Of course there is something intuitively bothersome about that: somehow, we don't believe that there is something it is like to be the United States, but we do believe there is something it is like to be xenophon. That's why the core question isn't absurd at all -- the author is trying to understand what truly differentiates a conscious system.
If you accept that many-celled organisms can be conscious, and that eusocial colonies (ants, bees) behave more like intelligent organisms than any one member, it's not much if a stretch to say "hm, a country belongs on that scale".
It's moderately surprising that a consistent system would put the US at eg 25% of a human by consciousness, but it's not the kind of thing that makes you say "oops I made a wrong choice somewhere".
The lense of homeostasis (or autopoiesis more generally) is useful: it does allow you to put things on a meaningful, insight-yielding scale: there are humans, and rocks, and then fire and hurricanes somewhere in between. So what does it take to make something past human in the scale?
Just like organs do not work like large cells and people aren't large-scale organs, societies aren't large scale people. But there are social elements that bind us into a society. Dogmatic individualism is wrong, and treating society as an individual is also wrong.
In any event the US acts like a person because it is basically the President plus Congress plus the leaders of the top 100 public and private American institutions. Any group that small is going to act coherently.
Your assertion is sorta like saying that the human body is like an organ because it is basically the heart, brain, and eyes.
We obviously do not live in anarchy, but I don't think our world can be so simplified accurately either.
[1] like how an atom-by-atom model of an airplane might be better, even if it would be accurate enough to break it into a smaller number of tension- and shear-bearing elements
I could see taking it a step further: instead of a Gaia theory, by which I assume you mean that the Earth is a sentient system, why not have all things that are causally connected be part of a universal consciousnesses? At what distance apart in space or time or both do we reject that individual components of a complex system could possibly combine to be conscious? Also, do all components need to be of the same type (individual human beings, in the United States example)? Can not other mammals and birds and fish and insects and forests and fields contribute?
The example in the article is a nation state, but is there any reason for rejecting a larger system? If the United States is conscious, does an American who goes to live abroad cease to be a bit of United-States-consciousness and become, for example, a bit of France-consciousness? What of astronauts, or those who will inevitably live on Mars someday?
Is the number of bits of nation-state-consciousness significant? Would China be "more conscious" by virtue of having four times the population? Is Canada only dimly conscious, having only a ninth of the population?
Finally, it seems strange to me that we'd use geographical borders to delineate separate nation-state-consciousnesses in an age when individuals so routinely communicate and travel outside of them. Nation states don't exist in vacuums, but interact and cooperate in many ways that affect each other mutually, for both good and bad. Perhaps all the people who speak a given language could be a conscious entity, regardless of where they live.
This is all fun to think about, but I lean towards the so-called neurochauvanism mentioned in the article and have a difficult time wrapping my head around the concept that something outside of brains could be conscious.
Why do we assume enough inteligence = consciousness? There was a great sci-fi book exploring that - "Blindsight", I highly recommend it.
Or, if this still does bother you, may be you should question your faith in materialism.
But while materialists may reject consciousness as a fruitful term, there's a problem with finding a functional definition of consciousness -- or even one that agrees enough with what we colloquially understand consciousness to be -- as consciousness, as we understand it, plays absolutely no observable function. Dismissing offhand as an illusion something that is not just perceived to be real but perceived to be the realest thing there is, is just waving away a really hard problem. I can accept that consciousness may be an illusion, but that doesn't make it any less elusive, as illusion itself pre-supposes consciousness.
And suppose that you come up with a theory of when consciousness -- or its illusion -- emerges. How can you possibly test that?
There is a huge difference between, "we can't talk about it in a scientifically meaningful way" and "there is no it to talk about". The former most certainly does not imply the latter.
In that situation the brain halves still insist on there being a self, and insist on knowing the motivations for actions taken by the other brain half, despite not having any direct connection, and often being provably wrong (e.g. researchers have manipulated data, presented them to one brain half as decided by the other, and gotten the brain half to explain its motivations for making choices that were actually made by the researchers).
Similarly, you can sever the connection between the brain and the gut (which also contains a mass of neurons) and the gut will continue to operate independently, yet the gut can affect your emotional state and other parts of what we tend to consider as "self".
We are government by a range of independently operating systems that combine to create "self" in some form.
Note that this does not mean that consciousness have to be an illusion, but the illusion single, coherent unified self is created by and actively perpetrated by our brains, papering over all kinds of holes.
