't know that Boeing has computed likely values of such costs, and that if they did, that they would allow them to be publicly known. Moreover, Boeing would probably focus on their worst-case numbers to justify to everyone why the only viable path is to minimally modify the design.
While I'm not a 737 expert, I have evaluated flight software (FSW) and vehicle management systems (VMS) on Gov't programs. Mr. Ewbank points out systemic deficiencies in the 737 VMS and controls.
It would seem the question to be answered by the FAA is whether they intend to address these systemic deficiencies or just the proximate causes of the crashes. It would be a valid, and more rigorous view that since these aircraft are already out of service in an unprecedented way, these systemic issues should be addressed as well. To be clear, it will involve significant engineering work to do so.
There will be immense pressure on the FAA, especially since the aircraft has been out of service and damaged Boeing economically so much already, to just deal with the proximate cause (i.e., stay the course they're on now). That will come from Boeing of course, but also internal management and their perceptions, as well the implicit or explicit pressure from the political class.
Speaking purely for myself, I hope the FAA does force the root causes to be dealt with as Mr. Ewbank advocates (I don't know him, but have immense respect for his coming forward like this - you have to know and understand the systems to be able to provide this kind of critical review).
However, I wouldn't at all be surprised if the fact they have already started down the path they're on causes them to retrench and leave these root causes unaddressed.
Source: You can look up my profile and comment history. I don't work on the civil side, but I know how things work in the USG.