Reassessing Airport Security
schneier.com
schneier.com
The fact is, nobody in this country has been willing to die to blow up an airplane since 9/11. If there had been just ten people willing to do so, then, from the statistics, nine planes would have been blown up, and, when the tenth guy was caught, he would have blown up the airport instead.
The TSA is a failure, and an infringement of civil rights besides. Everyone responsible for it, up to and including members of Congress, should, by all rights, be fired and forfeit all salary and pension benefits.
> The fact is, nobody in this country has been willing to
> die to blow up an airplane since 9/11
Or they've been caught pre-airport by the Intelligence Services.There was also the transatlantic plot in 2006. That one rejuvenated the travel-size cosmetics industry.
Consider that every single other hijacking up to that point had ended peaceably. One of the many, many, many reasons that this attack was so successful was that it was novel and unexpected.
Moreover, if the govt. was actually concerned about airline liability, they could have done for the airlines what they did for the phone companies; granted retroactive immunity for any actions taken by the airlines up to 9/11.
To enrich cronies.
Lisa: That's specious reasoning, Dad.
Homer: Thank you, dear.
Lisa: By your logic I could claim that this rock keeps tigers away.
Homer: Oh, how does it work?
Lisa: It doesn't work.
Homer: Uh-huh.
Lisa: It’s just a stupid rock.
Homer: Uh-huh.
Lisa: But I don't see any tigers around, do you?
[Homer thinks of this, then pulls out some money]
Homer: Lisa, I want to buy your rock.
If there was a threat, the TSA would probably do a pretty crap job at stopping it, every test that's been run against them shows it, not to even mention the myriad of people that accidentally bring a pistol, knife, or whatever through the checkpoint and discover it when they land!
Just fill big suitcase with explosives and wait until you are middle of the TSA screening line during holiday season.
Most of my flights are what Delta or United call "connector" flights, so there are only 40-50 people on the plane anyway. Not an attractive target, I would think. But standing in line at O'Hare, there could be 100+ people there. I'm not afraid of the TSA. I'm afraid of the massive crowd of people they create.
"The TSA is failing to defend us against the threat of terrorism. The only reason they've been able to get away with the scam for so long is that there isn't much of a threat of terrorism to defend against... Terrorists are much rarer than we think, and launching a terrorist plot is much more difficult than we think. I understand this conclusion is counterintuitive, and contrary to the fearmongering we hear every day from our political leaders. But it's what the data shows."
You're much more likely to get killed on the car ride to the airport than at the airport.
I was just debating with my wife last weekend about how people are so terrified of guns when cars are so much more dangerous and random and senseless. But it's human nature to worry about danger when someone is actually threatening you with that danger. I worry more about accidents when someone is driving dangerously in front of me. I worry more about terrorism when someone is screaming at me to take my shoes off so they can check for a bomb.
High security areas take security screening seriously.
When an intoxicated man in a blue shirt can successfully impersonate a member of your security staff and perform multiple private screenings of (attractive, female) travellers [0], it's clear that you don't take security seriously.
[0] http://www.loweringthebar.net/2014/07/drunk-gropes-two-posin...
I, for example, am scared of stranger violence. I know logically that if I were to be murdered/assaulted it would be much more likely to be someone I know who did it - but I still fear stranger violence more than what is rational.
Bruce Schneier (the author of this article) writes a lot about this:
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2008/01/the_psychol...
Busses and trains are not magically immune to explosives. Especially when they have literally zero security and you could easily bring an entire suitcase full of dynamite onto them. The fact is, there just aren't enough people interested in that who have the necessary skills to actually obtain explosives without alerting the FBI to their existence.
As it gets harder to deliberately crash a plane and there's ever more drive-by-wire, though, that threat diminishes, and the airport threat diminishes with it. Hypothetically if planes were completely ground-controlled, there would basically be no reason for airport security at all... blowing up planes isn't that intrinsically interesting, really. There'd be a certain amount of inertia to the concept, but that's it. (Yes, I know it used to be done, but post-9/11 I can't help but think that terrorists would view that as a pathetic second-best effort now.)
(Though I'd appreciate some serious security around the ground control station, though. Taking over one plane is one thing... taking over "all the planes in the area" or even "all the planes in the sky" would be something else!)
Post-9/11, the cabin door is now shut and locked during most of the flight. I can't imagine a pilot or crew-member would open that door due to a terrorist threat, knowing what we do now (and that they would probably die anyway, if they opened the door)
Indira Gandhi was murdered by two of her own bodyguards.
