election by jury is better. elections aren't the problem — uninformed voters are the problem. especially if the turnout is statistically demographically biased (older, whiter, wealthier, more conservative, etc.)
220 karma · joined August 15, 2014
I propose a unit shift to align physics with human scheduling: The Jot (Jt ), defined as 1 Joule/hour.
It shifts the awkward math (1 hr=3600 s) out of the usage calculation and onto the device rating.
Conversion: 1 Watt = 3.6 kiloJots (kJt ).
Usage Math: A 50 kJt bulb running for 10 hours uses exactly 500 kJ. No conversion factors.
Battery Math: Capacity (Joules) / Rate (Jots) = Time (Hours). Pure integer division.
> Isn't this due to defining "performance" in a way that is congruent with Approval (/ Score)
1. i did not define performance in a way that is congruent with approval/score. scores are not utilities. they are the modification of utilities via ignorance, normalization, and strategy.
2. that the correct social welfare function is just the sum of all voter utilities (the definition of "performance") is mathematically proven. https://www.rangevoting.org/UtilFoundns
> do I Approve my latent terrible party or not?
this is not a "problem". it's well understood. https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat6
approval voting obliterates IRV ("RCV") with any mixture of strategic or honest voters, so i'm not sure why you're bringing up strategy. https://www.rangevoting.org/StratHonMix
https://www.rangevoting.org/UtilFoundns
once you know that, that's the function you use in your VSE metrics. then the performance of the voting method is measurable without having to think about any specific criteria.
that's orthogonal. ranked voting methods already have (arguably more severe) response to strategic voting AND ALSO can fail IIA even with no strategy applied, just by changing an irrelevant alternative.
> Personally I think the possibilities of circular ties under Ranked Pairs is oversold.
what does that even mean? we have VSE figures that measure the combined effect of all failures, including when the Condorcet winner isn't the favorite candidate of the electorate (not the social utility maximizer). https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/vse-graph.html
that's not under or oversold, it's just measured performance.
https://www.rangevoting.org/IRVsplitExec.html
tl;dr IRV is extremely poor, doesn't actually solve the vote splitting problem, and is radically more complex and cumbersome than superior alternatives like approval voting, which would plausibly scale far faster once gotten off the ground. plus approval voting was adopted by 2/3 majorities in fargo and st louis, so we know it's politically viable.
1. of course it is, if you're not mathematically savvy.
https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat6
2. a lot of people will do it REGARDLESS of whether it's rational, just like people donate to charity. so YOU as a rational self-interested voter BENEFIT by using a voting method which allows you to receive utility donations from those altruistic voters, however irrational they may be. and that leads to a greater NET utility, because voting isn't a zero sum game. https://www.rangevoting.org/ShExpRes
again, it would really help you to just spend a few minutes reading elementary voting theory before going off on such a wild misguided tangent like this.
of course it does. this is basic game theory. but the point is, at some level of iterating on what other voters will do, you arrive at an effectively static "wave function" of possibilities, so you can behave as if you have constant fixed win probabilities for the other candidates, and vote accordingly.
just use VSE results.
http://scorevoting.net/RVstrat6
https://www.rangevoting.org/ShExpRes
> It is never correct to assign a score between the minimum and the maximum, so why allow it in the first place?
it would help you to spend at least 30 seconds researching a complex field like voting methods before asking a deeply misguided question like this.