Inside the sad, expensive failure of Google+
mashable.com
mashable.com
People don't want Google integrated with their YouTube account, coupled with their Facebook pages, coupled with their email, coupled with their contacts, and on-and on it goes with Google. No respect for separation of the information.
I darned sure didn't like it when Google took over my YouTube experience. Now I have pray that I don't accidentally access a sexy YouTube video with the computer logged into my wife's account. Now, all of my previous viewing will be highlighter all over her YouTube page the next time she logs in.
These guys are really stupid in trying to unify every internet experience we have all into one nosy mother-in-law. It's the essence of evil they promised not to become a part of.
The positive network effect of social media is that it helps you find everyone you want to talk to. The negative effect is that it denies you the ability to compartmentalize your behavior - to talk about indie bands on Pitchfork, and then secretly enjoy Nirvana on Youtube.
Google+ didn't have any active users, so it lost the positive network effect, but it was incredibly aggressive about forcing you to use it in every place possible (and with more sharing than you wanted). The result was that they only got a loss of compartmentalization, without any actual social benefit.
I actually somewhat like G+. But because Google has so much of the rest of my life, I'm:
1. Not willing to participate on G+ as "me" under a real name.
2. I'm going to withdraw as much other content from G+ as possible.
Frankly, another big reason G+ failed is because most people using Facebook didn't need anything else. Google essentially tried to fix a problem that wasn't even a problem. Yes, Facebookers complained about privacy concerns, but those who did were likely not even 2% of the entire user base.
In fact half the population connected to internet is using Facebook.
The problem with this statement is that the data (users, engagement %, profit) tells a different story.
Around this time Google just simply forgot this, killed reader, killed ig, killed labs, and then tried to herd people into using an inferior social network, then tried to shove all of google's other products into this terrible product nobody wanted to use.
This is different than what happened during the search engine wars, where google's product was simply better than all the others and that's why people used it.
1. He's the elitist who went against Google's culture and separated the Google+ team in its own sooper sekrit headquarters with its own cafeteria.
2. He's the backstabbing liar who first said the company-wide annual bonus was going to be based on the success of Google+ and then when it briefly looked like it would be a facebook killer, he went back on his word, thus alienating pretty much everyone.
3. He's the out of touch dumba$$ behind real names that sucked the appeal out of Google+ and left it a dumping ground for stuff that didn't fit anywhere else.
The day Google+ was released, I was besieged with invite requests from friends and acquaintances. And the Google+ UI IMO was nicer than Facebook's (and it still is IMO). However, as soon as Google+ made it their business to out gay people using pseudonyms to stay in the closet, those requests stopped.
I'm sure there are many more reasons for the failure, but this was what I saw from within Google at the time.
Bradley Horowitz still carries that torch unfortunately.
If you have to force people to use your product, and they still won't, the product is dead. There is no product. That Google couldn't see that is a little disturbing.
And let's not forget the damage Google+ did to search. You used to be able to use the + sign to force a word to appear in results documents, but this was changed to clumsy double quotes (on both sides of the word) because of G+...
Provider: Here use X. Customers: Nope don't wanna. Provider: Okay now you have X to use Y. (lol got you) Customers: Stops using Y.
http://googlesystem.blogspot.com/2011/10/how-steve-jobs-infl...
Also, not in the article but reported in the press at the same time, Jobs told Page that he should be less afraid of ruffling feathers and more willing to command the company to do what he wants. Unfortunately, what worked for Steve Jobs wouldn't necessarily work for Larry Page.
With social networks you just can't do that. The cost of switching is enormous for the individual user, and no new users will join the smaller network. It's s natural monopoly.
The only chance you have is to offer something else, such as a professional network (LinkedIn) or a similar thing to completely set it apart from all existing networks.
When I created my G+ account I expected to find features for adding/importing/inviting my FB contacts. Nothing. Google must have been too scared of legal fallout to just mass import users' networks.