As I understand it, FAA regs require that there be two people in the cockpit at all times. So, the Germanwings tragedy would very likely not have happened in the US.
Additionally, a jetliner's fuselage can take a VERY large hit at cruising altitudes and speeds [0] and still leave the plane flightworthy.
Planes are tougher (and their crews better prepared) than people think they are.
[0] http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/ll_main.cfm?TabID=4&LLID=20&LL... (Be patient. This might take a while to load, but it's worth the wait.)
I don't consider it a particularly sophisticated attack, but it was undeniably effective both at injuring people and at spreading FUD.
Aircraft are an attractive target if you can cause the aircraft to crash, but most terrorist attacks on aircraft don't have that result.
> and at spreading FUD
It was? Has the behaviour of Bostonians changed significantly? Were political goals achieved?Watertown residents' cars are no longer universally decorated with "W Strong" stickers. The feds had to strain mightily at the jury pool to get jurors willing to consider the death penalty -- sentiment in Massachusetts was 2:1 in favor of having Tsarnaev rot in prison.
Insofar as the Tsarnaevs had a political goal, I don't think they achieved it.
That is the problem with terrorism.
Sure, but the places where it happens anything that could even remotely be described as fairly regularly in parts of the world where the social and economic conditions and legitimate political outlets for dissatisfaction with those conditions are all vastly different than in the part of the world that has the TSA doing screening at airports, i.e., the US.
While it has happened at times in the US (e.g., Boston Marathon), it doesn't happen enough that the expected number of times it would be expected to have happened in airport lines if such events were even distributed among similarly-sized crowds would be anywhere close to 1.
So while clearly its not full of mass murderers, there are enough to cause chaos.
My other favorite example is that in a lot of buildings, including school buildings, the standard fire drill AND bomb evacuation drill has everyone move outside, often into a single area which is far less controlled than the building being evacuated.
Their objective is a hijacked airplane; a dangerous weapon that can be used to attack strategic targets like the White House.
Do you honestly believe that Air Force hardware won't be used to destroy a hijacked passenger jet that appears to be in service as a weapon? I don't.
How many jets patrol the US mainland now? What is their response time?
I am assuming the white house has AA, but what about congress?
I can't speak authoritatively, but jet response time to a breach of a sensitive no-fly zone is in the single-digit minute range. [0] I would be shocked if every major government facility wasn't surrounded by a no-fly bubble. I would be surprised if we didn't have the capability to send fighters to anywhere in the CONUS within ten minutes.
[0] Quite some time ago, I was living near Tacoma, WA when the POTUS was visiting. There was concern that an aircraft was going to enter the temporary no-fly zone around the POTUS, so a couple of jets from the nearby base were scrambled and cleared to go supersonic -maybe- 1,000 feet off the deck. The din and air pressure change was incredible; it was if a tremendously large bomb had gone off some distance away.
At $80-100 a throw, I'm not sure it's a very good money-making scheme. For starters, when someone enrols in the precheck program, they must undergo both a background check and an in-person interview... how much of the $80 fee do you suppose that leaves?
And even once approved, you're still subject to metal-detector scans upon boarding, you just get to skip the whole shoes-belt-laptop game. Oh and they can still "randomly" subject you to those checks if they want to. So I don't really agree that it's some crude "anyone can just pay and receive carte blanche access at the airport" scheme.
Here's another good one: for nationals of APEC member countries, there's the APEC Travel Card[2]. Frequent travellers can pay for one of these cards, and they gain access to dedicated expedited immigration queues (or, in the absence of a dedicated APEC queue at your airport, you get to use the pilot/aircrew lane). The card costs $150 and is good for 3 years.
For business travellers making multiple flights per week, access to programs like these is a godsend (I used to fly internationally at least once per week for work).
I do agree with you that all the "security theatre" stuff is a transparent sham, but the existence of programs like precheck isn't proof of that.
[1] http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2012/02/29/tsa-pre-check-T...
So I haven't gone through it but several people I know have and all of them report that they fill out forms, show identification and that's it. The "interview" is always a very short questionnaire and background checks are incredibly cheap to do nowadays.
> And even once approved, you're still subject to metal-detector scans upon boarding, you just get to skip the whole shoes-belt-laptop game. Oh and they can still "randomly" subject you to those checks if they want to.
