On the Value of Not Knowing Everything
iasc-culture.org
iasc-culture.org
Nothing, of course. Thinking that believing reductionism will somehow transform human minds into mathematics is like thinking that believing evolution will transform humans into chimps. And whether or not you believe in reductionism, the reality of humanity won't change. The only thing that changes is that the non-reductionist philosophers lose and the neurobiologists, cognitive scientists, and AI researchers win. Which seems to be happening, in any case.
If there is value in trying to learn something, surely that value must be present in the knowledge when it's finally gathered. To argue that answers are negative because they deprives us of questions is self-defeating - if the answers are worthless, then the questions themselves were worthless in the first place.
FWIW I've found that STEM students can be as good or better than humanities students at the parts of the humanities I value - that sense of wonder. I've read great articles and novels, seen beautiful paintings and photographs, by people with STEM degrees. But the reverse is less true; it's a rare humanities graduate who can write a proof, or a program, or test a hypothesis empirically.
Ultimately, there is fair competition in the marketplace of ideas. If people find the humanities offer something valuable, they will find a way to express that - that is, to pay for them. If not, not.
Let's start with the simple stuff: the value in knowledge. First, you assume that the value of a question is determined by the value of the answer. But that assumes that the value is inherent in the answer all along. Also, what is the value of knowledge? Sure, you could say something like, knowledge helps people live longer or die less or something. But what's the value in that? Surely your "one truth" cares not a jot about human existence, and therefore human knowledge. And if it us and who we are who give value to knowledge, then surely we might value the questions regardless of the answer. I think you'll find that Buddhists see value in questions much more than in answers.
Second, the "only one truth" statement. You base it on the assumption that there is only one reality. Now, suppose that were true (although you'll find no proof of that; that is simply an assumption of science, but nothing we can prove). Other realities can still exist within that reality that cannot be meaningfully reduced (see my comment about universal computation and reduction of the human mind). To the character in Minecraft, the world of Minecraft is real, and even you can't say it's any less real than our world simply because it's simulated (and, for all we know, our world may be simulated too). If the human mind is a computer creating an inner world, an inner experience, for each of us, how can anyone say it's less real than the physical universe? Mathematically it certainly isn't, and in fact, they may both be simulations. It is subjective -- but it's just as real. A computer scientist must understand that there is no mathematical distinction between an illusion -- i.e. a simulation -- and measurement.
Yes, it's true that if you die in your dream you're not really dead, and that if you die in real life then you can never dream, but that is just an implementation detail. If the CPU blows up the program stops and not vice-versa, but that doesn't make the program any less real than the CPU.
So who said finding objective truth is more valuable than subjective truth? Yes, it helps more people, OK. But who says that is more valuable? Once you start assigning values, you'll find no objective justification.
Finally, even the question of what constitutes knowledge is very tricky. The famous Gettier problem clearly shows that if we agree on a complete, robust definition of knowledge, we find that nothing we believe we know actually meets the definition.
Now, I'm not really disagreeing with you, because science and humanities exist on two separate plains. One in the physical world, and one in the simulated world -- neither is any more real than the other. I think it is Protestantism (especially its American manifestations) that makes people who are victims of its harsh culture so insistent on reconciling everything into a single paradigm. Catholics (and Jews) have no problem believing that God created the world in seven days while at the same time believing it was created in the Big Bang. They believe God created Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden, while at the same time accept evolution as fact. All those stories can be real and true simultaneously, but Protestants just don't get it.
As to your statement about STEM vs. humanities people, I could debate your assertions from my own personal experience all day long, but the mere fact that you chose to make it tells a lot about you and your priorities. What's your point? That STEM people are smarter? Let's suppose that they are. So what? Does that make them more valuable?
You seem to offload your personal judgement on value to the market, but you don't get off so easy. Who said that what the market finds valuable is indeed valuable? And if not, who really determines value? I think that is one question that is far more valuable than any answer you can find :)
I think there is consensus (at least among people, philosophers included, in their ordinary lives) on the value of helping more people. I can't persuade someone who has different values from me to change them, and I wouldn't try. But I think disagreements like the one I seem to have with the original post are more likely to be cases where we have similar values, but either disagree about the empirical facts, or one or other of us has made an error of reasoning.
> Finally, even the question of what constitutes knowledge is very tricky. The famous Gettier problem clearly shows that if we agree on a complete, robust definition of knowledge, we find that nothing we believe we know actually meets the definition.
Which is a flaw in philosophies that try to work with definitions. If we restrict ourselves to empirical predictions, Gettier's examples cease to be paradoxical.
> As to your statement about STEM vs. humanities people, I could debate your assertions from my own personal experience all day long, but the mere fact that you chose to make it tells a lot about you and your priorities. What's your point? That STEM people are smarter? Let's suppose that they are. So what? Does that make them more valuable?
Actually my assumption was that they're equally smart and my point was the opposite: that STEM education seems to impart some valuable abilities that those without STEM education do not have, whereas people without a humanities education seem to still have the supposed benefits of one. So my claim would be that an STEM education is more valuable than a humanities one.