The way G+ worked at launch, FB could have a year of downtime without risk of losing many users to other networks.
This mistake, coupled with a double-edged focus on privacy (as people shared with less friends, others wouldn't see much content) and their disastrous Real Name idiocy, was their undoing - G+ became a me-too.
Also made it clear they were not doing this for us.
Ah, as a very experienced text searcher (got into it in the early '90s in the document imaging arena) disabling a leading "+" for search terms was grossly obnoxious.
> Also made it clear they were not doing this for us. Most important point in G+ state IMO
Whatever Facebook was, it was something out of a guy's desire (lowly or great). Google+ felt like yet another business attempt at market share grabbing. The original circle idea was cute, but everything else was corporate strategy and forced unification.
And Google+ came from a Microsoft veteran who started back in 1991, when Microsoft succeeded in supplanting a lot of one trick pony companies. But those had limited network effects and the big ones also manifestly failed at software development, and Facebook continues to run that part of the company well (enough).
The attempts in this thread to retroactively attribute this failure to something other than Google are...interesting.
Here I'm just talking about Gundotra likely having the conceit from his time at Microsoft that he could make a Facebook replacement that wasn't 10x times better, but through tie-ins to other parts of the Google ecosystem would draw people in (vs. a lot of Microsoft's success in that period coming from other companies failing to execute, which Facebook did not).
But: the policies clearly ultimately came from the very highest level at Google. Biggest consequence is an exceptional blow to my trust in the company.
Or rather, series of blows.
What you could do is be the service people use to write to other services and then gradually lock them out. Unfortunately the fight you have to take on against the platform you are cannibalizing is really something a few fast moving guys, who fly under the radar and have nothing to show for anyway, can do for a few months, but nothing a Google scale corporation can do.
Buzz failed for very different causes: it was a twitter clone that offered no additional functionality and even compromised your gmail privacy.
In my case I never friended my parents on FB, and keep G+ for family - which means I don't share things with the wrong group.
I'm speaking for others, but I'll still say that sometimes we don't want some of the data we post accessible to others. That seems an obvious statement, but I always use Twitter in a way that I find acceptable for sharing data with everyone. Facebook and Google+ are used in that way, but also ways where I selectively share things with people I trust to view the data I post. (To be clear, I don't use Facebook at all.) That's where things get complicated, because the service must enforce rules to keep these people from seeing those people's data. Those rules turn into 'features' and then you have a problem.
A social sharing API doesn't need a ton of features, especially when it's designed to forward the data around to the people that need to see the data. By not storing it, you make things simpler and more resilient to attack.
To quote my other post [0] in this thread: Facebook cannot be killed with something so similar to Facebook like Google+, much like Google cannot be killed with something like Bing.
I get your point, though. If I were Google I would have started the whole Google+ thing as a publishing platform for businesses and/or regular news publishers and bloggers, using some benefits within the search to lure them in. Facebook clearly pisses them of as they try to squeeze them. That way Google could have gotten some content first.
Next push some commenting-system on top of it (as they did) but without the Feed-Posts appearing there and all the other crap.
They already had Hangouts/Voice and Picasa, why did they even need to cripple all these services. They could instead have made Google+ a lightweight identity services as they promoted it.
If G+ had been released pre-Facebook (or at least earlier in Facebook's history) I doubt any of those technical points would have been show stoppers. G+ has/had a lot of little advantages over competitors, but none large enough to bring about the mass migration that G+ so desperately needed. With good timing, none of the little annoyances or problems with G+ would have likely mattered. Good product; unfortunate timing - at least with respect to the fundamental product being offered.
[1] http://www.ted.com/talks/bill_gross_the_single_biggest_reaso...
