In Greek Debt Puzzle, the Game Theorists Have It
nytimes.com
nytimes.com
That, I think is a key part of the problem. In the US context it's known as too big to fail and applies to banks. In Europe it's unnamed.
The reality of every loan and every indebted entity is that default is a possibility. For a state to essentially become insolvent is no less likely than an individual or company. For some countries it is virtually inevitable on a 10-20 year scale. Before the euro, Greece dealt with this like all other countries, by printing money. They use the cash to pay debts and the resulting inflation actually helps manage national finances, that tend towards inefficiency and overpayment to vendors, employees, etc. If loans are denominated in foreign currency, debtors do not participate in the "haircut" and the danger of inflation notches up a bit.
No one thinks this is an ideal system. It's certainly not better than not becoming insolvent, but it usually works.
The Eurozone took this away without providing a working alternative. They solved liquidity issues using bailouts, emergency loans and nationalisation of debts and bad assets, but liquidity<>insolvency.
For ideological reasons, the Greek government isn't willing to do that. Membership of the Euro is a lens that reveals exactly how many clothes the Emperor is or isn't wearing.
In other words: I see no problem.
Pension payments and debt repayments are both part of the general "national deficit." Printing money directly plugs the hole. Printing money causes inflation, so it also also makes the hole smaller.
A Keynsian might say that salaries (and other prices) are "sticky" and can't be adjusted down like the price of petrol. Prices need to go down in a business cycle low point (which often happens simultaneously to debt repayment problems). So the inflation is a good thing in addition to the more commonly quoted Keynsian suggestion that government spending shouldn't be cut (austerity).
A classical liberal perspective would just see this whole manoeuvre as default or a tax equivalents. Paying back debts with debased currency is a default and printing drachmas is a tax on whoever holds drachmas.
Both agree that if you do this too much the currency becomes unreliable and contracts start to be denominated in a foreign currency or inflation adjusted. This makes the inflation problem worse because nominal prices and debt repayments go up when inflation happen. You need to print more to get the same effect, causing more inflation...
With regard to pension payments, I am a little more cynical. I think the Greek Government was happier to write the contract than make good on it. The pensions were promised many governments ago, and the political gains have already been had. Paying them was left to future generations. Taken together, all these promises add up to more money than they have. The current debts are a manifestation of this "pass it forward" politics. To be both ideological and realistic, they could have set aside money as the liability accrued rather than promising that future generations would pay it without worrying about how.
I don't like these "Emperors Clothes" slogans. They are too easy for politicians to sound like they are making a point without (necessarily) having any content. We should hold leaders to a higher standard, not accept rhetoric that skips over important questions with slogans. An ideological position is good, but it also needs a plan for how to make it happen.
Also, I think if the Greek government could print money, devalue the pensions and get out of this mess they would. They did it when they could.
For a different (and very valid) perspective, see the vide linked by wsc981. For a very simplified synopsis: Germany loaned Greece money so they could buy german goods. Greece consumed the goods. Germany accumulated the wealth as debts owed to them by Greece. EU policies were encouraging this dynamic.
My personal feeling is that this is not a victim/culprit situation. Greece's political imperative was consumption , they wanted loans for this. Germany's was exports (and subsequent economic benefits like jobs, accumulating bank wealth..)
worth watching.
Governments everywhere tend not to do this, so it becomes impossible to sort out a rational picture of the economy when economics is inevitably highly politicised.
>Also, I think if the Greek government could print money, devalue the pensions and get out of this mess they would.
This will happen if Greece leaves the Euro. I don't doubt plans are in place.
But the underlying problem is that Germany and the IMF are simply loan sharking. And you can't loan shark in the Eurozone, because if you call in a debt too aggressively the whole project falls apart, with potential to seriously damage the Euro area economy, and possibly unwind the entire world economy too.
The only justifications for austerity are political - specifically to put the Greek government and the people who voted for it in their place, and to show them how little political power they have.
Austerity is not an economic solution. There is no possible way imposing austerity can make debt repayment more likely. Even the IMF has accepted this.
Austerity is simply a punishment for taking a loan from someone who's now trying to do the state-player equivalent of breaking a debtor's limbs because they're trying to pay late. "Reform" is econo-Kremlin code for "We don't like it when public money is spent for the benefit of the public."
So this is purely about face now, not facts or futures.
The real question from a game theory point of view is how much damage a Grexit would do. Some people in the game realise that it has the potential to spread and become a major market meltdown.
Tsipras and Varoufakis are certainly aware of this, and are playing accordingly.
It's not obvious how well the other negotiators understand this.
I think you are overstating the point about justifications for austerity.
The Greek government's finances were such that they consistently spent more than they took in, that is ho the debt accrued. Austerity/reform got it to the point where it spends what it takes in, without enough left to pay back loans. I doubt that it would have been politically realistic for Greek to do this without EU forcing them (and taking the blame).
This is a terrible thing even if it had ended here. Improving efficiency in this environment is nearly impossible, unless "inefficiency" means big chunks of fraud and theft. So, reform means reducing services, and creating unemployment. Say you have 10 firemen. You can fire 5, halving the firefighting you can do. 5 become unemployed, but unemployment costs are less than fireman salaries so you save the difference.
There is a political catch 22. These reforms are not too bad if done during economic good times, but they are politically impossible without some sort of unbearable pressure like insolvency (IE, can't pay salaries this month).
Individuals can and do this all the time too - that's what moving into the bigger apartment when you get a raise at work is all about.