> I think that is one question that is far more valuable than any answer you can find :)
Maybe we really do have different values. All I can say is that in ordinary, everyday life, I suspect you find questions (ordinary everyday questions like "where are my car keys?") to be only as valuable as their answers. And that in ordinary, everyday life, you find things valuable only insofar as they connect to ordinary, everyday life. You can construct a whole anti-inductive edifice of beliefs that stand alone, but if they're completely disconnected from anything in real life... well, I find I'm better off without them, and I expect you would too.
There may be consensus, but the source of the consensus is not some objective fact, but a mere convergence of various simulated worlds.
> If we restrict ourselves to empirical predictions, Gettier's examples cease to be paradoxical.
They're not paradoxical, they simply challenge the meaning of knowledge. But who says we want to restrict ourselves to empirical predictions? The problem in your reasoning is that everything in the real world is mediated for us by the simulated, subjective world. A click on the mouse in the "real world" might have some effect on the world of Minecraft, but the nature of that effect is determined by the rules of the simulated world -- not objective, physical reality. We should limit ourselves to empiricism when we want (subjective) to do stuff that interacts with physical reality, like build an airplane. But what if we want to laugh? Is a joke less real than an airplane?
> whereas people without a humanities education seem to still have the supposed benefits of one.
That is not true. People without humanities education have humanities knowledge comparable to grade-school math. It's more than nothing, sure, but it's far from making one knowledgeable. It is an extreme example, but there's a fascinating fringe group (mostly centered in and about Silicon Valley) called the Dark Enlightenment or neo-reactionism. They are similar in many ways to other historical groups, but different in others. In any case, they are mostly STEM people who have some historical beliefs that are completely erroneous, precisely because they believe what you just said (and that makes the movement all the more interesting).
> All I can say is that in ordinary, everyday life, I suspect you find questions (ordinary everyday questions like "where are my car keys?") to be only as valuable as their answers.
Sure, but why restrict ourselves to ordinary, everyday life? Do you think that human existence lies solely at that level?
> You can construct a whole anti-inductive edifice of beliefs that stand alone, but if they're completely disconnected from anything in real life
Here's that word again: real. Is a joke not real? What makes physical reality any more real than simulated reality? Is euclidean geometry any more real than non-euclidean geometry simply because we find the former in objective physical reality? Is, say, Call of Duty any more real than Minecraft or Super Mario simply because it imitates physical reality better? They're both simulations. Certainly some things are more physical than others, but whether that gives them any more value is completely subjective.
Is there a difference?
> They're not paradoxical, they simply challenge the meaning of knowledge.
But the challenge is to the word, not the reality. Wondering whether belief under particular circumstances is "really" knowledge is as meaningless as wondering whether a glider is really an aeroplane - or whether an amusing quote is really a joke. When you get down to empirical predictions (and empirical predictions inside the world of Minecraft are no less empirical) - Will someone predict correctly? Will this object fly? Will my friend laugh at this quote? - the confusion goes away.
> People without humanities education have humanities knowledge comparable to grade-school math. It's more than nothing, sure, but it's far from making one knowledgeable.
I deliberately didn't say anything about knowledge, because the article doesn't; the article talks about beauty, about wonder, about things that touch the innermost parts of our mind. If that's its defense of the humanities, then it's on those criteria that I will judge a humanities education - and my experience is that humanities graduates are no better at producing those things than those who are not.
> In any case, they are mostly STEM people who have some historical beliefs that are completely erroneous
What is it that they're erroneous about? Surely not the subjective parts, by definition; it's only on the objective, empirical parts of history - the parts that, in the article's classification, belong on the STEM side of "Humanities vs. STEM" - that one can even have erroneousness (and perhaps indeed knowledge).
> Sure, but why restrict ourselves to ordinary, everyday life? Do you think that human existence lies solely at that level?
I think that we think more clearly and make better decisions at that level.
> Here's that word again: real. Is a joke not real? What makes physical reality any more real than simulated reality? Is euclidean geometry any more real than non-euclidean geometry simply because we find the former in objective physical reality? Is, say, Call of Duty any more real than Minecraft or Super Mario simply because it imitates physical reality better? They're both simulations. Certainly some things are more physical than others, but whether that gives them any more value is completely subjective.
And yet, in ordinary, everyday life, no-one finds the word confusing. We know immediately which things are real and which things are not (and sure, we find that some things straddle the borderline - but that only means that language is imprecise, not that we don't understand those things), and we find that there is consensus, that realness is objective.
Of course there is. A consensus may shift, or be challenged. In some societies there was a consensus that harming many people -- of a particular race -- is a good thing. In many other societies it was widely held that some people are subhuman, and therefore may, and should, be subjugated.
> Wondering whether belief under particular circumstances is "really" knowledge is as meaningless as wondering whether a glider is really an aeroplane
Why is that meaningless? Because it has no physical consequences? Again, you assume that physical consequences are more meaningful than mental games, but it is you who gives them that meaning, and you can change the rules.
> When you get down to empirical predictions (and empirical predictions inside the world of Minecraft are no less empirical) - Will someone predict correctly? Will this object fly? Will my friend laugh at this quote? - the confusion goes away.