The metal-detector scan is incredibly fast, no one is ever in that line and you don't have to remove your laptops, shoes and other related equipment. You just go through and you're done 99% of the time.
> So I don't really agree that it's some crude "anyone can just pay and receive carte blanche access at the airport" scheme.
I don't agree with that either hence why I never said it so I'm not sure why you bring it up.
"According to this TSA report [0], $14.50 of that [$85] fee pays for the FBI to run a criminal-records check, and the other $70.50 (83%) goes to the TSA for administration." (Via [1])
[0] http://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/pdf/stak...
[1] http://www.loweringthebar.net/2014/03/tsa-confuses-perfume-b...
> It's just a money making scheme
For whom? Where's the money going?2) The background check they do probably makes it more secure than a normal screening. What the chances that a cornfed, midwestern woman who likes baseball, cherrypie, and is crazy 'bout Elvis tries to hijack a flight?
In fact that sort of scrutiny is how Israel does their airport security. The reason America doesn't is because giving the fifth degree to [muslims/political radicals/other ethnic groups] is illegal and unpopular.
A terrorist wouldn't apply to precheck.
I strongly disagreement with your statement. See: http://www.loweringthebar.net/2015/03/notorious-felon-and-te...
Why wouldn't they? A large majority of terrorists end up having no prior record. It's not like a background check goes and talks to family or friends, checks references, etc (a SSBI will but a regular background check does not). A regular background check is almost entirely useless.
I learned that from one of the TSA line prep barkers. They were putting such a jolly spin on their spiel and it sounded so ridiculous that I assumed it was a joke. But, both happily and sadly, nope.
They're growing in popularity.
I did once accidentally leave a large, full bottle of contact lens solution in my carry on, though, and it passed right through. Maybe that's the trick.
You could probably claim contact lens solution as a "medically necessary liquid," which is exempt from the rules anyway.
That's not a loophole that could be exploited. /s
On a side note, could one seek to get water treated as a medically necessary liquid? It is, and the rules say nothing about being limited to only counting medically necessary liquids that cannot otherwise be obtained on the other side of security.
Far less. I, too, never remove this stuff and I've never been asked to.
The detection rate on a flask with vodka in it is slightly higher, which makes me concerned as to what other things you could bring with you as long as it's in an xray-opaque container.
When I do this, they often will spray a bit of the solution and test it for something or other.
Half the time, the TSA misses my solution bottle. The other half, they find it, have me open it, wave it under a chemical detector, and then send me on my way.
I travel with an empty water bottle every time.
Now, that's not to say the TSA isn't incompetent and shouldn't improve its procedures and policies, but rather the 95% is an exaggerated value.
One other observation to make. When driving down the highway over the speed limit and a patrol car becomes visible, it's quite clear the car would not catch every infringer, yet, nearly everyone slows to comply with speed limits. In other words, as Bruce says, you don't need 100% effectiveness for the system to be effective.
I'm going to go re-watch the video to see if I missed something though. I'll edit this if I learn something new.
Edit: I looked for some more detailed articles and I found this quote, however it is coming from the TSA not the testing agency.
> The goal of the Red Team is to build tests that push the boundaries of our people, processes, and technology. We know that the adversary innovates and we have to push ourselves to capacity in order to remain one step ahead. With that said, our testers often make these covert tests as difficult as possible. It’s not like they’re using a cartoonish bundle of dynamite with an alarm clock strapped to it. These items are extremely hard to spot.
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/06/tsa-fails-secur...
Edit 2: I'm an idiot the TSA was the screening agency, or at least these tests are frequently referred to as internal tests. I didn't know the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General (IG) was a part of the TSA.
They did use that excuse in the past. Lame after-the-failure excuse making.
However, if I were a nefarious evildoer, I may be willing to take a higher risk of getting caught in order to do whatever it is I want to do.
1. It's trivially easy to distinguish vehicles travelling over the speed limit than hijackers. One might even suggest that speeding enforcemnt is significantly enabled by the ease, and low false-positive rate, of detection: speed radar.
The two situations aren't comparable.
The trade-off is: they do a background check and take some biometrics, and in exchange you can skip the conversation with an immigration agent where they ask you where you're been, etc. - you just answer the usual customs-form questions at a kiosk.
It's actually a pretty reasonable trade-off, and speeds the process of going through Customs - which, unlike some of the TSA stuff, is in no way unique to the US (having gone through immigration/customs in 20+ countries, I can say with some experience that the US is far from the worst...)