Meaning you could come up with a trivial system to which it doesn't apply. Which begs the question: How do you define triviality here?
Meaning you could come up with a trivial system to which it doesn't apply. Which begs the question: How do you define triviality here?
This includes some surprisingly complicated systems, like real (as opposed to integer) arithmetic.
Bonus pedantipoint: it's not begging the question - that actually means 'to assume X in your proof of X'. It's just raising the question.
I don't think I've actually ever seen it used in the original usage "in the wild", as opposed to in the posts of pedants complaining about people using it wrongly.
So it's over, "begs" has a new meaning, and complaining about it is pointless.
Real arithmetic is not enough to express integer arithmetic?
I suppose it all boils down to how you define "arithmetic", but what is it that the integers have that the reals lack under the relevant definition? I would think that real arithmetic by any reasonable definition would give you enough tools to check whether a number was an integer, and in that case, doesn't it necessarily contain integer arithmetic as a subset?
http://books.google.com/books?id=71pK8Zz9Dd8C&printsec=f...
"Since the natural numbers form a subset of the real numbers, it may seem odd that the theory of real numbers can be complete when the theory of the natural numbers is incomplete. The incompleteness of the theory of the natural numbers does not carry over to the theory of the real numbers because even though every natural number is also a real number, we cannot define the natural numbers as a subset of the real numbers [...]
How would we ordinarily define the natural numbers as a subset of the real numbers? The real numbers 0 and 1 can be identified with the corresponding natural numbers, and using addition of real numbers we get the natural numbers as the subset of the real numbers containing 0, 1, 1+1, 1+1+1, and so on. However, this "and so on" cannot be expressed in the language of the theory of real numbers [because it requires the notion of sets, a second-order concept outside of the theory]."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real-closed_field
If you don't believe this, try writing down a formula in the language of this theory that says "x is an integer".
Ultimately, the issue is that the first-order theory of real closed fields contains no axiom approaching the induction scheme of PA in power.