True, because there is only one (presumably) physical reality. But why does that matter that the confusion goes away? It is we who are confused, and we who make the predictions. You've decided that less confusion is better. But those are your rules, not some objective truth. I fully agree that when you want to build an airplane, you'd better use the scientific method if you want it to fly. But when you want to ponder the morality of something, confusion might be helpful. And it is you who decides how meaningful pondering ethics is vs. flying in an airplane, and those value preferences may change in one person, or vary from one person to another.
> and my experience is that humanities graduates are no better at producing those things than those who are not.
That's because the thing that produce wonder or beauty in your simulated world are things that reduce confusion. Many other people are not like that. I don't think we, as a society, would be better off if only one of those groups existed, or if one of them were to be much larger than the other. These are not new ideas, BTW. The struggle of humanities vs. science is part of a bigger struggle of empiricism vs. mystery that has been one of the defining features of modernity. Thomas Mann wrote a masterpiece about it: The Magic Mountain.
> What is it that they're erroneous about? Surely not the subjective parts, by definition; it's only on the objective, ...
It's more complicated than that (not in their case; they're wrong about pretty much everything, but it the general sense). Yes, you can be wrong about the objective parts, but you can also be wrong -- or, rather, primitive -- about the subjective parts. There are levels of refinement of thought in the humanities. It's like a child's drawing -- it's not wrong per se but it won't be put in the museum either (unless it's an exhibition about how children view the world). It's why some people in these parts are angry that Ayn Rand has never been considered a serious philosopher. But her thoughts were adolescent and unrefined, and so, like a child's drawing, are not worthy of serious consideration (maybe serious psychological consideration -- like a child's drawing -- but not philosophical considerations).
I can tell you one thing. It is often the people with the more primitive thinking who are less confused and less tormented, precisely because they've never learned to consider questions from various perspectives (even if they've learned to do so in math). Many scientists were very easily swayed by notions of racial inferiority, and quickly proceeded to find ample "scientific" evidence for that. They were very much certain and un-confused, yet not any less wrong. Of course, you might say that their fault was not truly engaging the true scientific method and their critical thinking -- and I agree. But things mesh together and every one of us -- including scientists -- view physical reality only as it is reflected in our simulated worlds, and sometimes the simulation can really twist things.
Would it be better if our simulated worlds were more regular and more precise? That's an unanswerable question. Better for what? And for whom? We certainly wouldn't be the same beings.
> I think that we think more clearly and make better decisions at that level.
You may be right, but so what? Who says that's better? Dostoyevsky wrote Notes from Underground about that (the protagonist is a man, a very neurotic man, who finds freedom -- or convinces himself so -- only in spite and self-harm). It is we who decide what's meaningful for us, and what we want our inner world to contain.
> And yet, in ordinary, everyday life, no-one finds the word confusing.
Sure, because we normally use that world as a synonym for physical reality. I don't find that word confusing either. But you imbue it with intrinsic, rather than functional value, and that's why it deserves closer examination. Physical reality is extremely useful -- to build an airplane, find a cure, or testify in court -- but to us as human beings a feeling of, say, betrayal, is real and meaningful whether it's objective or not.
There is an interesting duality between objective and subjective reality. What is meaningful for one can be seen as a psychological pathology to an outside observer, and it is often useful to look at things from both perspectives. As you seem to like everyday life so much, I can tell you that scientific facts have rarely motivated people to action -- or changed consensus -- as much as abstract, subjective ideas (like fascism or communism). You can view this from the outside and say that we have a physical psychology that works this way and can be manipulated or "hacked", or from the inside, and say that in each of our simulated worlds, some imagined realities play a bigger role than physical reality.
The concept of universal computation says that a machine that is able to perform just a few simple operations, can not only simulate the entire universe it is in, but any universe at all -- with any natural laws. The physical world can therefore contain something that is more general than the world itself. Of course, this is not quite so but only an approximation. As the machine needs to be actually built of earthly materials, it does not have enough degrees of freedom to describe the exact universe it resides in, but even as a bounded approximation, reduction is severely limited.
Of course, much of the "reductionst" study of the mind indeed operates at the "software" level, the algorithm level -- not the hardware level. But the thing about universal computation is that even that is not enough. A computer software can simulate another computer, and the simulated computer cannot be reduced to the workings of the "virtual machine" it runs in. The number of levels of simulation is, of course, bounded by computing resources, but I think it's quite possible that there is at least one simulation layer in the brain.
So while reduction is always necessary to understand the foundations of the next level of abstractions, it can never be a full explanation or even a full explanation mechanism. This is doubly so when computation is involved.
"Reducing" the mind to neurobiology, therefore, does not change Shakespeare being a better explanation to human behavior than neural networks. The two might well operate at two irreducible levels of abstractions, and even if one gives rise to the other, it does not form a sufficient "explanation" (whatever that means).
Dismissing the "reality" or applicability of "literary logic" (e.g. the moon is made of cheese) makes as much sense as dismissing software as less real or less fundamental than the hardware it runs on -- even if the software is simulation a world ruled by laws very different from those governing matter.