The Tiny Team Taking on a Massive Reform of Government IT
medium.com
medium.com
My friend went to DC with a lot of optimism.
Halfway or more through the program, I met my friend at a wedding. My friend's take on the problems with government IT was that it wasn't resolvable by such a small team, because the problems were cultural, deep-grained, and protected by turf-guardians who had a lot to lose with reform.
Without the President spending significant political capital, nothing will ever get done.
The most egregious instance of wastage that could not be resolved involved an instance where a certain government department was receiving emails for archiving. Was printing out the emails. Was sending those printouts to another department by snail mail. That department was then scanning in the emails and archiving the digital images to computer storage.
The stupidity of this process was manifest to everyone without mental disability, and yet nobody could change the process due to the various contractors and their patrons, and the various government employees employed in the process.
Later, talking to other government IT workers (not Presidential Fellows) I came to the conclusion that Govt. human capital is not of the highest quality, and Govt. is perhaps the worst place to work unless you have a thick skin that helps you to resist demoralization at every turn.
I think USDS is doing a good job of putting "critical mass" on a limited number of high-impact projects, and ensuring there is buy-in from the top-level leadership of each agency they work with. That seems like a good strategy to me.
I suspect the reason so many government web sites suck is that those contractors "core competence" is navigating the byzantine purchasing process. Being able to write good code is far down the list of qualifications.
The reason that I ask, is that I could've swore this article was posted last month, but it was an actual different FastCompany article (http://www.fastcompany.com/3046756/obama-and-his-geeks).
Meanwhile in the page source:
<meta property="article:published_time" content="2015-07-30T17:21:08.966Z">But ultimately, the people making the contracting decisions are agencies like CMS, HHS, the VA, and DHS. And with USDS, the agencies now have solid third party to provide technical advice--for example, that a consumer login system shouldn't cost $80 million to develop.
That's why you see results like the one quoted in the article, where a $200m initial healthcare.gov system was replaced with a $4m one. And if you read between the lines, you'll notice that the major federal contractor for healthcare.gov decided not to bid this year: http://www.wsj.com/articles/healthcare-gov-contractor-optum-...
Sometimes the good guys win.
[1] On the other hand, the engineers at those companies generally want to do the right thing, if they are empowered to.
I like to think that if everyone of the contractors had their customers' interests as priority #1 that the current situation wouldn't be happening. This is why I have few hopes of much changing down the road without a massive reform. The most skilled, talented contractors tend to have trouble surviving the system despite the funding vehicles available.
Even the SETA system created to "police" contractors a bit in the government's best interest is fairly easily gamed by the reality that people form relationships and that people can easily switch companies.
I think what was probably key is to find an internal champion within the organization you're working with. If you can find a good partner on the business side, you can often get things through the bureaucracy if you're patient and diligent.
I wonder what their PR budget is like?