Anatomy of Error: A surgeon remembers his mistakes
newyorker.com
newyorker.com
I met my surgeon on a gurney just before a shoulder operation, and joked with him that we had considered writing "not this one" on the good shoulder. He smiled, and then handed my then-wife a pen, saying "Write that. Things like that happen all the time." And I felt that much more confident in him, because I think people who know they can do something stupid are so much less likely to actually do them.
Many in the medical fraternity bury their mistakes, not admit to them.
It's better for the individual who makes the mistake, for all that it's worse for everyone else.
One of the first steps the day of was the surgeon coming in, talking to me, and initialing the shoulder he was to operate on.
Every new person I met along the way asked me what shoulder it was, and then wanted to see the initials before continuing.
I barely have the emotional maturity to handle a breakup -- never mind a mistake that cost someone their life or even a finger. Certain structural engineers or medical device engineers might face such decisions but the vast majority of devs and tech people don't.
I dread to think how many people's relationships have been destroyed because the developers of Facebook, Whatsapp, Telegram et al decided to implement read notifications/"last seen" on their instant messaging apps.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23233573
Suicide is complex and I don't want to ascribe a simplistic reason to suicide, but at least one post office manager died by suicide after a wrongful accusation.
A bungled software update left many people in the UK without access to their money for weeks. At least one person was imprisoned for that - they had to pay a fine by a certain date; they tried to pay but couldn't; even though this was totally outside their control the system wasn't flexible enough to cope.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21280943
British Gas allows some people to make weekly payments as part of a payment plan scheme. But you have to pay exactly that amount on exactly the agreed day or their software does not recognise the payment as part of the plan. EG you agree to pay £10 every Friday. On Wednesday you start by paying £20, then on Wednesday you pay £12, and you continue to pay £9 or £12 every Wednesday. You're always actually paid more than your plan agreement; and your actual balance is in credit; but you'll be getting aggressive "red" letters from British Gas telling you that you have not kept up to date with your plan and that your account is in arrears. British Gas, and I say this as politely as I can, are fucking scum.
The very idea of prison time for RBS re-cycling the Enron ideas of debt vehicles is laughable.
Enron people went to jail and the banks (like RBS) then had regulators permit exactly the same debt-swap bullshit that killed Enron. Banks went on to trade in debt - an eventual cause of the financial meltdown. RBS was a major culpable party but their chairman, Fred Goodwin, managed to get away with returning the knighthood and a fraction of his pension, while protected by a super-injunction making it illegal to reveal to the public he was a banker[1]. He continues to enjoy 'Royal Family' level police protection, has his properties removed from Street View [2] and is granted a level of establishment protection no-one else could dream of if they had been responsible for any catastrophe of even a fractional proportion.
[1] http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/mar/10/fred-goodwin... [2] http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/20/fred-goodw...
Took me a few moments to realise it was our very own "Fred the Shred" out for a quick spin....
[95% certain it was him]
I've written code that computes performance bonuses for thousands of employees, and I'm confident that it's about 85% accurate. Took me a while to come to peace with that, since the workers my code is evaluating have a high ratio of bonus to base pay. But eh, I can only do my best.
If there is an adverse event, or interaction reveals that one is possible, you'll do corrective-action/preventative-action analysis and depending on the severity you may need to inform you entire user base.
At first this sort of thing can feel process heavy and unwieldy, but I quickly came to appreciate the way in improved the actual engineering and made you think about system design in particular, useful ways.
It did make me feel more comfortable about he process.
This New Yorker article talks a bit about the early days of aviation checklists, and some attempts to apply them in medicine, including a hospital which tried checklists as a method of avoiding common causes of line infections with IVs. The result:
These steps are no-brainers; they have been known and taught for years. So it seemed silly to make a checklist just for them. Still, Pronovost asked the nurses in his I.C.U. to observe the doctors for a month as they put lines into patients, and record how often they completed each step. In more than a third of patients, they skipped at least one.
The next month, he and his team persuaded the hospital administration to authorize nurses to stop doctors if they saw them skipping a step on the checklist; nurses were also to ask them each day whether any lines ought to be removed, so as not to leave them in longer than necessary. This was revolutionary. Nurses have always had their ways of nudging a doctor into doing the right thing, ranging from the gentle reminder (“Um, did you forget to put on your mask, doctor?”) to more forceful methods (I’ve had a nurse bodycheck me when she thought I hadn’t put enough drapes on a patient). But many nurses aren’t sure whether this is their place, or whether a given step is worth a confrontation. (Does it really matter whether a patient’s legs are draped for a line going into the chest?) The new rule made it clear: if doctors didn’t follow every step on the checklist, the nurses would have backup from the administration to intervene.
Pronovost and his colleagues monitored what happened for a year afterward. The results were so dramatic that they weren’t sure whether to believe them: the ten-day line-infection rate went from eleven per cent to zero. So they followed patients for fifteen more months. Only two line infections occurred during the entire period. They calculated that, in this one hospital, the checklist had prevented forty-three infections and eight deaths, and saved two million dollars in costs.
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/12/10/the-checklist?p...
The look on his face after the procedure was one of shock. He gave me a free root canal and crown for the original bad tooth.