A history of backdoors

Another history of backdoors: http://ethanheilman.tumblr.com/post/70646748808/a-brief-hist...

I went into detail on the subject myself at the link below with a focus on the NSA's long-term activities. It's worth noting that most of that was stuff we were criticizing before the Snowden leaks. It was hard to tell if it was incompetence or downright subversion. The leaks confirmed the latter played a major role. If you see these patterns, then your government might be doing the same thing. Unless it has no history of developing strong security solutions. Those are just less competent.

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/03/friday_squid_...

One person griped that the market could've chosen secure products. That's true. However, Bell (of Bell-Lapadula) noted high security has never spontaneously emerged in marketplace. The incentives go in other direction too much. So, subsidizing high security via DOD purchasing was critical and did result in a number of products appearing. Their canceling that resulted in almost all disappearing with rest barely improving. But, the market's impact on the situation is where it starts and I blame them a large degree in another article (clipped below).

http://pastebin.com/NucgJ3Ws

Any word on the whole "logjam patches still aren't out" thing?

It seems like Google's informal outlook is that they don't want Chrome to cut users off, so they're just going to work with vulnerable sites instead of patching.

Even the Lotus Notes "key escrow" they screwed up and used 760-bit RSA.

"I can't believe it, Jim! That girl's standing over there listening and you're telling him about our back doors?!"