If you believe this I think youre going to be in for a big surprise when the baby boomers retire en masse. Chicago is probably going to go bankrupt in the next year or so because of overpromised pensions. Other cities are going to have issues.
In 'Boomerang' a statistic is given that the public trains are so expensive that it would be cheaper to pay to have everyone that uses them go by taxi.
So I don't think Greece is exactly an innocent being bullied by 'econo-Kremlin' tactics whatever that means.
I agree, but tendency is not inevitability. Some countries (eg Australia and to an extent the US) have decent systems where instead of promise-pensions you have an actual bank account, with some amount of personal control. This specific is solvable, though moving from one system to another is very hard.
Your solution appears to ask them to do exactly that but structured slightly differently? Reducing pensions and public sector pay can be done by changing the payouts denominated in euros just as easily. I doubt the electorate would fail to notice, and make their views known.
In this video [0], Friedman explains that keeping all countries in the Euro is very important for the German economy (export + welfare state). And it seems the Greece government uses this knowledge in their negotiations with the EU.
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I had just commented with my own bias/perspective on what the central problem is (I have some background in economics, hence a relatively mature opinion set) and this is another undeniably key piece of the problem, this time from a political economy rather than an institutional perspective.
I will definitely follow this guy. Very convincing. thanks
[1] https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wirtschaft_Deutschlands (for the lack of a better source)
*edit, does this include interest payments?
Greece's default is as important for the EU as Detroit's default was for the USA. The rest is media burlesque.
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21565657-greek-tax-dodg...
Over the last few years, while Greece sinks slowly due to financial situation, IMF and Germany won't back on austerity measures demands. Even if, in reality, those measures are making the country sink even deeper due to very low income and chopping away peoples' pensions.
As I live in Greece, I can say for sure that the situation is getting worse and worse over time. While Greece took huge loans over the last few years, almost everything went to fuel German and French banks so they won't collapse. Very little -if anything- was used to help the situation. But not even those same countries acknowledge that fact. They demand "their" money that used to fuel their banks. Smart thing (not).
Of course I could be a troll and mention that after WWII Germany received a lot of help to be able to reconstruct the country, even if they slaughtered millions across Europe. But that's politics. ;)
Personaly, I'm tired of all that bs. Europe is _not_ a union and this situation is getting out of hand. Supposedly "friendly" countries demanding everything from another member of the "union" is not what Europe was -supposedly- all about.
At least with a new government that is able to say the word 'no' for a change, almost anyone can see the true face of European "union".
Well, I'm German, and I think that this is an extremely pertinent point. The German economic recovery after WW2 should have been a blueprint for how to deal with the Greek situation. Germany received both cash infusions (the Marshall plan) and benefited from the deferral of debt (the London Agreement on German External Debts) that required Germany to only repay debts when a trade surplus allowed for it. It was a strategy that allowed both economic growth and debt service. Instead, Greece was strangled by an austerity regimen that impeded economic growth and as a consequence also made it impossible for Greece to fix its debt issues.
Yes, the Greek government was cooking the books when it joined the Euro, but as you correctly point out, that doesn't even come close to starting a couple of world wars. Policy-making should focus on fixing economic problems (that 99% of the population aren't responsible for), not exercises in finger-pointing.
There unbalanced budget is 100% Greece's fault and has absolutely nothing to do with the EU. Long term the government has three options, collect more taxes, pay fewer benefits, fail. It's obvious which one Greece wants.
PS: Actually paying down their debt is another issue and would require Greece to maintain a surplus. Though, if they had that surplus they could just default and probably be better off.
Or is it Germany's fault, because Europe wrote off most of their debt in the 1953's (despite being LITERALLY Nazis...), yet they want to savage a populace for illegitimate odious debt, as well as "payments to Greece" which actually went to French and German banks? (http://www.euronews.com/2015/04/17/chomsky-says-us-is-world-...)
There problem is they need to borrow more money tomorrow, because their budget is not balanced even if you ignore the debt. And if they default the money truck keeping their country afloat stops showing up.
Greece hasn't had a balanced budget in decades, and creditors don't believe that 2015 will be any different. If they can manage to actually not run a deficit in 2015, that would be a great boon for them.
I would guess the Euro would take a small hit, but bear (speculation) wouldn't have much too feed upon.
This due to the fact that (1) Greece is a small part in the Eurozone and (2) the other countries that were having problems (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland) seem to have things stabilized.
But perhaps a fear of bipolar contagion - will other weaker economies leave (and the Euro become increasing like the Deutschemark - high, stable, low interest rates) or will Germany leave (and the Euro become a currency associated with volatility).
The illustration of the three-sided chessboard was fascinating.
To win, you need to destroy one player with the aid of a second and remain strong than your ally. Committing pieces to offence would leave you vulnerable, but successful attack could earn you queens.
[0]http://www.wsj.com/articles/greece-misses-target-on-budget-s...
You borrow at one and buy at ten
You use the spread to bury the dead
You bank it at four and Repo more
Then go knock on the ECB's door
If you want a detailed explanation of how that trick worked - the moral hazard trade that European banks took advantage of when the Euro centralized money bu not monetary policy - and how a lot of people are trying to blame sweep that under the rug and get other people ("the poor", mainly) to pay for it by blaming Greece and insisting on dangerous austerity programs, highly recommend Mark Blyth's[1] recent lecture[2].[1] Prof. econ, Brown University and hilarious lecturer
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B6vV8_uQmxs#t=673 (note: #t=673 to skip the unnecessary introduction)