RandomLensman

So the idea is to make cities denser? Is maximum density use what we really want? What about industry, data centers, etc., that could be built in rural areas - wouldn't that push land value up there a lot?

Having most people rent their home would bring what advantage? Can still have high property prices and (local) lack of supply.

Depending on the risks, we put a lot of controls, processes, locks, vetting around who is allowed to handle certain things, what humans can do or instruct others to do. Don't see why that wouldn't be applicable.

For some crimes the tolerance level is pretty much zero. Given the considerable resource AI needs that doesn't seem impossible to clamp down on some things.

That sounds still controllable.

We don't try to "align" those things themselves - so maybe there are some learnings there about control, containment, processes etc.

I guess the question is what unprompted systems (would) do spontaneously?

Not sure that is enough for forecasting as the function to be estimated could change over time in random ways.

Could sit in the box and interact if a model of certain capabilities is needed/tested. We do physical security for other things, too. Not saying everything needs that type of isolation.

Wouldn't this mean better sandboxes are needed for some things, for example (might include very strong airgaps even)? Breaking out of something isolated electromagnetically, optically, and acustically is not easy.

Why would the limit of T1 devices matter when there are ones that already can do hotter? Thermodynamics make things harder to remove heat but not sure how they forbid it (you need the hot side to be hotter than outside to pump heat). Might need stages, for example. We can cool things 200K and more below ambient.

Is 52C a physical limit?

Why would 41C be the limit for the hot side? How does it work now in hotter places?

Why do we need modern weapons for defense at all then? Horses, bows & arrows plus will not enough?

Early data processing machines were used in the Holocaust, for example. Or cipher devices played important roles in WWII.

Not sure it needs to be about publications and data analysis technology as such to regulate AI development, for example - could be about processes, procedures, people, etc., no?

Not just on prediction but in parts also based on just not wanting certain risks. We can and do deem some things inherently risky, up to the point of banning them even.

Why wasn't it airgapped, for example? How was the action not allowed? Or do you mean in some weak sense, not in a hard not possible? RL systems doing weird and expected things wouldn't exactly be new, no?

We police people working with all sorts of dangerous things, if we think AI dangerous why not do that here, too? We don't just leave things up to people on the ground or companies.

Edit: I think the post I replied to changed a bit - nevermind. A complex topic.

Yes, my point was more that I don't know whether parsing those outputs as a human is a useful thing to do or not (even though it is in human language of sorts). What machines mean or want elecit might be different from a human interpretation, especially in relation to any RL "forcing".

Not sure we need to experience all possible issues to mandate certain things. We don't do that in other areas either, no?

Big if.

What was the inner state there? How would something not being allowed expressed internally? Maybe such language is one way to elicit certain behavior but not a statement of what was permissible?

Does that work with RL? Simpler RL systems already have done weird or unexpected things (even simple optimizations are prone to home in on errors or incorrect inputs to create poor results)? Could be easier to limit certain things, have processes and controls outside etc. instead of trying to align (as we do in a lot of areas when using machinery).

RL things doing weird and unexpected things isn't new - much simpler things than current AI already show that.

That said, we have a lot of experience working with (potentially) unaligned machines and things of various degrees of risk (from heavy machinery, to pathogens, to humans) and the approaches include various measures and procedures to control, contain, limit, etc. that are outside of the thing - not sure why that isn't a possible direction (or maybe I misunderstood).

Related to not tested: Who has a large bioweapons arsenal? As per below, my point was more about that bans do happen.

For starters, they are banned by the bioweapons convention from the 1970s (180+ parties).

Edit: I think back then the rather unpredictable nature and the little added value in deterrence etc. led people to the conclusions that arsenals of those things made little sense (and there was/is public dislike, too). The use was already banned by conventions from the earlie 20th century and the convention then addressed production, development and stockpiles (incl. delivery systems, I think).

I guess all I wanted to point out is, that there can actually be agreement to ban certain technological things pretty comprehensively (outside of some peaceful protective research etc.). Whereas things like SALT are (or were in that case) limiting the number of weapons deployed.

Why is the analogue necessarily the regulation and control of nuclear weapons (e.g., SALT) and not, for example, that of bioweapons? Some very different paths are available. On both I would note that the private sector has only a limited role, though.

Where did I say people shouldn't work on their societies?

There were always crises, I think.

RL leading to weird and unexpected things isn't new or restricted to current AI systems.

> Do not underestimate the power of this technology. These will soon be superhuman systems that can hack anything, revolutionize any field overnight, and acquire real power and resources.

Is the idea here that no field needs experiments and data anymore (which can take a lot of time) to be revolutinized and just "thinking" would be enough?

How would an AI itself own anything?