The Disruption Machine: What the gospel of innovation gets wrong (2014)
newyorker.com
newyorker.com
Silicon Valley (the show) pretty much nailed this on a regular basis when shoddy-investor-guy warns against making money because you'll be worth less money because people know how much money you can make.
It's totally reasonable to eat a market while it exists, and then find a new market later -- or even decide that the shrinking market is actually ok, and you're content with your share of that market.
Unless you're the VC -- because you have a VERY high risk fund (almost by definition) and you'd like only 10-30% success but with 100x profits on those 30%.
This leads lots of tech companies to flame out, overstress, and build things people don't need, because the sane, logical ideas are the ones that are harder to find investment for (if they can't bootstrap them).
It's a weird space.
I'm all for experimentation, but it has been surreal to see the discount for solving an actual problem despite a massive market opportunity, little competition, and clear customer need + willingness to pay.
That being said, most wouldn't flame out if not for the crazy pressure of using it for explosive growth. There needs to be more "medium size / medium growth business investment" type VCs. I've never met any, but they might exist. $10M doesn't make you flame out, but how fast the VCs want you to spend it can, they only give you money for a year or two so they can get a larger percentage stake later, and that you are moving for an exit versus profitability.
It all seems to come down to the chase of the growth curve. Anything thats not growing by x% per quarter is considered sick and on its death bed. Never mind that it may maintain its current place in the market for years and years, "investors" don't want to touch it.
Clayton should try out AirBnB. An interesting article, though I found his use of the third person confusing/odd.
But I still love Christensen's books for the way they provide a framework for discussing business strategy.
Clayton Christensens theory provides a perspective, a lense to understand large parts of how the business world works. Of course there are all sorts of exceptions but that doesn't disprove the overall theory it just shows there are other ways to look at it too.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8153457
Are we not talking about this because it's not relevant, or because everyone here is so invested in this disruption movement?
TL;DR: Read Nassim Nicolas Taleb, he has a lot to say on the likelihood and impact of highly improbably events (Black Swans)... like the successful of highly innovative products. Everything I say next is a rambling couching of the ideas of this article into his framework with the hope that someone else will engage with it.
Personally, I think the key point is here:
"Companies that were quick to release a new product but not skilled at tinkering have tended to flame out."
Which reminds me of the NNT's barbell approach to mitigating Black Swan's. Invest the majority of your energy conservatively in safe, non-risky ventures and then spread the rest of your energy across high-risk ventures (tinkering) with extremely high (or unlimited) potential upsides.
New technology has allowed the creation of many more Black Swans for businesses through innovation and they can be positive or negative depending on whether you are the disrupting company or the one being disrupted by this new innovation Black Swan.
Established companies that don't tinker, don't expose themselves to positive innovation Black Swans... while startups that ignore all established wisdom gambling on a single Black Swan innovation expose themselves to the reality that 9/10 innovations don't actually result in Black Swan level disruption.
For those that don't know what I'm talking about, I definitely recommend Nassim Nicolas Taleb's The Black Swan and Antifragile:
http://www.amazon.com/The-Black-Swan-Improbable-Fragility-eb...
http://www.amazon.com/Antifragile-Things-That-Disorder-Incer...
</rambling>