(I'm not an expert on the subject, but it's been discussed before on HN, and this is my recollection.)
It occurs to me that an interesting variation would be for the loser to pay an amount equal to the lesser of the two parties' legal bills. That would limit the risk, and remove the incentive for the deeper-pocketed party to spend money just to inflate the bill.
I am small troll A suing company B. I lose, judge orders that troll A pay all the legal fees. I don't have the money, I file bankruptcy, I flee the country.
Lawyers still want to get paid. I doubt any legal team will just chase some random around into collections because "loser pays"
I remember a comment a while back on HN or somewhere which suggested an approximate solution to this : the loser must pay the costs equal to its or the winners fees- whichever is lower.
What about the situation with east Texas where they side with the patent holder the majority of the time?
Under this I might almost be more likely to just settle. Do I pay nothing, a paltry sum to settle, or 2-4x the cost without "loser pays" to lose? If I have even a 10% chance of losing it sounds like settling might be a good deal.
Not to mention that the costs to the losers the few times they win would really scare anyone who isn't able to eat the massive costs anyways. Would you sue someone from stealing thousands from you if there was a small chance at you owing them millions?