The most that shows is that coherence of self is sometimes an illusion. You could modify the source code of a distributed database so that the nodes in a cluster were no longer guaranteed to be consistent. That wouldn't show that consistency is an illusion; it would just show that you can break stuff by modifying it. It's hardly surprising that people with damaged brains behave in odd ways.
Whether or not they're right in any given claim is besides the point, as at any point past the split that includes an element of chance and is dependent on the extent of outside interference. E.g. just talking to a person with severed brain stem from one side in sufficiently lowered voice is sufficient to provide different information to each brain half and cause them to diverge - coherence is lost pretty much from the first moment; though the extent of it can remain quite low for some types of information for quite some time.
> You could modify the source code of a distributed database so that the nodes in a cluster were no longer guaranteed to be consistent. That wouldn't show that consistency is an illusion; it would just show that you can break stuff by modifying it.
This is a poor analogy. In this case the brainstem is the replication mechanism, not computation.
Take a multi-master database and sever the replication, but let the nodes most of the time see mostly the same data. Now change the database so that it tries to infer what the results actually should be based on patterns seen in the past, so that it actively lies to you about what the basis for the query responses are (the database tells you it is derived from inserted data, but half the time it's computed based on imperfect assumptions of what the other node will have seen).
This is what is actually observed in experiments on people with severed brain stems: You know you've fed bullshit data in, yet the system responds with providing a result with a confidence it has no justification for. You can argue we can't prove that the motivation is to maintain the illusion of self, but the effect certainly is to maintain an illusion of a coherent self - or at least try to. Unlike the database, you can ask each brain half what it based it's decision on, and the deceived brain half will usually insist it made the decision based on x,y,z, even when researchers made the decision without its knowledge.
The only change is blocking communication.
Yet when one brain half tells you it made a decision and explains to you why, you can't trust a word it's saying, as it will present itself with equivalent certainty whether or not it actually made the decision, as long as it thinks some part of the collective actually did make the decision.
Think of any part of your brain as some government spokesperson who is trying to speak for the whole, and who needs to answer questions about statements they personally never made without letting slip that it's total chaos behind the scenes.
Some certainly do, more specifically eliminative materialists: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/
But my read is that this article is intending to throw a challenge in the direction of philosophers who advocate a materialist understanding of consciousness, but who aren't eliminative about the concept of consciousness. I.e. they believe it's meaningful to call humans "conscious", and they also believe that the phenomenon has a materialist explanation. This article aims to force them to either drop the concept, or accept that it can be applied very broadly.
consciousness (atman/soul) is self-existent, ever-blissful non-material energy. it has no beginning and no end. It never born so never dies. it's the absolute truth because it's not subjected to change, death and decay. Material reality is only a relative truth because it's always changing. Whole of our body cells recycle every year. But we're still aware of the body as before. that awareness is the non-material atman, which associates, itself with this body as long as it's bound.
Yogis for ages have been able to go to the source – atman – by silenting the mind and its modifications (vritis) and have been able to observe the causal, subtle and gross planes of existence along with wheel of time. Hence Upanishad declares: "That which cannot be observed through mind rather through which mind gets the ability to observe is atman"
It hardly takes an year or two under proper guidance and full commitment to get glimpses of this subtlemost thing, do you dare to invest?
If you fanatically stick to a viewpoint without even evaluating the other view with an open mind, you risk of repeating what religious fanaticism did with pre-modern scientists in the west.
And regarding downvotes, do you think I care? I could have posted more popular comment in favor of materialism to gain more material points :p
Edit: To learn more, you can read autobiographies of two living yogis [0] and [1]. A succinct yet most authoritative practical guide is Yoga Sutras [2].
0. http://www.amazon.in/If-Truth-Be-Told-Memoir/dp/9351368068/ 1. http://www.amazon.com/Apprenticed-Himalayan-Master-Yogis-Aut... 2. http://www.swamij.com/index-yoga-meditation-yoga-sutras.htm
Where does the idea of materialism fall?
Is the idea of materialism itself part of materialism?
If you think it's hard to define what a soul is, try defining what it is for something to be "material".
And saying that consciousness is a fruitless concept is a bit short, when this very concept is unavoidable when trying to know what is humanity. It's so fruitless that hundreds of books have been written to try to grab a part of it. It is also central to psychoanalysis, and to many major novels of the last century. Fruitless you said?
To say this is quite ignorant of the past few (24?) centuries of philosophy, including those centuries and thinkers when philosophy was part of religious thinking.
Where are you getting this from?