Can confirm, I just signed up /because/ of this announcement.
3,399 karma · joined June 23, 2012
One mainly, although not always, harms individual wellbeing, whilst the other causes mass death and lines on the map to change.
Hopefully you can work out which is which.
Two ways to think about it: weight vs volume.
By weight (assuming all $100 bills):
$20,000,000,000 / $100 = 200,000,000 bills
Each bill is roughly 1g, so total mass is ~200,000 kg
A typical builder’s wheelbarrow can take about 100 kg before it becomes unmanageable
200,000 kg total / 100 kg per wheelbarrow ≈ 2,000 wheelbarrows (weight limit)
By volume:
A $100 bill is ~6.14" × 2.61" × 0.11 mm, which comes out to about 102 cm³ per bill
200,000,000 bills × 102 cm³ ≈ 20,400 m³ of cash
A standard wheelbarrow holds around 0.08 m³ (80 litres)
20,400 m³ total / 0.08 m³ per wheelbarrow ≈ 255,000 wheelbarrows (volume limit)
So,
About 2,000 wheelbarrows if you only care about weight
About 255,000 wheelbarrows if you actually have to fit the cash in
So the limiting factor isn’t how heavy the money is; it’s that the physical volume of the cash is absurd. At this scale, $20bn in $100s is effectively a warehouse, not a stack.
He's also absolutely right about the architectural problems too, single points of failure, performance bottlenecks, and the complexity in cloud-native environments.
That said, it can be a genuinely valuable layer in your security arsenal when done properly. I've seen it catch real threats, such as malware C2 comms, credential phishing, data exfiltration attempts. These aren't theoretical; they happen daily. Combined with decent threat intelligence feeds and behavioural analytics, it does provide visibility that's hard to replicate elsewhere.
But, and this is a massive but, you can't half-arse it. If you're going to do TLS inspection, you need to actually commit:
Treat that internal CA like it's the crown jewels. HSMs, strict access controls, proper rotation schedules, full-chain and sensible life-span. The point about concentrated risk is bang on, you've turned thousands of distributed CA keys into one single target. So act like it. Run it like a proper CA with proper key signing ceremonies and all the safeguards etc.
Actually invest in proper cert distribution. Configuration management (Ansible/Salt/whatever), golden container base images with the CA bundle baked in, MDM for endpoints, cloud-init for VMs. If you can't reliably push a cert bundle to your entire estate, you've got bigger problems than TLS inspection.
Train people properly on what errors are expected vs "drop everything and call security". Document the exceptions. Make reporting easy. Actually investigate when someone raises a TLS error they don't recognise. For dev's, it needs to just work without them even thinking about it. Then they don't need to work around it, ever. If they need to, the system is busted.
Scope it ruthlessly. Not everything needs to go through the proxy. Developer workstations with proper EDR? Maybe exclude them. Production services with cert pinning? Route direct. Every blanket "intercept everything" policy I've seen has been a disaster. Particularly for end-users doing personal banking, medical stuff, therapy sessions, do you really want IT/Sec seeing that?
Use it alongside modern defences. ie EDR, Zero Trust, behavioural analytics, CASB. It should be one layer in defence-in-depth, not your entire security strategy.
Build observability, you need metrics on what's being inspected, what's bypassing, failure rates, performance impact. If you can't measure it, you can't manage it.
But Yeah, the core criticism stands though, even done well, it's a massive operational burden and it actively undermines trust in TLS. The failure modes are particularly insidious because you're training people to ignore the very warnings that are meant to protect them.
The real question isn't "TLS inspection: yes or no?" It's: "Do we have the organisational maturity, resources, and commitment to do this properly?" If you're not in a regulated industry or don't have dedicated security teams and mature infrastructure practices, just don't bother. But if you must do it, and plenty of organisations genuinely must, then do it properly or don't do it at all.
Also, the BBC first reported on the boat immigration crisis on "BBC South East" regarding small boat arrivals in 2014.
GB News wasn't launched until June 2021, so they can't take much credit here.
Daily Mail is likely to buy The Telegraph, which honestly worries me.
I also think it is interesting to use an LLM because it will likely be a bit more human than a normal integration automated test.
Printing and postage cost was about £5.8 million. At the time, I thought it was a waste of taxpayers’ money. A letter wouldn’t change anyone’s behaviour, least of all not mine or anyone I knew.
But the economics told a different story. The average cost of treating a Covid patient in intensive care ran to tens of thousands of pounds. The UK Treasury values preventing a single death at around £2 million (their official Value of a Prevented Fatality). That means if the letter nudged just three people into behaviour that prevented their deaths, it would have paid for itself. Three deaths, out of 30 million households.
In reality, the effect was likely far larger. If only 0.1% of households (30,000 families) changed their behaviour even slightly, whether through better handwashing, reduced contact, or staying home when symptomatic, those small actions would multiply during an exponential outbreak. The result could easily be hundreds of lives saved and millions in healthcare costs avoided.
Seen in that light, £5.8 million wasn’t wasteful at all. It was one of the smarteer investments of the pandemic.
What I dismissed as wasteful and pointless, turned out to be a great example of how what appears to be a large upfront cost can deliver returns that massively outweigh the initial outlay.
I changed my view and admitted I was wrong.
Is the highest bidder really the best custodian of a tld?
Why have a quota of, as you say, 250 every 10 years? What does this do to help, what issues does it address?
However, to use it with blockchain smart contracts, you'd need to run an oracle to retrieve the data from the authoritative source then submit it to a blockchain, constantly. This moves the responsibility of this back to the government.
If you don't have a blockchain project, then this doesn't add value to you.
Rather than have a custom ETF you can get one that includes it then individually short Tesla to counteract your identified risk.
This would be cheaper and if your theory is correct, you'd outperform the S&P500.
But this is the point I am making, if I have a relationship with someone at work, particularly when one person is subordinate or position of authority, then we'd simply be fired... but a prison officer will face a criminal prosecution of Misconduct in Public Office, and possibly face prison time themselves. Seems somewhat unfair for a low paying job.
A prison officer has a sexual relationship with a prisoner, should they simply be fired or also have a jury heard criminal court process then a record?
.. Not that it should be relevant, but now factor in the prison officer is female, newly qualified and the training college wrote to the prison to warn that the prison officer is not suitable to be a prison officer because they are not robust enough. The prisoner is also highly manipulative and has a documented history of romance with vulnerable females.
https://www.verisign.com/en_US/domain-names/registration-dat...