- So far ran into two applications which don't even implement the X11 clipboard specification (ICCCM section 2) correctly - xsel and Emacs (patches submitted).
- By far the worst offense I've seen in clipboard privacy on the Linux desktop is RedHat's virt-manager. It sends your clipboard AND selection content to all virtual machines, even when they are not focused, with no indication that it's happening, and with no GUI option to turn it off. This is at odds with the common practice of running untrusted code in virtual machines.
- X11 being network-transparent makes its protocol fairly malleable, so it's not difficult to bolt some privacy on top. hax11[2] has an option to restrict access to the primary selection for configured applications (though, for truly malicious applications, you may find X11's security model generally lacking).
[1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29808487 [2]: https://github.com/CyberShadow/hax11