Google did an excellent job of targeting influencers and creating a wonderful experience for a few million people in the first several weeks of the "closed" beta. While most of the advantages were indeed small, there was one very big carrot: the possibility of improving your SEO via G+. [Of course a lot of people don't care about this, but they influencers they were talking about disproportionately do.] Facebook got caught somewhat flat-footed; Zuck threw everybody into lockdown mode for a few months, and when they surfaced, the general reaction "this is the best you can do?"
So while I agree that the technical issues weren't a major reason (Hangouts might have been janky but Facebook didn't have anything remotely comparable), I really do think it was the social stuff that killed them.
- the nymwars turned off a lot of their most enthusiastic early supporters, and turned the overall energy negative at a crucial time
- the failure to create a developer ecosystem (due to the lack of a write API) left them unable to leverage their deep pockets for a longer-term war of attrition against Facebook
Nymwars. Relevance. Hinky UI (and still). Lack of search. Poor formatting options (and still almost wholly neglected.) Forced integration. Too many SEO types.
Much of it screams "this sovles Google's problems, not yours."
I had a boss who's Google Plus page was owned by one of his other employees - they were on so many of the same emails that Google guessed who was who wrong. The two of them, working together, couldn't figure out how to hand the profile to its real owner. Similar experiences with identity issues and unusable bugs abounded.
It's one thing to have a hard-to-use website, or one that crashes sporadically. It's another to have errors so severe that they make the site permanently unusable for some people.
I think it basically was the social reasons. The name is really clunky and corporate. It was never that cool or exciting to people. The lack of original inspiration and the obvious ham-handed attempt to move people from Facebook just made it fall flat.
> none of the little annoyances or problems with G+ would have likely mattered
Yes, it would have mattered. It has happened before.
You know Orkut had every reason for not failing. I mean everybody was on Orkut seeing the Internet penetration at that time (at least in my part of the world) and Orkutting was the thing - for us there was no Twitter, no Instagram, no MySpace, traces of Friendster, but just Orkut. But it failed. It was pre-Facebook (by a a few weeks iirc) and had gained momentum long before Facebook did.
What else surprises me? The fact that what every one - I mean every Tom, Dick, Harry - knew was seemingly unknown to the G+/G leaders. Many of their decisions brought universal reactions of a metaphoric "really?" and they would do that all over again as there was a total communication gap with them and the rest of the world.
> Good product; unfortunate timing
Imho it's actually like: good idea (but nothing innovative; in fact many times repeated) badly executed (and more bad repeatedly over the time) is failing as expected.
Wave, Buzz, Orkut, G+
> For all that success, the Internet giant just couldn't seem to figure out social
I think this lines really sums it.
Maybe they banked upon the number they had in all their G-ecosystem and they believed they could just herd the flock.
This more than anything. And it was not just the external observers either. As pointed out in the article, Vic ran roughshod over the entire company to push his agenda. As is well known, a very large fraction of the rank-and-file employees were up in arms over the real-name policy. There were petitions against it signed by thousands of employees. None of that was heeded by the leadership.
It would be really interesting to see a more in-depth analysis of how this happened. It didn't happen because the folks at Google are stupid: from top to bottom, they are wicked smart. So how did such a mass delusion take hold? I'd be genuinely interested in hearing from people who expected G+ to succeed, and why they had this expectation, and how its failure has changed their perceptions.
This process is often reinforced with incentive structures:
- raised salaries for everyone working on Z; - higher performance bonuses offered to top performers on Z; - greater social cachet for those working on Z (more mentions in Q&A sessions, presentations, etc.; more marketing punch; more opportunities for advancement; air of secrecy; etc.)
Once the incentive structures take hold, even smarter employees have rational reasons to perpetuate Z.
It has little to do with egos and everything to do with bad planning and a panicked knee-jerk response to the crisis at hand.
Of course they had years of experience in helping people read content with Google Reader, so that had to be shut down and lessons ignored. Then they made sure there was no API, or even RSS feeds, so no one else could make a more efficient reader either.
Or in other words, did anyone at Google actually try using their product? (I seem to say that a lot about different Google products.)
