Nike Missile Sites of the San Francisco Bay Area (2001)
acme.com
acme.com
I'd imagine most of US civil air defense is just sending up fighter jets.
But on 9-11, US air defense got caught with their pants down. I wouldn't expect much.
The US has developed a lot of missiles, including those used to shoot down other missiles. Do you have a reason to believe that their IADS is so dependent on fighters? I'm not particularly well-informed on the issue so I'd be interested to read more.
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/americas-capitol-is-guarded...
I'm not sure it's US air defense who got caught with their pants down, the entire notion of the 9/11 attack would have been to get around the effectiveness of US air defense at keeping foreign aircraft out of US airspace.
The time needed to scramble F-16s is not based on a jet flying from Boston to DC or whatever. That's already the end zone.
The 9/11 Commission Report is well worth a read.
For ICBMs there are naval vessels like the Aegis, as well as land based systems surrounding the CONUS.
Within CONUS however they are largely relegated to military installations. For example there are batteries on military installations in the D.C. area, but not outside of those reservations.
[1]http://theweek.com/articles/549964/futuristic-air-defense-sy...
Modern air defenses are the anti-ballistic missile stuff, interceptors located at the borders, etc.
But today there is a far greater chance of being shot by a an armed squad of uniformed men driving armoured vehicles.
It's really apples and oranges, but people still die at the hands of violence today as they did in the past.
"it appears as though our missile attacks the center of mass of tight formations, downing none of the aircraft"
"let's put a nuke on it and call it a feature"
Probably, though Soviet strategic bomber formations probably wouldn't be operating at particularly low altitude and, IIRC, the idea was to intercept before they were over target (but not far enough away that it wouldn't be problematic!) anyway, and, finally, localized EMP and flash from a kiloton-range airburst is better for people on the ground than the effects of a megaton-range ground burst.
If the Nike missiles around SF had ever been fired in anger, it would have been an effort to turn what would otherwise be total disaster into merely major disaster.
(May well have been a bored volunteer making things up, but I wouldn't dismiss it out of hand...)
My worry is what happens to critical infrastructure. For instance, if the blast were in line-of-sight of multiple high-voltage transmission lines then extra-high-voltage transformers (think >200 kV) could “melt-down” (that is to say, the cellulose insulation is damaged by higher than normal temperature of the oil caused by the excess DC current, but maybe I am wrong?). These are multi-million dollars, weigh 500 000 lbs, are very difficult to move, and have a lead time measured in years. (There are probably 10 of these on hand as spares across the country for the 4,000 currently in use.) Cascading power failure, say substantial failure in San Francisco, could affect the entire Western Interconnection. If the power goes down, so does water pressure which depends on electrical pumps. A loss of power/water for more than a week could be an extremely severe event. A military strategist wouldn't settle for just one city to be in this state either.
So if you have an attack on multiple fronts, then today it would be suicidal to potentially knock out the power to your own cities. But, maybe back when the Nike was in use power failure wouldn't be as catastrophic as it would be today OR this wasn't a possible failure mode.
Also, I argue that your line-of-sight is increased by "low-altitude" EMP blasts (30 000 ft for a localized EMP on a bomber vs >100 000 ft for high-altitude EMP) whereas a nuclear detonation probably occurs at much lower altitude (~2 000 ft), so the higher altitude could in theory attack a much larger area as far as power is concerned. So in terms of electrical infrastructure, a larger area of damage could occur by Nike attacks on bombers higher up. But who knows.
Recently in Vancouver we hosted the woman's world cup. Joe Biden was in town. And so was this (http://i.imgur.com/pvxYN49.jpg). That's the USS Stockdale entering Vancouver port to provide him cover. It left port the day after he left town. All very quiet. Local news didn't speak of this big thing coming in unescorted. I only noticed after one of our boats went screaming by the dog beach (http://i.imgur.com/G7lY9s4.jpg) about half an hour before. It was probably leaving to make room at the dock. When the Stockdale left it was followed by a tug and a rib from the local cops... they probably learned about it at the same time I did.
Stockdale's itinerary listing it docking in North Vancouver. http://www.uscarriers.net/ddg106history.htm
The lack of air defence is probably a good thing. The error rate, the risk of shooting down something by accident, would be unacceptable.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/photogallery/vic...
Also, air defense and ballistic missile defense have largely converged. The newer systems are designed to intercept just about everything that moves from sea level to low-earth orbit. It is one of the reasons the ABM treaty had to be scrapped -- limiting missile defense was tantamount to limiting air defense.
By the 60s, the Russians were concentrating on ballistic missiles,
and not much more work was put into air defense in the U.S.
How does one defend against ICBMs? Is that not considered "air defense"? By the 80s, a smaller group of F-15s were presumably
adequate to defend the U.S., nevermind the missiles.
"Nevermind the missiles"? Do you mean: a smaller group of F-15s was adequate to defend the US if by "defend the US" we mean completely ignoring the missiles? The Russians kept improving their system though, and
it remains quite powerful.
Where can one learn more, or what web search keywords are good?The differences make for extremely different requirements. To shoot aircraft down, you want a missile that can travel somewhat faster than the aircraft. By not going too fast, they can stay maneuverable, to counter the aircraft's own maneuverability. You can use a proximity fuze so that once you get somewhat close to the target, the missile explodes and destroys the aircraft with shrapnel. You typically have some hours of warning to get the missile into position.
To shoot down an ICBM warhead, you need a much faster missile in order to perform the intercept at a useful altitude. You have maybe 20 minutes of warning at best, and probably no more than 5-10 minutes knowing the exact target. The target doesn't maneuver so the missile doesn't need to counter that. The target is maneuvering so fast, however, that a proximity fuze does you no good if you're using chemical explosives. The target is moving much faster than your explosives explode, so timing the explosion to hit the target with your shrapnel field is too hard. One option is to hit the target directly (kinetic kill), which means hitting something with a cross section of a couple of square feet while your closing velocity is several miles per second. This is hard. Another option is to use nuclear warheads on the interceptor. The detonation won't physically destroy the incoming warheads, but the radiation flux can destroy their electronics.
The answer to "how do you defend against ICBMs?" is more or less: you don't. No practical system to defend against a large-scale ICBM attack has ever been developed, or even planned. Defending a few targets at great expense is possible. The Soviets had their Galosh missiles defending Moscow, which are still in place. The Americans built the Safeguard system to defend ICBM silos around North Dakota, but it was decommissioned quickly because it just cost too much. The Americans now have the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense in Alaska and California. This can defend much of the country against ICBMs, but only a small number of them, so the intent is to prevent e.g. North Korea from carrying out a small strike, not stopping a full-scale Soviet/Russian/Chinese strike. Some Aegis destroyers operated by the US Navy also have the ability to shoot down ICBMs, but again the numbers are limited. In general it's cheaper to build an ICBM than to build something that can intercept an ICBM (especially since one ICBM can carry 10 or more warheads, all of which need to be shot down separately unless you can somehow destroy the missile while it's still launching), so unless you have great economic superiority over your adversary, they can always out-build your defenses.