Dial-A-Ride: Boom or Bust (1975)
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My late father was a leading critic of Dial-a-Ride at the time, mustering his considerable organizational analysis skills to show just how unworkable it was even in the most perfect scenario. To wit: imagine an assortment of riders all lying roughly in a long line across the valley with a common destination. Even in that case, the transit time for the first boarder from origin to destination would be at least 10-15 TIMES direct door-to-door time, or at least 3-4 times as long as taking existing bus routes with transfers (if needed).
In a small town with a well-bounded small center of commerce and residences, sure, that could work.
Here's a postmortem analysis from Stanford: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00165244
VTA's current farebox recovery rate is below 15% and, to my knowledge, has not ever been better than that.
Looking at how municipalities subsidized dial-a-ride, are any subsidizing ride-sharing (uber, lyft) systems? Many uber/lyft rides inside of SF are cheaper than the cost of a muni trip.
Terminology "fare capture" refers to the % of rides that are paid (vs "stowaways"), not the $ of expenses that are paid by fares.
> So, the government is paying $9 subsidy for each rider.
This isn't quite right. A proper analysis needs to separate marginal cost from overhead. If the system is not running at capacity, adding more rides would decrease the subsidy per ride.
The (lack of) such commonality was key.
SCCTA/VTA's infrastructure was always politically oriented, not need-based. Note how Mineta obtained hundreds of millions of Federal funding for light rail along the Mountain View/Sunnyvale corridor (despite mass reductions of workforce in the area at the time from Lockheed and the Blue Cube)... then quit his House seat early and joined Lockheed Martin's executive ranks.
But I'm sure that was just coincidence.