Google could never decide if they wanted to G+ to basically be Instagram (not surprising given Horowitz' Yahoo/flickr background), or if there was something to be done along the Interest Graph angle a la Reader / HN / Reddit / asf. The info density for the latter has always been terrible on G+, not to speak of various other iniquities that text-heavy posts (or post shares) had to endure for years, like much smaller images in the stream for the longest time.
Really they should have just split these two use cases into either two separate apps (maybe to prescient for 2011), or at least provided alternative UI views. Of course, a solid API including Write could have solved it as well as you alluded to.
That would be a solid alternative to Apple's ecosystem and you would see the benefits of going from Facebook to Google.
Google has a much better chance of competing against Apple's photo/notes/cloud services than it would beating Facebook. Also I believe there is going to be a tendency in the next few years to move out of Facebook because of the social network effect people want to get out of.
Google would be the only solid candidate for anyone not wanting to jump into Apple's products.
Privacy is like "corporate responsibility" or "environmental sustainability": the public at large simply does. Not. Care. They just want shiny sh*t for free.
Facebook cannot be killed with something so similar to Facebook like Google+, much like Google cannot be killed with something like Bing. They are at a local maximum amassing lock-in and buying up every improvement on the status quo.
What might ultimately kill them is either EU regulation, a big Chinese domestic market or some jump in technology or business model. The end result might again look very similar to what we have now. I think in the beginning it would start out as something like Whatsapp or Siri. It could be something that takes over or kills advertisement completely like Amazons various tries to create a platform for all online commerce.
> The massive Google+ launch effort had all the hallmarks of a technology corporation: a code name ("Emerald Sea"), an artificial timeline (100 days to launch!), a dedicated secret building (with the CEO relocated there) and a full PR blitz once completed.
The CEO puts his office in the G+ building. I see that as Page being the driving force behind this. The article says:
> "Vic was just this constant bug in Larry's ear: 'Facebook is going to kill us. Facebook is going to kill us,'" says a former Google executive. "I am pretty sure Vic managed to frighten Larry into action. And voila: Google+ was born."
But for what actually happened to have happened, Page had to have bought into the idea independently (assuming he is independent). Every article I've seen about G+'s failure fails to mention anything about Page's role - this article goes out of its way in this strange way to try to say Page was just 'whispered to too much'.
> By early 2014, less than three years after its big launch, the Google+ team had moved out of its coveted building to a spot on campus further from Page. Gundotra announced his departure from the company that April — in a Google+ post, of course — to pursue "a new journey."
The G+ push/force was still in full-swing on the consumer side through 2014. Evidence that Page was the driving force, not Vic.
This was an organization-centric article, but I wish it had mentioned the other potential causes for G+'s failure, such as being invite-only during the media attention, and the rude forcing of people over from other platforms (Reader, YouTube, Maps, business listings, etc).
No, that reads as Vic Gundotra being the driving force behind this and Page buying in fully. If Page was the driving force, Gundotra would have put his office by Page's.
> Page had to have bought into the idea independently (assuming he is independent).
I don't think Page was independent. He was a brand new (in some sense) CEO with a lot to prove to shareholders and he had to make a big splash. Although his leadership has improved and he clearly came back to power with a vision to unify Google's services, he still had a vibe of being a bit unsure.
My perception of the management at Google is that they mostly come from the engineering side and don't typically do things like overhype themselves or their projects—they generally call the importance of their projects as they see them.
So along came Gundotra, who had spent 15 years at Microsoft in the most political meat grinder on the planet and was wayy more politically savvy then the rest of the management—and sells Facebook as an existential threat and G+ as salvation with unflinching confidence, plus a little bit of brown-nosing that would go a long way with an insecure new CEO. Feeling this versus the even-keeled/mildly pessimistic reporting styles that the rest of his engineering management had, I think Page bought into it hard, and G+ was history.
Although it's circumstantial evidence, the conditions inside the G+ team were insanely political versus other Google orgs. I think this is a mirror of Gundotra's style.
> The G+ push/force was still in full-swing on the consumer side through 2014.
Really? Everyone knew it was dead. I perceived that as merely consolidating the unified logon/identity system they'd build in G+.
As long as a company pulls the plug on projects that involve user investment with some regularity there is little chance that they'll be able to launch a social platform requiring significant investment from the audience they seek. You can kill only so many projects before people will become wary of trying out your next project, no matter how hard you try to force it on them. In fact, forcing it on them reeks of desperation and that is another nail in the coffin.
Technology and the real-names fiasco were for sure factors but I just don't see google 'getting' social.
I've seen this multiple times when interacting with Google employees, just a sense of removal from the real world that permeates some of their choices. Stuff like, "oh, I guess the page on accessibility should be accessible."
Facebook really has face(s) (puns aside again): it has Mark Z's friendly looking face, it has the faces of all your friends and family that are already there, it has a warm-looking humane-looking brand (not with a damn mathematical sign like "+" in. its. freaking. name.), even the annoying-to-most-geeks UX has a "face" that you can recognize. Even when they do their ubercreepy stuff we all complain about, they do it with a face, you viscerally hate it or you get freaked out just like you would get freaked out by a stalker watching you naked... you don't just feel like your privacy is invaded by a mathematical equation. Facebook, the company, really feels like a "person" and not a "thing". (Yeah, to me at least it feels like an ubercreepy person for whom I want a restraining order and maybe a vicious guard dog too and few extra alarm systems to keep it as far away as possible... but it's still a "person"). And it's not a reaction, Facebook wan't born out of a reaction to MySpace, it "authentic" and people can feel this about a brand. That's why corporations can spend millions on buying a brand that "feels authentic" instead of "manufacturing a brand".
Facebook started with a bunch of cool faces and a cool story. They even made a movie out of that story! And a totally shitty technical platform, but that didn't matter. The gargantuan effort to make Google+ succeed looked like some folks' effort to make Esperanto into the de-facto international language instead of English. You needed the literary face of a Shakespeare, and the military face of a British Empire to make a language succeed, an beneath them an authentic foundation (English was not invented as a reaction to Latin!).
G+ was ready to succeed big.
RealNames killed G+, the most transparently Moronic decision of the last decade or so in tech
I agree the world was ready for a Facebook/Twitter hybrid network with the semi-anonymity of twitter but the interactive capabilities of Facebook.
In fact, I think it still is TBH.
But Google+ also integrated into your email and all other Google products. It was like Facebook but without the walled garden.
So yes, real names were a part of it but Google really wanted 'real everything', which was presumably to increase the users juicy ad relevance.
The 'real everything' thing had another effect - confusion. Google+ to comment on YouTube? I had friends literally not know Google owned YouTube, so when they needed this account to set up channels and comment they rightly noped out of there.
The name, Google Plus, didn't help. It was never its 'own' thing - it sort of 'was' Google, and Google is massive and has many services. If they have even limited it to a semi-walled garden network they might have had some success with real names, but so open, so interconnected and pervasive was just asking for failure.
They do have a chance still though. Get rid of real names, make it a separate network walled off from the rest of Google properties, still public like twitter but with the granularity of circles for semi-private stuff and it'll fly.
It's really a good service, much better than Twitter and despite the more 'anonymous' nature of the network it would still keep laying the golden advertising egg for them.
Yes! What a stupid, simplistic and limited name. Most product names with Google are stupid ("Play"?!??) but Plus has to win the stupidity contest.
I remember when Vivendi's CEO invented "Vivendi Plus" (in 2000 or so) and even registered vivendiplus.com just to show how unprepared the company was (at the time of the announcement, it was a big surprise at headquarters...)
Brand extension never works, NEVER. There are many books written about this subject, one of the best being "Positionning" by Al Ries.
Google Video failed, Youtube thrived; there is no "Google mobile", but Android is doing pretty well, thank you very much. Gmail is not exactly "Google Mail".
Google Maps is a counter example, maybe because it feels like an extension of search.
I didn't want to be logged into google search when checking my email or having a youtube-account when signing up for g+.
This is still the worst fallout for me. Whenever I need to do a video call with someone it involves lots of hair pulling trying to get everyone to press weird "say hi" buttons on profiles before it will ever even manage to show messages between each other, let alone video conference. Half the time it doesn't and we all just use Skype which is reliable. Google Talk was actually good, Google Hangouts is just broken and killed it for an inferior product.
This is a constant in every struggling project / startup.
The technology behind Google+ seems nice tho ( so was Wave ), very snappy but that is probably because of lack of users. I like some of the communities there, but it seems to die slowly.
At the same time, a lot of people never gave G+ a chance, because they felt Google already had too much power. It felt like giving Google the "missing link". At least, that is my experience.
Agreed. I really wish Google would make all G+ feeds into RSS feeds, and add the ability to subscribe to any RSS feeds in the G+ stream/circles. This would effectively make G+ into an RSS feed reader, with the ability to very simply publish one's own feed. I'm sure not many would switch to using G+ as a feed reader in the near-term after they shut down Google Reader, but it would be a small first step to begin tearing down the giant walls around social networks.
During those years, they let Reader languish, it was treated as a dead project, then finally shut down. So it felt like a continuous series of events.
So the narrative of at minimum neglecting Google Reader in favor of the not a substitute of Google+ would seem to be correct.
And yeah, at the time there was discussion about how they should have kept reader and somehow rolled it and its users into G+. Reader was their only organically successful social sharing product.
That is how I felt. Once Google started doing things like trying to force people to link their YouTube and Gmail accounts I got off the bandwagon (I now not only don't login to YouTube I block YouTube from setting cookies altogether).
He could also have said: "Apple is going to block ads in their new version of Safari. Soon they will introduce iPhone native search, and nobody will ever see Google again."
I am sure the social media trend numbers looked great on paper, but they severely underestimated how tired people would get with it. (I'd say only a small fraction of my facebook friends still are active there, for instance.)
Anyhow, my troubles with the G+ branding may sound like a nitpick, but I think it was a lot of the problem. People already had privacy concerns about Google, now they could have privacy concerns+.
If Google+ has a few hundred million regular users, that sounds good. Why the need to comptere with Facebook on numbers?
Reader was my top visited site daily by far. Nothing replaced it.
Yes, but that seems unlikely.
Google+ was great. It just didn't do a much better job of solving a problem that Facebook already had.
One strategy would have been to integrate Google+ into Google Contacts, Photos, Messaging, basically forcing people to integrate their social network into their phone and gmail contacts, messaging etc... People would have been pissed, but it would have actually provided a unique utility (one place for all your social interactions).
A bold move is what it takes to dethrone a king.
G+ circles were a blessing for me.
I hope I won't have to leave Google+
I tend towards a mere like when I'm feeling more introverted. To me, commenting and sharing are the extroverted alternatives — and liking is the absolute least one can do that still technically qualifies as "social".
Lowering the friction to increase social participation is precisely catering towards introverts, from my perspective, and that is what Like and +1 do.
But no "pohl up-triangled your HN comment".
Now if only they used that data to make a better Google plus feed ,It's the feed that died.
If you want to participate and create a g+-account you'll automatically sign up for google search, gmail, google drive, youtube, google maps, play store, google maps with no option to opt out.
Now who thought this was a good idea?
But even if someone wanted all that, if you signed up for your business to have a youtube channel and a g+ page, you don't get your custom vanity URLs with the chosen account-name. That's remarkably bad UX.
These days I blackhole services that do this. Pinterest most recently.
Fucking autocorrect.
This just tells me the market is not open, and allows for no competition.
#nymwars, noisy content (with poor controls), confusing UI, and intent that was expressly counter to users' interests really didn't help.
See Tim O'Reilly's Aug 23, 2011 post requesting topics for conversation with Bradley Horowitz:
https://plus.google.com/104092656004159577193/posts/A1qHbykj...
As I commented recently on a private re-share:
What's telling to me are:
1. How many times Real Names / Nymwars came up.
2. The alienation issue: how Google were (and frankly, have) demolished goodwill with their core tech evangelist community (I used to be one, I no longer am).
3. How lacking Google's first instance of G+ was: no search. For reals.
4. Requests that remain unanswered. Especially subscribable circles / feeds, RSS, and tags.
5. How many names I recognize here. Many are in my Circles. A few are long gone.
All that had some value in 2013 (although perhaps not the amount Microsoft paid for it). Microsoft's own decisions post-acquisition expedited the loss of value and resulted in them writing off the entire purchase price.
Something might....
Google's just amazing at building technology no one wants/needs. Wave, Buzz, G+, are all great examples of that. If only they could hire someone like me (and many others with common sense in this area, I'm far from special in this regard) who would have told them even before release the G+ would have been a failure. And Buzz and Wave and probably a whole bunch of other great technology that ended up being useless.
I disagree - I think a lot of people were expecting exactly that[1]. But I think the big mistakes were a_ forcing every Gmail/Toutube user to use it (and with real names, which was even worse), and b_ stop halfway and claim "it's not a social network, it's an identity service", essentially giving up.
Had Google stuck to the "Facebook for those that hate Facebook", I think it could have worked.
Google+, when it started, was superior in almost every way to Facebook in its first few years. (That's not a fair comparison. Facebook was a startup social network; Google+ came out of the gate at 120 mph.) It had Hangouts, which would have been a killer app if people had actually used them as a sharable social space (i.e. to "hang out") as the execs thought they would. The problem was that Google thought its muscle would allow it to take a greatest-fixed-point approach (i.e. a "stay popular once popular" strategy) whereas any social network needs to focus on the least fixed point, because that's where it's going to land. It had wealth but no users and no credibility, and it wasn't able to get those.
Hangouts are genuinely useful and there was some guy at Google who argued that courting independent game developers (and getting high quality products, rather than third-string products and Zyngarbage from mainstream publishers who expected Google+ to fail and weren't going to use their best stuff) would have allowed Google+ to grow organically and inductively, with the same "cognitively upscale" initial user base that made Facebook, thus proving Hangouts and moving to progressively larger subsets of the population. It became obvious that the failure of Google Games (and, possibly, of Google+ in its entirety) came from Google's leadership not listening to him. I wonder whatever happened to that guy.
U.S. Facebook engagement was actually dropping in 2011 and the Zynga games were the reason why. People hated those games.
Google+ could have gotten some more air time with that idea. What they did with it, I can't predict. Sometimes, more air time means not crashing; sometimes, it just means crashing later. It would have had a chance with Real Games, though, and I'll take "a chance" over "no chance" any day of the week.
Anyway, I'm glad that Google lost. A closed-allocation company with stack ranking deserves to get beaten. So there.
That doesn't make any sense. Facebook goal is to have people staying connected to Facebook as much time as possible. Be it to check their friends status, the fan page of their idols or to play whatever game is trending. If Zynga's games are popular, the better for them since they monetize that popularity, and the better for Facebook since people spend more time on their platform, and they can water their virtual crops or whatever in between checking the cat pictures some friend posted and reading about the new thing some other friend's baby did. If Zynga's games lose their popularity, someone else will overtake them (it was King with Candy Crush) and Facebook will not be impacted.
Games I'm not so sure. Addictive yes. But so's crack, and that doesn't make for a good neighborhood.
I cheared, loudly, when Games died.